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PHD IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
‘WE ARE ALL ORIGNARIOS’: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND IDENTITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY BOLIVIA 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in rural and urban areas of Bolivia, this 
thesis examines a local political conflict arising out of different understandings of 
identity and the ongoing processes of change taking place in the country. Within the 
Quechua-speaking highland indigenous community of Bolívar province in the 
Cochabamba department of Bolivia there exist multiple overlapping forms of local 
political authority, including the municipal government, peasant union and the 
traditional authorities who claim to predate the Spanish conquest. Ironically, the 
national project of the governing ‘Movement Towards Socialism’ (MAS) party of 
refounding the Bolivian state to include the country’s ‘indigenous majority’ has 
coincided with an intensification of conflict between them. While examining the 
substantive content of their disagreements, this thesis also explores how legal and 
institutional changes which purport to advance the decolonisation of Bolivian society 
have served to further conflict among local leaders. In part, ideological differences are 
articulated through contested notions of what it means to be originario: a term roughly 
equivalent in contemporary Bolivia to indigenous, but which in the context of local 
discussions relates to what it means to be a member of their community. I suggest that a 
way of understanding this conflict is as an ‘ethical discourse’: a process in which 
different groups or persons contest and seek to define key elements of their shared 
culture, identity and morality. 
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ancestros apoderados (S)  ancestors who purchased the ayllu 
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canton (S)      territorial division of colonial origin 
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  couple 
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charango (S)      traditional Andean lute instrument 
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chicote (S)      rope whip 
coca (S&Q)      leaf with mild stimulant properties 
cocaleros (S)      coca producers/movement 
comunidad (S)     hamlet, lowest level of the ayllu 
contribución territorial (S)    obsolete land tax of colonial origin 
cholo/chola (S)    ‘semi-indigenous’ rural-urban 
   migrant 
ch’ullu (Q)      traditional wool hat 
ch’uño (Q)      freeze-dried potatoes 
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compadrazgo (S)     fictive kinship of godparents  
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community 
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hacienda (S)      landed estate of colonial origin 
hermano (S)      literally ‘brother’: ‘comrade’ or 
       Evangelical Christian 
jap’iy (Q)      ayllu division  
jilanku (Q)      traditional authority at village level 
jula-jula (S)      traditional group dance in fiestas 
katarismo (S) highland indigenous political 
movement  
kuraj tata (Q)     ayllu leader at level of jap’iy 
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mink’a (Q)      form of labour exchange  
misa mast’ay (Q)    ritual to venerate ayllu documents 
   and ancestors 
muyu (Q)      rotation of authorities and ayonoqas
  
originario (S)    category of ayllu membership, 
   original inhabitant and term for 
   highland indigenous people 
organización matriz (S)    parent organisation 
padrino (S)      godfather 
personería jurídica (S)    juridical/legal personhood 
pollera (S)      pleated skirt worn by chola women 
poncho (S)      woollen poncho worn by kuraj tatas 
ponguaje (S)      quasi-serfdom prior to 1952 
patrón (S)      landlord 
phututu (Q)      cow horn used to summon meetings 
pirañu (Q)      ayllu division and authority 
pokuy (Q) flourishing (name of ayllu’s 
‘political instrument’) 
qañawa (Q)      Andean crop related to Quinoa 
q’ara runas (Q)     white outsiders, the landlord class 
runa (Q)      person 
runa tinku (Q)     ritualised battle 
soqta achachilas (Q)     ancestors who purchased the ayllu  
sombrero (S)      traditional sheep hide hat 
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sub-central (S)     sub-division of the peasant union  
saneamiento (S)     process of titling land 
secretario (S)      secretary within union organisation 
sede sindical (S)     site of local communal assemblies 
sindicato campesino (S)    peasant union 
suyu (Q)      pre-colonial territorial division 
sub-central (S)     lower division of peasant union  
tata santísimo (Q)     sacred staff of power 
tata santiago (Q)     the Spanish saint Santiago 
técnico (Q)      professional or technical adviser 
toro tinku (Q)     ritual bullfight 
tantachawi (Q)     meeting 
tawnitinsuyu (Q)     the Inca empire 
thaki (Q)      path taken through cargos 
usos y costumbres (S)    internal norms and customs 
urinsaya (Q)      ayllu division 
uma ruthuku (Q)     child’s first haircut 
vilacaymense (S)     member of Vilaycayma 
wathiya (Q)      earth-baked food (often potatoes) 
wiphala (Q)      highland indigenous flag 
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Chapter 1. Local Political Conflict in the New Bolivia 
 Introduction 
In July 2015 my wife and I were traveling along the dirt road that led from the small 
town of Bolívar, nestled in a valley among the hills of the dry Bolivian altiplano, to 
attend a meeting in the rural hamlet of Vilaycayma. We had stayed the night before in 
the home of Gregorio Jacinto, the Kuraj Mallku of Ayllu Kirkiawi: the name given to the 
traditional governmental structure still observed among the majority of village 
communities in the remote area of Bolívar province. The six of us, my wife and I, 
Gregorio, his wife Dominga, their six-year-old daughter Alina and their two-year-old 
daughter Heidi, were hitching a lift with a truck driver who was taking the road through 
the town of Bolívar to the nearby mining city of Oruro. In the morning, Dominga had 
made a fire to boil water in the courtyard of their adobe brick house so the whole family 
could bathe and ready themselves for the meeting. With great ceremony, Gregorio 
polished his shoes and put on a smart shirt and trousers and his wool poncho and later 
his ch’ullu, the traditional hat worn in the altiplano woven from llama wool and over 
this a wide-brimmed hat or sombrero made from sheep hide. Lastly, he put on his llama 
wool chalina or scarf and, delicately balanced between the crook of his elbow and his 
arm in the manner of a royal scepter, a three-foot-long wooden staff topped with a silver 
pommel. This was his baston de mando (or tata santísimo as it was normally referred to 
in Bolívar), the symbol of his authority as leader of the ayllu, which is also carried by 
the Kuraj Tatas, the authorities beneath him in the traditional hierarchy. Dominga had 
changed from the pleated pollera skirt she normally wore in the town of Bolívar to a 
more traditional black almilla dress and a beautifully patterned lliklla or wool shawl she 
had woven herself. She dressed her daughter Alina in identical fashion, like a version of 
herself in miniature. 
The truck made its way along the track that wrapped itself around the hills, kicking up 
clouds of dry earth to the extent that we had to close the windows to stop ourselves from 
choking. The landscape of Bolívar province is austere and dramatic and the climate is 
arid between June and September when relative humidity goes down to single figures, 
resulting in permanently chapped lips, cracked skin and night time temperatures below 
zero. The view that passed before us through the window was a mosaic of red and 
yellow earth, green pastures and farming terraces cut into the sides of hills. The truck 
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turned a final bend and left us at the side of the road by the graveyard of Vilaycayma. 
The village of Vilaycayma, or comunidad as the permanently settled hamlets in Bolívar 
province are referred to, is spread out along a small valley by the side of the road to 
Oruro. Not long ago it was the largest permanently settled community in the whole of 
Bolívar province, but waves of migration, mainly to the cities of Oruro and 
Cochabamba have left it largely abandoned; the walls and straw roofs of many of the 
adobe houses are collapsed from neglect, leaving a strange and melancholy landscape of 
broken down homes and hidden among them the lonely figures of the remaining, mainly 
elderly, inhabitants. While the elderly and middle-aged permanent residents were 
friendly people who were willing to share their time and food when we came to visit, 
many people we came to know from Vilaycayma were examples of the phenomenon 
known as ‘double residence’. That is, while living permanently in the city, they 
regularly returned for short periods to the countryside during times of sowing and 
harvesting crops and to participate in the cultural and political life of their community. 
So, while the site of Vilaycayma was largely abandoned, it continued to exist as a much 
larger community of double residents and migrants in the cities of Oruro and 
Cochabamba.  
As we took the path through the graveyard and over the small bridge to the main square 
of the village we were greeted by Maximo Condori, the jilanku or traditional authority 
of Vilaycayma. Alongside Maximo stood some of Gregorio’s Kuraj Tatas, the Mayor of 
Bolívar province, the leader of the provincial peasant union or dirigente sindical and 
two government representatives from the constitutional court in the city of Sucre, who 
were here to organise the meeting. A number of local Vilaycaymenses were sat around 
the main square chewing coca leaves and warming themselves in the midday sun. We 
shook hands with Maximo and the other local dignitaries and sat down to chew coca on 
one of the stone benches of the square. Today’s meeting or tantachawi was being 
organised as part of a consultation process of the Tribunal Agroambiental or Agro-
environmental Tribunal to institute a new branch of law pertaining to agricultural and 
environmental matters. As Bolívar province is a highland indigenous community, 
Gregorio and other local authorities had been participating in meetings of the 
constitutional court in Sucre that I too had attended. This consultation process was 
supposed to reflect the sensitivity of the government towards indigenous peoples and 
their ways of life in a nation popularly referred to as ‘the most indigenous country in 
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South America’, mainly as a result of a 2001 census in which approximately 60% of the 
population identified as such. Moreover, in 2005, Evo Morales, often referred to in the 
international press as Bolivia’s first ‘indigenous president’, assumed the presidency and 
the Movement towards Socialism or MAS party established itself in government, 
officially recognising the need to change the constitution to reflect the needs of the 
‘indigenous majority’. This had finally displaced the traditional political oligarchy and 
brought an end to twenty years of neoliberal governments. Under its new constitution 
Bolivia is now a ‘plurinational state’ that values the cultural rights and autonomy of its 
different ethnic groups alongside forms of legal pluralism, while the government 
remains committed to the ‘decolonisation’ of the nation and a project of reform which is 
popularly referred to as ‘the process of change’ (‘el proceso de cambio’). 
Maximo sounded a phututu, a cow horn used in the Andes to signal the start of a 
meeting, to alert any other locals who weren’t present and shortly after we began to file 
in from the main square to the hall of the sede sindical, the seat of meetings of the local 
communal assembly of the village. Gregorio unrolled a patterned, traditionally woven 
lliklla blanket on the floor in front of the table which faced the room and another over 
the table itself. Each of the Kuraj Tatas present was dressed in an almost identical 
fashion to Gregorio, with their ponchos, ch’ullus, scarves and wide-brimmed sombreros. 
In addition, each carried their own tata santísimo and a chicote, a rope whip used to 
castigate those who infringe the customary norms or usos y costumbres of the 
community and carried as a symbol of the judicial power of the traditional authorities. 
Each of the authorities placed his tata santísimo atop the lliklla and they were bound 
together with a woven thread to form a single structure. Beneath the tata santísimo were 
placed a mound of coca leaves and two bottles of pure alcohol. Gregorio took one of the 
bottles of alcohol and sprinkled a few tiny drops over the tata santísimo as libation to 
honour the authority and dignity of the cargo or post it embodied, before drinking some 
himself and presenting both bottles to the other traditional authorities, who each partook 
in turn. More coca leaves were piled on the lliklla on the table, behind which were 
seated the traditional authorities or autoridades originarios and the Mayor of Bolívar. 
Nevertheless, the traditional authorities were not the only figures present at the meeting. 
Apart from the local councillors, technical staff and the mayor were the representatives 
of the sindicato campesino or peasant union, most notably the dirigente or leader of the 
province, Olker Nina. Unlike the ayllu authorities, whose existence precedes the 
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colonisation of the Americas, the peasant union dates back only to the reforms of the 
1952 national revolution. While some areas of rural Bolivia are controlled by 
autoridades originarias with little presence of the sindicato, others (most notably the 
valley regions of Cochabamba) are entirely represented by peasant unions. Meanwhile, 
Bolívar Province is a curious example of political hybridity, where the peasant union 
and the traditional ayllu authorities exist side by side, alongside the municipal 
government. Moreover, the sindicato also has a parallel organisation of Bartolina Sisas1 
who are composed entirely of women and represent female interests. Beside Olker Nina 
were lower level peasant union leaders or dirigentes of sub-centrales as well as three 
local councillors: two were representatives of the MAS party while one, Augustina 
Condori, a young woman in her early twenties, was the sole representative of POKUY, a 
word in Quechua meaning to grow or flourish and chosen as the name of the traditional 
authorities’ ‘political instrument’, designed to represent the ayllu within the local 
municipal government. Coca was distributed among the rest of us present in the room, 
who included various lower-level authorities from some of the other comunidades that 
make up Bolívar Province, besides locals from Vilaycayma. 
One of the two men from Sucre introduced himself as Juan Sanchez, a lawyer whose 
job was to consult with indigenous communities so as to understand how the new law 
would interact with traditional customary norms or usos y costumbres and he invited 
those present to explain how they managed justice in the province. Although Juan 
Sanchez spoke entirely in Spanish, the meeting was held in a code-switching mixture of 
Spanish and the local indigenous language of Quechua. Gregorio then explained the role 
of the traditional authorities such as jilanku in managing disputes concerning land and 
its rotation within communal areas; how they resolved conflicts over the ownership of 
plots of land or damage caused by grazing animals and how this was done without 
money because their ancestors would never pay for justice. Olker Nina, the union figure 
equivalent in stature to Gregorio as Kuraj Mallku, spoke immediately afterwards. He 
greeted everyone present and stated the following: 
‘Well brothers, a little has been said about lands. The issue of land is coming more to the 
central provincial and here in the comunidades there are small parcels, they become 
divided progressively over time and as a result there are problems. More of this comes 
in the direction of the central provincial…but just this, we receive problems as a result 
of lands, shall we say…because of inheritance, right? Because of inheritance. So, this is 
                                               
1 The Bartolina Sisas or women’s union are named after the wife of the eighteenth century indigenous 
leader Túpak Katari, the most important figure in the imaginary of Bolivian indigenous nationalism. 
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causing problems, right? People fight between families and the community. For 
example, there’s a comunidad, it’s happening that way. We’re going to see how we solve 
it. We’re looking.’ (Q) 
The comunidad Olker was alluding to was Piruani where a number of families had been 
physically fighting each other over the inheritance and correct demarcation of adjacent 
lands, to the point of some individuals being hospitalized with stab wounds. Olker 
explained the process through which conflicts were normally resolved within a 
comunidad, stating that anything that couldn’t be resolved internally should be passed 
up through the hierarchy of their province to the dirigente of the sub-central, 
representing various comunidades, to resolve the matter in coordination with the Kuraj 
Tata.  
However, the fact that Olker had alluded to the case of Piruani resulted in a series of 
recriminations between the different authorities present in the room. Not only was 
Piruani the scene of bitter fighting between families but it had also become a conflict 
between traditional ayllu leaders, the peasant union and local MAS government. 
Different leaders had offered different solutions and they began to accuse each other of 
failing to act properly. This brought up the issue of the legal status of the land, as most 
of the province had been designated as a Native Communal Land or TCO, which meant 
it was recognised by the state as the collective territory of an indigenous community. 
This was the result of the efforts of the traditional authorities, who had responded in the 
1990s to a reform known as the INRA law to collectively title their lands. However, 
according to the dirigentes this was fueling uncertainty over ownership of the land and 
the sorts of conflicts that had developed in Piruani. This was met with derision by some 
of the ayllu authorities who claimed to be simply defending their usos y costumbres and 
that in this sense they were the true originarios, the true natives of the place, not the 
peasant union who were merely a ‘political’ organisation and a European imposition 
dating to the national revolution. The peasant union and MAS local government simply 
wanted to seize power and get rid of the ayllu and they were being discriminated against 
for speaking out against the national policies of the MAS government. The discussion 
then began to focus on la parte orgánica, meaning questions related to organisational 
structure and the responsibilities of community leaders. It was repeatedly pointed out by 
some of the union figures and by the MAS Mayor, Francisco Delgado, that it was a very 
sad thing that the different authorities could not coordinate with each other: all three 
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authorities must work in coordination, he pronounced resoundingly, ‘kimsantinku 
coordinanku tiyan, kimsantinku trabajanku tiyan, coordinación kanan tiyan!’ 
To this it was added that the fact that Gregorio and his Kuraj Tatas and jilankus held 
their own separate meetings was both illegitimate and divisive, as was their creation of a 
political party in POKUY, which had nothing to do with the usos y costumbres. Don 
Jesus, a man in his early forties from the comunidad of Pampajasi, who had previously 
assumed roles both as a jilanku and a dirigente stated the following: 
‘I see and I know, some comunidades are practicing, jilanku, dirigente, sub-central, 
Kuraj Tata, coordinately they are practicing between themselves, but this is the reality of 
our life in the comunidades. Now, these usos y costumbres of ours were before, right? 
Who in reality is assuming [the responsibility] now brothers? The dirigentes. They are 
assuming it. The dirigentes solve the problems that come from the land. So, this means 
that it isn’t the case that here we discriminate among ourselves. No one should say ‘I am 
truly an originario while that person is not…we are all originarios, brothers!’ (Q) 
To this last remark about all those present being originarios there were cries of 
agreement from many in the room. However, this was not received well by Gregorio 
and some of the traditional authorities, who seemed annoyed by the repetition of the 
phrase. It was pointed out that the MAS party were pursuing many of the same 
neoliberal policies as their predecessors and had not given power to originarios like 
them. As the meeting wore to a close, Juan Sanchez conceded the existence of a divide 
in the room but stated that they needed to move past the differences expressed towards 
greater cooperation. After all, he pointed out, they were all part of one family and there 
is nothing worse than when a family fight among themselves. It was essential to work 
together so that the plurinational state could exist in practice and not just on paper. This 
last comment was greeted by general applause throughout the room. Gregorio then 
formally closed the meeting and admitted that unity between his brothers and sisters 
was important to him and that now they had to think seriously about the development of 
their municipality and what was to be done about the huge levels of migration towards 
the cities, ‘Kunanqa piensananchis tiyan en el desarollo de nuestro municipio y también 
imayna ciudadman ripushanku, chaykunata más bien imaynatachus ruwayta, no?’ 
We returned to Cochabamba the following day, taking the five-hour journey through the 
mountains from the town of Bolívar. This meeting in Vilaycayma touches upon many 
issues that were presented to me in the course of nearly a year and half of fieldwork in 
Bolivia. While the MAS government remains officially committed to various reforms, 
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including the ‘decolonisation’ of Bolivia and the introduction of legal pluralism and 
indigenous autonomy, public meetings and consultations like the one described above 
often seemed to be more about paying lip-service to these ideas and didn’t lead 
anywhere. What the meeting did represent, however, was a space in which 
disagreements were made public between the different forms of authority of the 
province. A meeting that was ostensibly about understanding the customary norms of an 
indigenous community had become a stage for airing grievances between the traditional 
authorities of the ayllu on one side (represented politically by their local party, POKUY) 
and the peasant union and local MAS municipal government on the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Picture of consultative meeting of the Tribunal Agroambiental in 
Vilaycayma 
Don Jesus’ comment that ‘we are all originarios’ constituted a piece of rhetoric often 
used by peasant union leaders in public debates with the ayllu authorities and formed 
part of the discourse of the sindicato and the members of the MAS controlled local 
government. I heard it repeated constantly during my fieldwork in formal meetings and 
even in arguments at social events. In effect the phrase is a useful rhetorical device 
which suggests that the traditional authorities are creating division within the 
comunidades of the province when all are really one family. The implication is also that 
the autoridades originarias claim to speak for all the province when they are only one 
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part of its governmental structure which includes the sindicato or peasant union, the 
women’s union and the municipal government. For the union leaders and local MAS 
politicians, the traditional authorities were illegitimately presenting themselves as the 
authentic originarios, while some of the autoridades originarias accused them of being 
discriminatory, racist and ‘anti-indigenous’. 
In contemporary Bolivia originario is a term of ethnic identification which often forms 
part of the discourse of indigeneity present in the populist politics of the MAS and other 
organisations. It is typically used to mean something akin to ‘indigenous’ or ‘first 
nations people’, with the term originario or campesino originario being the preferred 
form of self-identification among residents of Bolívar, if they choose to define 
themselves in this way. In this sense it refers to the ordinary people from the countryside 
who had been denied power and dignity since the colonisation, as opposed to the people 
of the towns and cities and in speeches it is sometimes used almost interchangeably 
with the term gente humilde or ‘humble folk’. Nevertheless, the term originario in 
Bolívar province has multiple meanings and connotations, including that of being 
someone who is original to a place. It can, for example, refer to a traditional category of 
ayllu members who are in theory the original occupants of a community. Meanwhile, 
the traditional leaders are also referred to as the autoridades originarias to denote the 
fact that, unlike the peasant union authorities, they had existed prior to both the 1952 
revolution and the colonial state. They therefore believe they embody the original forms 
of social organisation and values which predate the colonisation of the Americas. On a 
number of occasions during my fieldwork I heard individuals from the traditional 
authorities state that they were the true originarios, unlike the MAS politicians and the 
peasant union. For some of them, the peasant union, having only come into existence 
with the 1953 agrarian reform, is a European ideological imposition with no ‘organic’ 
link to the historical territory of Kirkiawi and nothing more than a ‘political’ 
organisation. The adjective ‘political’ in Bolivia often has a negative connotation as it 
implies a clientelistic form of politics associated with a past when political parties kept 
the majority rural population excluded from genuine participation in government. 
Against this, the sindicato would repeat that it is illegitimate for the ayllu leaders to 
present themselves in this way, as they were all originarios regardless of their 
affiliations. After all, thanks to the changes that had taken place in Bolivian politics all 
the councillors and the mayor of the local municipal government were now themselves 
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originarios from local families, unlike the representatives of the ‘neoliberal parties’ of 
the past, who were often outsiders chosen ‘al dedo’, meaning directly by the party 
leadership. 
The fact that a remote and tiny region inhabited by Quechua-speaking indigenous 
people should have multiple overlapping forms of political authority which are involved 
in a public conflict is puzzling, especially when, as the lawyer from Sucre pointed out, 
these figures are often from the same comunidades and families. That this political 
conflict appears to have escalated during and as a result of the current period of reform 
and the election of an indigenous president is yet more puzzling still. Some ten years 
before the events described in this thesis, the traditional authorities and the peasant 
union in Bolívar saw themselves as allies against the neoliberal government, 
representing the interests of the gente humilde against the traditional oligarchy. A year 
prior to Evo’s election as president they had together carried out an ‘indigenous 
takeover’ in the local elections, eliminating the established political parties to take direct 
control of the municipal government. Yet by the time of my fieldwork in 2015, local and 
national events had conspired to bring them into a particularly bitter phase of conflict, 
which I witnessed as I followed meetings of the different forms of authority as well as 
those of local government, NGOs, government agencies and public rallies during more 
than a year. During this time, I struggled with the question of why they were in conflict: 
what did this have to do with the new period of social change and wider politics in 
Bolivia and what were the substantive issues and ideological differences that divided 
them? This thesis is an attempt to answer this question and to do so it explores the social 
and political transformations at both the local and national level that have contributed to 
this situation. Moreover, it contextualises the national politics of Bolivia and wider 
political, legal and social processes within a localised political dispute, while exploring 
the perspectives that motivate it. 
I. Finding the Field and Locating the Site of Politics 
The original intention behind my fieldwork had been to study the local politics of urban 
migrants from the highlands through a multi-sited ethnography. I had become interested 
in Bolivia partly through its fame as a ‘pink tide’ country, with an indigenous president 
elected by radical social movements engaged in a process of widespread social change. I 
considered studying how migrants involved in grass roots political activity in the city 
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maintained links with their communities of origin and the continuities and ruptures in 
forms of communal life and political practices, alongside their understandings of 
morality and local concepts of justice. However, the realities of fieldwork meant that the 
focus of study changed quite dramatically. While the nature of the fieldwork remained 
multi-sited, the political situation I was confronted with and which became the central 
theme of this thesis took place primarily in the rural area of Bolívar province. 
Nevertheless, in following the politics of a remote locality and the lives of some of its 
inhabitants I travelled frequently between the rural altiplano and the city of 
Cochabamba, as well as to the cities of Sucre, La Paz and Oruro. 
Having spent several months between late 2014 and early 2015 learning Quechua while 
living in a neighbourhood of retired miners in the western suburbs of the city of 
Cochabamba I had made friends and local contacts who provided me with a great deal 
of contextual knowledge about Bolivian society, politics and history. One of these was 
the anthropologist Fernando Prada, whom I had met while organising Quechua-English 
language exchanges with students and teachers at the local San Simon university. He 
suggested that if I was interested in understanding or studying the highlands and its 
political organisation and values, I should approach the offices of COAMAC or the 
Federation of Ayllus of Cochabamba, the regional branch of the CONAMAQ (National 
Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu) national ayllu federation and that their 
offices were located in a convent of Franciscan Monks in downtown Cochabamba. I 
found these without too much difficulty but discovered they were not the offices of 
COAMAC but rather an office that the Franciscan brothers let out to lawyers and 
academics who provided legal and technical advice to various ayllus in the department 
of Cochabamba. However, there I met the lawyer and indigenous rights activist, Edwin 
Prada, who introduced me to the leader of Ayllu Kirkiawi, Mallku Gregorio Jacinto. 
Following meetings with the traditional authorities in Cochabamba and later in 
Vilaycayma in Bolívar province itself, I proposed that I would attend their meetings and 
study their organisation, procedures and values as well as spend at least several months 
living in the province. At the time, my intention was still to study the politics of urban 
migrants, so I planned on establishing some relationships with people in the countryside 
and then following the networks of migration and double residence to the city. No one 
raised any objections to my presence, but one jilanku emphasised that I should write 
something in Spanish that could be left in the local educational centre in Bolívar to 
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serve to educate their children, given that with all the migration to the cities they were 
forgetting who they were. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Picture of Dominga weaving while taking her sheep to pasture 
Throughout my time in Bolivia access to field sites was negotiated with local leaders 
and it was necessary to introduce myself in public meetings and explain what I was 
doing. The fact that rural and peri-urban Bolivia is characterised by the presence of 
local civic-political institutions means that it is very difficult to carry out fieldwork 
without first consulting the local community through these channels and explaining the 
potential harm and benefits of one’s presence. In addition to the process described 
above, I also introduced myself in public meetings of the communal assembly of 
Vilaycayma, the OTB of Copacabana in Cochabamba and the local Baptist Union 
congregation. Individuals were aware that I was carrying out fieldwork to write a PhD 
thesis and that my interest was in understanding local politics. All the figures 
interviewed agreed to be recorded and for their words to be reproduced. Those 
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individuals who gave their consent in this way have not been anonymised through 
pseudonyms. Given that this thesis deals with conflict among members of the same 
community, this raises the question of whether it is ethical to make it public. I would not 
have written the thesis in the form I did if I believed it would harm the people among 
whom I worked. Those I spoke with were eager to express their point of view and for 
this to be included explicitly in any future publication. Moreover, were it the case that 
persons’ safety, livelihoods or reputation were potentially placed in danger by their 
inclusion within this thesis, the use of pseudonyms would not suffice to keep them 
completely anonymous, as nearly all are elected officials or other leaders who could be 
identified by reference to their roles. While this thesis makes clear the nature of the 
dispute between local political figures and analyses the situations from which these 
differences have arisen, I do not believe this endangers any group or individual and 
neither does it cast aspersions on any person’s conduct or character or portray the 
communities of Bolívar province in a way that would be prejudicial to them. 
The following month I returned to Bolívar, this time in order to stay for about six weeks 
in the home of Gregorio along with his wife Dominga and their three children. I was 
introduced to and spoke with members of the local council and various technical 
advisers within the municipal government. During this time, I attended meetings of the 
traditional authorities, the peasant union, the ampliado general or general meeting of 
the province and the municipal development committee or CDM. I also spent time with 
Gregorio and his family and accompanied his wife Dominga and their children when 
they went to feed and pasture their animals. I also visited and got to know Don Enrique 
Tola, the septuagenarian candidate for POKUY from Vilaycayma, as well as the former 
MAS congressman and union dirigente, Severino Condori. Towards the end of this first 
month I became ill with stomach problems and returned to Cochabamba, having lost 
quite a lot of weight. I returned to Bolívar the following month, as I had been invited to 
participate in the local festivity or fiesta of Tata Santiago in early July. The comunidad 
of Vilaycayma were dancing the jula-jula as part of an inter-community contest to 
celebrate the Catholic saint’s day of Santiago the Moor Slayer and I was asked to take 
part. I continued to follow the circuit of different meetings described above as well as 
the monthly meeting of the comunidad of Vilaycayma, where I began to spend more 
time and spoke with various residents and accompanied them in their daily activities. I 
also visited the nearby comunidad of Pampajasi with Gregorio, where he and his friend 
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Javier would play and record traditional charango music in a home-made studio for 
their folk duo: ‘Los Caminantes de Kirkiawi’. During the next few months I kept 
returning to Bolívar for extended periods and attended the circuit of local political 
meetings as well as those of NGOs in various locations around the province and at one 
point organised a workshop in the courtyard of Gregorio’s home in which some of the 
traditional authorities discussed their understandings of the history of their territory and 
the problems they were facing. 
Around this time, I also began accompanying Gregorio and the traditional leaders on 
their trips to other parts of Bolivia. These included visits to the constitutional capital in 
Sucre as part of a consultation process for the Tribunal Agroambiental, to La Paz for 
conferences on indigenous justice and to Cochabamba and Oruro for meetings with 
other ayllu authorities. In Oruro I visited two former Mallkus, Juan Apaza and Sabino 
Veizaga, in order to record interviews and I met with the indigenous rights lawyer Piter 
Fuentes. In October my wife and I took part as delegates in the three-day Climate 
Summit for Peoples of the Global South in Tiquipaya near Cochabamba, as well as the 
‘alternative’ summit, Mesa 18, alongside Mallku Gregorio and the lawyer Edwin Prada, 
organised to denounce the ‘fake environmentalism’ of the MAS government. 
From November 2015 I began to spend less time in Bolívar as I visited and got to know 
people in the peri-urban neighbourhoods of Copacabana and Yuraq Rumi in the south of 
Cochabamba. I came to realise the extent to which the comunidad of Vilaycayma where 
I had spent time was in reality located in multiple places, as many families lived mainly 
in the cities or in some cases the eastern tropical lowlands and returned periodically for 
cultural events, local political meetings and to sow and harvest crops: a pattern 
commonly described as double residence (Antequera, 2011). This reality of highland 
communities was one of the two major surprises that contradicted my naïve 
understanding of Bolivia, alongside the fact that the political dispute which reflected the 
wider changes occurring in Bolivian society largely took place in the countryside and 
not the city, between the different forms of authority of this remote province.  
In the neighbourhoods around Yuraq Rumi I came to know the Baptist Pastor Don 
Victor Ari and his family and attended the meetings of their congregation, eventually 
staying in their home in a spare room. In the church, my wife and I organised a weekly 
English class for the local children and spent time with other families as well as 
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accompanying them in their work selling products in the centre of Cochabamba and 
attending local sporting and cultural events and the meetings of residents’ committees 
which serve as a form of local government. However, during all this time I continued to 
regularly visit Bolívar, attending the circuit of political meetings as well as cultural 
events and major public political rallies, including a visit by Evo Morales to the town of 
Bolívar and a rally held in anticipation of a consultative referendum on the terms of a 
new mining law. In effect, by travelling between these two spaces, I was doing what 
many double residents who lived in the cities do: returning for cultural events, political 
meetings and to help take part in agricultural and collective communal work within their 
home comunidad. On some occasions we travelled from Cochabamba alongside people 
from Bolívar, such as Severino Condori or Don Fermin Mamani, who was selling 
fertilisers and agricultural products in the highland regions of Cochabamba. 
While the form this ethnography took emerged naturally, the multi-sited nature of it 
could be seen as problematic. A frequent criticism of multi-sited ethnography is that it 
attenuates the power of traditional fieldwork, which normally requires a period of 
months or years to become familiar with the intimate patterns of daily life in a particular 
location (Falzon, 2009; Amit, 2000). A key idea behind multi-sited ethnography, 
detailed in a famous paper by George E. Marcus (1995), is that moving beyond the 
traditional single field site is necessary to better understand the nature of reality with its 
flows or movements of people, ideas or objects across multiple spaces. Tracking the 
movement of these entities across space allows for the mapping of the networks through 
which they are transmitted and transformed. Not only was this the case with my 
fieldwork, but the nature of both the social situations I was following and the 
community I was observing necessitated movement between different sites. The reality 
of rural-urban migration, multi-locality and politics in contemporary Bolivia is such that 
it would have been difficult to study the themes outlined in this thesis without moving 
between different places. While remaining in one place for the entire period may 
generate greater ethnographic detail, what is gained in multi-sited fieldwork is an 
understanding of the wider networks and flows of people, resources and ideas. 
Travelling between different spaces, as I did between the city and countryside and 
following the circuit ‘walked’ by local political authorities, allowed me to comprehend 
the emic perspective of individuals who understand themselves to be part of social and 
political entities which traverse multiple locations: a mentality which is arguably 
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consistent with long-standing cultural logics of Andean peoples and communities, as 
will be detailed in the following chapter. 
Toward the end of my fieldwork I realised that the major theme of my thesis would be 
the political dispute taking place in Bolívar and the way this reflects the wider changes 
occurring in Bolivia and the dilemmas and contradictions of the national MAS 
government. I recorded a series of interviews with a number of the traditional 
authorities as well as the provincial and departmental union leaders, the Mayor of the 
province, the head of the local council and the local authorities in Vilaycayma. I also 
carried out similar interviews with local residents and leaders in the neighbourhoods I 
came to know in Cochabamba and was able to speak with the former provincial union 
leader and local councillor from Bolívar, Justinano Cunurana, as well as two 
professionals who had worked in Bolívar: the anthropologist Nelson Antequera and the 
NGO coordinator Toribia Lero Quispe. I also recorded interviews with Edwin Prada and 
the paralegal and activist Francisco Larico. These interviews allowed me to reflect on 
and analyse the situation I had observed as well as to gather further details and to 
document the perspectives of key figures.  
While I was able to talk extensively with a number of individuals involved in local 
politics, when it came to understanding their beliefs and motivations I encountered 
difficulty relating to them, given the tremendous gulf in our backgrounds and 
experiences. My own background and political beliefs are those of a university educated 
western leftist. I was brought up in a family that supported the British Labour Party and 
I have been involved in left politics as part of various socialist organisations since my 
undergraduate student days. Not only my intellectual understanding of politics and 
history but my own identity and emotional attachments to certain narratives and 
symbols centre around conventional notions of a left-right continuum and social class. 
These concepts are not entirely suited to comprehending how my informants conceive 
of their identity, history and political projects. My unfamiliarity with the collective 
narratives, symbols and notions of identity which form the basis of politics in highland 
Bolivia explains why the situation I encountered, described in the opening scene of this 
thesis, was such a confusing puzzle for me. Arriving at an understanding of this was a 
large part of my fieldwork. This consisted of a process of becoming gradually familiar 
with the language and concepts people used to express their views and reflecting on the 
meaning of this data both during and after fieldwork: this being arguably one of the 
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defining elements of ethnography (Eriksen, 2001), the primary methodology used in this 
research.  
Admittedly, numerous factors, including time, my identity as a clearly ‘other’ white 
European man performing fieldwork among people of indigenous descent and the 
specific relationships I made shaped my interactions with people, the data I was able to 
collect and my interpretation and understanding of it. Individuals I was able to gather 
detailed information from were largely men involved in local civic politics, although 
some individuals in Bolívar involved in peasant unionism were guarded with me and 
not entirely comfortable with my presence in public meetings. This was despite the fact 
I had been granted permission to attend by the relevant leaders and this was related to 
the tense atmosphere between the ayllu authorities and the union and municipal 
government leaders, as I was staying much of the time in the home of the Kuraj Mallku, 
Gregorio Jacinto. More practically, language proved a barrier that restricted both whom 
I tended to form relationships with and the sort of information I could gather. While I 
had learnt to speak conversational Quechua, I lacked fluency and would become lost 
during lengthy exchanges, which meant interviews were carried out in Spanish and 
again tended to be with men rather than women, who often lacked even a primary 
school education. However, the degree to which I spoke Quechua was useful in two 
respects. Firstly, the Spanish spoken by many people I interacted with was so heavily 
grammatically and lexically inflected by Quechua it would have been impossible to 
understand them without some knowledge of it. Secondly, it meant that I was able to 
follow public meetings (which were in a linguistic code-switching mixture of Quechua 
and Spanish) and later transcribe and translate parts of what was said. 
Both in the countryside and the city I found women treated me with distrust, partly out 
of a sense that people would interpret their interaction with me as flirting, which 
alongside language barriers limited the extent to which I formed meaningful 
relationships with them. My own sense of unease with this situation and the fact that the 
men who came to be some of my key informants were forthcoming with information 
and fluent in Spanish meant that I concentrated on their testimonies. However, the fact 
that the relationships I formed and the interviews I carried out were largely with men 
represents an admitted limitation to the data gathered over the course of my fieldwork. 
Although the political spaces in which the ethnography was carried out are male 
dominated and the overwhelming majority of contributions to discussions are by men, 
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they are also attended by women (either accompanying family members or representing 
the women’s union or Bartolina Sisas) who often take part in more informal discussions 
during breaks or cuarto intermedios and prepare and distribute food to those present. 
Not only was I not privy to these talks, but the lack of women’s perspectives means that 
this thesis is unable to explain or account for the gendered nature of the division of 
labour in the political spaces of the province. 
Moreover, as much of the participant observation and interviews were carried out with 
political leaders and most of the individuals I formed meaningful relationships with 
were men involved in civic politics, this thesis is largely an ethnography of the political 
spaces of a community, rather than the community of Bolívar province as a whole. 
While I did spend significant time in more local field sites, living with families from 
Bolívar in Cochabamba and with the family of the Kuraj Mallku, Gregorio Jacinto, 
much of the substance of this ethnography concerns political meetings in the province 
and the cities of Cochabamba, Oruro, La Paz and Sucre. 
Lastly, I am aware that my reading of social situations in Bolívar province and of 
Bolivian politics, history and society more generally contains judgments, perspective-
taking and generalisations which, while making things meaningful to a general reader, 
omit some of the full complexity of the social reality being discussed. I take the view 
that all ethnography is an act of interpretation (Geertz, 1973) and in as much as it 
renders beliefs, practices and social situations comprehensible it necessarily paints an 
incomplete picture. Nevertheless, I am confident that the account presented in this thesis 
contributes to understanding the politics of highland indigenous communities and 
contemporary Bolivia. Meanwhile, my very naivety and the need to overcome wide 
cultural differences provided the basis for constructing an original reading of the 
situation, through observation and dialogue with informants and reflection on my initial 
mistakes and confusions, an aspect of the ethnographic method that has been described 
as one of its unique advantages (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Erikson, 2005; 
Rabinow, 1977; Wacquant, 2008). 
II. The Ayllu, Politics and Morality 
This thesis attempts to understand the rift between the traditional ayllu leaders and the 
other forms of authority of Bolívar province as a contemporary political conflict, 
motivated by certain differences in perspective and values between those involved, and 
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which is connected to wider changes in Bolivian society. There exists an extensive 
literature on the Andean ayllu as a form of territorial organsiation and a system of 
rotative authorities that embodies a certain relationship between people and the land 
they inhabit, involving forms of reciprocity and complementarity (Rasnake, 1988; Platt, 
1986; Harris, 1995; Larson, 1995). Much of this work has been criticised for not only 
essentialising Andean rural communities but in fact creating the very category of the 
ayllu as a work of academic imagination (Weismantel, 2006). Orin Starn (1991) 
famously alleged that anthropologists were engaged in ‘Andeanism’, analogous to 
Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism: a work of reification which creates the fiction of a 
pristine Andean community by deliberately omitting the role of connections to urban 
centres, the existence of various forms of Christianity and altering terms as a way of 
exoticising the subjects being described, for example, by the very act of describing an 
area as an ayllu rather than a canton or province. Starn claimed this underemphasises 
the role of politics and in fact de-politicises Andean rural life, explaining the abject 
failure of anthropologists to comprehend the emergence of the ‘Shining Path’ Marxist 
guerilla movement in rural Peru. 
This view is complicated by the fact that for indigenous intellectuals in Bolivia the ayllu 
is a vital concept for imagining alternative possibilities to existing social conditions and 
for social movements it is a resource to help mobilise and seek change (Rivera-
Cusicanqui, 1990; Choque and Mamani, 2001; Weismantel, 2006). As an oppositional 
concept based on what is partly real and partly ideal it can be considered a form of 
‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 1987). In contemporary Bolivia the ayllu has become 
central to debates concerning the reform and decolonisation of the country (Fabricant, 
2010), with the ayllu cited as the basis of an alternative developmental model of el vivir 
bien and as a ‘moral reserve’ for the nation’s edification (Morales, 2008). This discourse 
draws not only on the work of western scholars but a long tradition of native 
intellectuals, stretching back to the indigenismo of the early twentieth century 
(Mariátegui, 1928; Arguedas, 1956).  
Moreover, the term ayllu in Bolívar is a genuine emic concept used to refer not only to 
the traditional authorities or ‘los del ayllu’ but to the territory of the province with its 
people, history and ways of life. While some of the customs and forms of self-
representation of the traditional authorities may be labeled as ‘invented traditions’ 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), similar in certain ways to how structuralist 
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anthropologists interpreted and arguably ‘created’ the ayllu, many of the features of the 
ayllu identified in traditional scholarship are apparent in Bolívar. These include ways of 
managing land and people’s relationship to it, agricultural labour and reciprocity 
(Sheild-Johannson, 2014), forms of territorial organisation and the system of political 
leadership roles or cargos. However, as shall be explored later, these features of 
leadership are not limited to the traditional authorities and despite Bolívar province 
remaining in some ways an ayllu, it features a hybrid system of government with 
multiple overlapping forms of authority. 
Much of the early anthropological scholarship on the Andes and the ayllu placed a great 
deal of emphasis on history and sought continuities and discontinuities with the historic 
communities that formed part of the Inca Empire and Aymara kingdoms (Bouyousse-
Cassagne, Harris and Platt, 2004; Platt, 1982; Harris, 1982). It was influenced by a 
structuralist perspective and the work of the archaeologist and anthropologist John 
Murra (1956), who identified key elements of the economic and political system of the 
Inca state. This work often emphasised the historic and continued resistance of ayllu 
communities to the colonial and postcolonial state and capitalist market (Abercrombie, 
1998; Platt, 1982, 1986; Rasnake, 1988). While this was certainly a reality, these works 
arguably paint a one-sided picture of what was a more complex interplay between 
indigenous communities, the state and market (Larson, Harris and Tandeter, 1995; Stern, 
1992). Similarly, a famous and highly influential paper on the relationship between the 
ayllu and peasant union authorities of northern Potosí by the Aymara intellectual Silvia 
Rivera-Cusicanqui (1990) is based on understanding present conditions through 
examining deep and longstanding sociocultural patterns which date to the Spanish 
colonisation and serve to reproduce its categories and logics. Accordingly, the ayllu and 
peasant union are seen as embodying fundamentally distinct forms of democracy with 
different notions of citizenship and the peasant union as reproducing forms of colonial 
oppression. This analysis has been influential in drawing attention to the ideological 
differences between different forms of authority and yet in doing so it arguably reifies 
them (Sheild-Johannson, 2014). Although this thesis claims that the peasant union and 
ayllu authorities have differing perspective and values, these are not the result of 
essential timeless features and have as much to do with events and reforms of the last 
twenty years than the deep history of the post-colony. The community of Bolívar 
province has existed in a shifting relationship with a wider society that has helped shape 
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its local identity and internal forms of government, resulting in a hybrid mixture of 
different cultural elements, customs and forms of governance which retain a sense of 
meaning for its inhabitants. This is because what makes up a society, its traditions, 
systems of government and justice are the result of a historical sequence which is being 
constantly assimilated and interpreted in the present.  
This thesis examines the local politics of an area historically considered an ayllu and 
provides ethnographic detail of the lived tensions, contentions and discourses of the 
different forms of authority within it: how their interpretations of history, 
representations of their community and notions of belonging to it constitute a political 
conflict. It also presents how this situation and the processes which gave rise to it are 
connected to wider changes in Bolivia and the region. While this moves away from 
earlier structuralist-inspired studies of highland communities, it fits into the existing 
body of ethnographic work on Bolivia studying local forms of civic politics and 
citizenship (Lazar, 2008; Goldstein, 2004, 2014; Postero, 2006, 2016). It also relates to 
growing scholarship on the contradictions of ‘post-neoliberal’ governments (Webber, 
2011; Goodale and Postero, 2013), given the fact that the presence and actions of an 
avowedly post-neoliberal government, committed to decolonisation and the protection 
of indigenous rights, are related to the intensification of tensions within this indigenous 
community. This thesis is therefore a work of political anthropology. However, it 
examines a particular type of political conflict: one which is about articulating 
competing definitions of the values, institutions and identity of a community and 
arguing over what is authentic to it. It is therefore necessary to enquire how 
anthropology approaches the study of politics and how this research engages with and 
contributes to existing theory. 
The field of political anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century was neatly 
defined as the study of indigenous systems of law and government and especially the 
forms of governance which exist in the absence of a centralised state (Gledhill, 2000; 
Evans-Pritchard, 1940). However, this early view of the discipline and the theoretical 
and methodological presuppositions which supported it, such as British structural 
functionalism, had been largely abandoned by the final quarter of the century. 
Anthropologists became increasingly aware of the interconnections between different 
social groups and the notion of native societies as bounded entities not subject to change 
was criticised as a damaging fiction (Wolf, 1982). Perhaps more importantly, the 
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functionalist approach deliberately stripped out local meanings and cultural idioms from 
representations of politics in an attempt to get at the ‘real’ underlying social structure 
(Spencer, 2007; Fortes and Evans-Prichard, 1940), despite this being precisely the sort 
of data the methodology of anthropological fieldwork is suited to collecting (Geertz, 
1995). 
Nevertheless, in the period since the 1960s, a series of anthropological studies have 
demonstrated the advantage of ethnography for investigating various aspects of politics. 
These include analyses of how power works at the local level and is recreated in 
everyday practices (Scott, 1985; Ong, 1987), how outside institutions, the state and 
political leaders interact with local groups and communities and the way relations 
between them are negotiated and maintained (Scott, 1990; Gledhill, 1997; Wolf, 1999). 
Moreover, bringing in the wider political and legal institutions and social networks in 
which smaller communities exist in order to make sense of situations and events was a 
large part of the ‘case study’ method of the Manchester school (Gluckman, 1961; 
Mitchell, 1983). What John Gledhill (2000) refers to as ‘getting at structure through 
events’ involves studying local political events and situations while tracing their 
connections to wider networks and socio-political processes. Through doing so it is 
possible to illuminate these occurrences in a way that would not be possible without an 
understanding of the wider context, while also demonstrating how local events not only 
reflect larger-scale processes and national-level conflicts but may also contribute to 
them. 
This method of analysis is important to how this thesis develops its argument. Wider 
social, political and legal changes that have occurred in Bolivia are of great relevance to 
understanding the situation in Bolívar province. Moreover, local events and situations, 
including the political dispute between local authorities, are themselves constitutive of 
them. As shall be explored in Chapters 2 and 4, one of these changes is the breakdown 
of barriers between the countryside and city and the phenomenon of rural-urban double 
residence. However, more important to understanding the rift between the authorities of 
the province is the evolving relationship between communities like Bolívar and the state 
and other outside institutions. Rural communities like Bolívar have been integrated into 
larger state structures since before the time of the Spanish colony and this relationship 
has defined their forms of local governance and sense of identity over a long period. 
The traditional cargo system which the ayllu authorities claim to embody owes its 
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existence in part to the Spanish colonial state and Catholic church, while the peasant 
union became a feature of life as a result of the changes brought about through the 
national revolution of 1952. Moreover, legal and political reforms instituted in the 
1990s have further modified the way individuals and communities understand 
themselves and their relationship to wider society. In the current period, the national 
MAS government is enacting its own national state-building project based on particular 
interpretations of cultural and legal pluralism and decolonisation, while promoting a 
new understanding of citizenship. Nevertheless, the meaning of this process and the 
identities generated by it have been disputed by local and national actors. 
The notion of political and legal pluralism has been an object of study not only in Latin 
America (Ramos, 1994; Hale, 2004; Barrantes-Reynolds, 2016) but in many regions of 
the world (Chaterjee, 1993; Das, 1995) by scholars who examine how legal and 
institutional reforms influenced by changes in international human rights law and 
associated discourses have shaped politics (Spencer, 2007) and encouraged the 
formation of specific identities. Moreover, this is arguably an illustration of the more 
general phenomenon of how the modern state, distinguished by its particular presence, 
forms of bureaucracy and surveillance (Giddens, 1985; Foucault, 1976) channels the 
efforts of social groups through its administrative apparatus; such groups are therefore 
compelled to pursue their interests within the domain organised by the state. While the 
new Bolivian state has officially sought to create legal and political structures that 
respect the diversity and autonomy of its citizenry, in doing so it obliges individuals and 
groups to articulate their identities in terms that are legible to it. Much of contemporary 
politics in Bolivia must be understood as a response to the construction of the new 
nation state, as various social groups and communities attempt to define both the 
meaning of this process and their place within it. This is taking place at various scales 
and involves the interpretation, contestation and adoption of symbols and discourses by 
different groups. As this thesis will illustrate, this is a phenomenon which may also 
provoke or deepen rifts within local communities. 
Describing this process as political raises the question of what politics should be 
understood to mean. I use the term in the course of this thesis to describe the local forms 
of civic politics that exist in rural and peri-urban Bolivia, the national political policies 
and discourse of the governing MAS party and other social organisations and the 
conflict between the different forms of authority in Bolívar. Like much of the theoretical 
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vocabulary of anthropology and the social sciences ‘politics’ is a polythetic term, which 
rather than corresponding to a precise concept describes distinct but often related social 
phenomena (Needham,1975; Sperber, 1985). The way such terms are used may capture 
certain elements of the social world while obscuring others and consequently much 
theoretical debate in anthropology has to do with the descriptive adequacy of its lexicon 
(Ibid.). It is my contention that the way politics is often understood in anthropology 
limits both its ability to describe some aspects of the political as well as the use of the 
type of data typically acquired through ethnography.  
In part this relates to the growth of studies in anthropology from the 1970s onward 
focused on the analysis of power and resistance to it by subaltern groups (Scott, 1985; 
Comaroff, 1985; Ong, 1987). While a valuable area of investigation, it arguably came to 
define how the discipline approached the study of politics. In doing so it shared a 
similarly problematic methodology to structural-functionalism, through removing local 
idioms in the assumption that cultural expressions are ultimately a function of power 
(Sahlins, 2008; Spencer, 2007). Moreover, the tendency to treat local meanings as a 
mere epiphenomenon of underlying processes helps explain why anthropology has 
paradoxically neglected what can be described as the cultural dimension of politics 
(Spencer, 2007). Here culture is used to refer to the elements of a shared universe of 
symbolic meaning which humans inhabit while simultaneously creating (Geertz (1995). 
According to this view, the ethnographic method allows us to render social phenomena 
meaningful through the process of ‘thick description’: by describing the cultural 
meanings which guide action and imbue it with significance (Ibid.). Nevertheless, 
anthropology has exerted limited use of its powers of thick description in the 
examination of individuals self-reported motives for political action, emic notions of 
what ‘politics’ represents and how symbols, values and disputes over them can be 
constitutive of political processes. 
In contemporary Bolivia national and local politics is a cultural spectacle in at least two 
senses. Firstly, it is often the best show in town: political rallies are normally 
accompanied by live music, dancing, processions and drinking and are timed to 
coincide with local or national festivities. Secondly, the performative elements of these 
events serve to express identities and legitimate persons, organisations and projects. The 
current state-building enterprise of the national government is expressed through the 
adoption of various discursive and symbolic elements during public rallies, including 
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the use of originario clothing and the display of symbols that reference indigenous 
identity and historic struggle. Many, including those within social movements hostile to 
the MAS government, would subscribe to the view that these elements are ‘purely 
symbolic’ and mask the real operation of power. This is often because they claim 
authenticity in the face of what they see as the appropriation of indigenist discourse and 
symbols and the ‘fake environmentalism’ of the national government. However, it could 
equally be argued that they are a sincere expression of the project of creating a new 
Bolivian nation and are themselves constitutive of the new national identity being 
forged in the ‘process of change’.  
The emic notion of politics in much of Bolivia results in it being something of dirty 
word. La Política summons an image of forms of clientelism and prebendalism that 
were common in the years following the national revolution. Partly for this reason, 
individuals engaged in local politics will vociferously deny they are politicians, even 
when they stand for election and popular parties will identify themselves as 
‘instruments’ of social movements and organisations. While this would seem to echo the 
view that the essence of politics is the self-interested pursuit of power, the point is that 
this characterisation is intended as a criticism, while popular social organisations and 
communitarian forms of local civic politics are believed to embody something 
fundamentally different. In as much as anthropology and social theory naturalises the 
operation of self-interested power in politics it struggles to make sense of this 
distinction. Moreover, in as much as it views everything as a function of power it 
dismisses an important set of social phenomena that form part of what is often described 
as politics.  
In addition to a struggle for power, politics may also be understood as an attempt on the 
part of groups and persons to shape their community, offer different perspectives of the 
common good and their shared identity and in doing so debate the definition of 
symbolic constituents of their social reality. I contend that this is best analysed through 
comprehending its moral dimension: how politics and political conflict may involve the 
way individuals conceive of themselves in relation to society and are motivated by a 
desire to do what is right and to be a good person. Such an approach does justice to 
local understandings and employs the tools of thick description characteristic of social 
anthropology.  
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Since the turn of the century there has been a tremendous growth in research in 
anthropology concerning the role of ethics and morality. As Michael Lambek (2010) has 
pointed out, much of the ‘ethical turn’ is an attempt to take informants seriously: despite 
the fact that the people anthropologists typically encounter explain or justify their 
actions in terms of what is right or are involved in some debate about the nature of the 
collective good, the tendency in modern social theory is to treat the ethical dimension of 
social life as superficial, marginal or illusory. Although the literature on this topic does 
not have a consistent theoretical basis2, a common thread has been a focus on how 
individuals reflectively engage in moral behaviour and attempt to make themselves a 
certain type of person (Laidlaw, 2002, 2014; Mahmood, 2005; Faubion, 2011; Lambek, 
2015). These works describe how persons may choose from multiple moral models 
available to them in their social environment and creatively engage in forming their own 
identity (Rasanayagam, 2011) in addition to confronting dilemmas in which they are 
faced with competing ethical demands and are forced to reflect on what constitutes their 
personal morality. For some, this represents an attempt to break free from the implicit 
view that the individual is essentially an unfree product of society or culture (Laidlaw, 
2002, 2014; Mahmood, 2005).   
At the same time, figures in social psychology have been arguing for the need to 
understand political conflict and ideological difference in terms of morality (Haidt, 
2001, 2012; Greene, 2013). Among these figures, developmental psychologist and 
comparative primatologist Michael Tomasello has contributed the idea that collective 
intentionality is central to understanding human morality (2007, 2014, 2016). This 
notion refers to the ability of minds to be jointly directed towards goals, states of affairs 
or values (Searle, 1990, 2010; Gilbert, 1990; Bratman, 1993). According to this view, 
although humans are born into a world of pre-existing cultural conventions and 
institutions they act in part as co-authors of this world and are free to accept, interpret or 
reject its norms. The individual subject is influenced by competing motives which 
include those of sympathy, concern for equality and loyalty, adherence to the 
conventions of their culture and self-interested concerns (Tomasello, 2016). Persons will 
attempt to balance these different motives while maintaining a consistent sense of moral 
                                               
2 It encompasses work influenced by elements of Anglo-American ordinary language philosophy 
(Lambek, 2010, 2015; Das, 2010), phenomenology (Zigon, 2006, 2008; Throop, 2010), the later writings 
of Michel Foucault (Laidlaw, 2002; 2014) and psychology and cognitive science (Shweder et. al, 1987; 
Mattingly, 2014). The latter has some cross-over with recent growth in moral psychology (Haidt, 2012; 
Greene, 2013) and experimental philosophy (Appiah, 2009). 
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selfhood, creatively interpreting practices and norms to provide justification of their 
actions to themselves and others. According to this model, it is a basic feature of the 
human condition that individuals are forced to choose between conflicting and at times 
incommensurable values and their relationship with the social world is not a one-sided 
process of enculturation but rather an active and creative engagement with norms and 
models in which they participate in the construction of the social through intersubjective 
discourse. Collective intentionality explains how the social realm is constructed not as 
an emergent property of self-interested power-seeking behaviour but through the innate 
human capacity for taking the perspective of others and cooperating with them. The 
most basic underlying mode of human morality is formed from our ability to recognise 
ourselves as equivalent to others and cooperate within specific contexts. This is 
followed by the social morality that emerges from collective intentionality, comprised of 
much of the shared background of symbolic meaning of a culture. 
The details of this collective social morality may include what it means to be a person 
or citizen and the virtues this involves, the practices that embody and engender these 
virtues through the acquisition of skill, character or unconscious habits of thought or 
action, the idealised conceptions of society and its institutions and the narratives that 
provide a meaningful sense of individual and group identity and a common goal or 
purpose. Individuals and groups may not agree on part or all of these and dispute them. 
To describe this process, I borrow from Jürgen Habermas the term ‘ethical discourse’ 
(1991)3. Here discourse is taken to mean what happens when there is a breakdown in 
communication between individuals or groups and it becomes necessary to adduce 
reasons for the validity of utterances. It is a particular reflexive form of communication 
in which the meanings of utterances are made salient and contested (Habermas, 1983). 
Ethical discourse is fundamentally about making a claim to authenticity: about 
determining what values are germane to the tradition of a sociocultural group. It is 
concerned with conceptions of the good, with what it means to be a moral person and 
with the ultimate ends of life. In the case of ‘ethical-political discourse’ (Habermas, 
1991) this is related to the collective identity of a community. It is for this reason that it 
involves not merely the contestation of moral norms but more fundamentally the 
                                               
3 This does not imply an endorsement of Habermas’ overall project of discourse ethics in which he 
attempts to explain how universally valid moral norms can emerge from the formal rules of rational 
communication. Rather, ethical discourse is a descriptive term for the type of intersubjective discourse 
that takes place within a particular cultural tradition or community when individuals seek to define their 
collective identity, values and other symbolic constituents of their shared social world. 
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collective ‘we’ that defines group identity and which is expressed in an idealised 
representation of what it means to be a member of it. As a contested object of discourse, 
I refer to this collective ‘we’ as the ‘ethical-political subject’. Sian Lazar’s recent 
analysis of Argentinian trade unionism (Lazar, 2017) also brings ethics into the 
anthropological study of politics through examining how activists make themselves into 
particular subjects and create a ‘collective self’. While this is closely related to the 
theoretical framework I employ, it draws on Foucauldian notions of ethical 
subjectivation to understand practices of self-formation and how they link with political 
action, rather than analysing political conflict as an ethical discourse in the manner 
outlined above. 
This phenomenon can take place during periods of social change in which individuals 
have to negotiate shifts and conflicts in the ethical models of their society or the 
breakdown of existing moral orders, as is described skilfully in some ethnographies 
(Robbins, 2004; Zigon, 2006, 2008; Heintz, 2006). It also describes much of the content 
and substance of politics in the sense that has been articulated so far, as different groups 
enter into disputes concerning their visions of the common good, aspects of social 
norms as well as interpretations of history and what it means to belong to the group, 
community or nation state. Understood in this way, politics is not always a naked 
struggle for power. Nevertheless, imbalances in power between groups and persons will 
result in those with less means of reproducing their perspective struggling to influence 
the norms, institutions and collective identity of the overall society (Kitcher, 2011). Less 
powerful groups may encounter strategies for negotiating with and influencing others, 
including utilising creative ways of appealing to the more basic common morality of 
sympathy and recognition of self-other equivalence (Tomasello, 2016). I believe that 
understanding much of political conflict as a form of reflexive discourse about 
collective morality, conceived of in the broad sense detailed above, could allow social 
anthropology to fruitfully apply its methodology to political analysis. It is well equipped 
to investigate how values, collective symbols, narratives and idealised conceptions of 
society and personhood serve to mobilise individuals, establish legitimacy and become 
the basis for conflict and contention between persons, factions and groups. Moreover, it 
allows us to understand cultural and symbolic dimensions as genuinely constitutive of 
politics itself, rather than as an epiphenomenon of underlying processes. 
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I contend that the rift between the ayllu, peasant union and municipal government in 
Bolívar represents not only a struggle for power but an ethical discourse in the manner 
outlined above. While originario is a politicised term in contemporary Bolivia, it is also 
used locally to refer to those who are truly of the place. As belonging to this category 
means being a certain kind of person, it also entails being judged and judging oneself by 
its standards. Therefore, in seeking to define the meaning of the term originario, those 
on either side of the divide are really arguing over the content of moral values related to 
their collective identity: namely the virtues a good person should embody, ideas of the 
good of life and shared goals. During my fieldwork I saw how these differences were 
manifested in disagreements over land tenancy, the administration of justice and the 
future development and political administration of the province. The situations which 
have given rise to these disputes are in turn the consequence of profound socio-political 
changes in the communities of Bolívar and in Bolivia as a whole. These include the 
breakdown of the social and cultural barriers between countryside and city, political 
reforms carried out from the 1990s which have changed the nature of local governance 
and the relationship of rural indigenous peoples with the state and in the present period 
the ongoing attempt by the MAS government to enact a project of nation state-building. 
Ultimately, the differences between the visions articulated by these authorities relate to 
their different historical trajectories as social organisations, not least the period of 
reforms of the 1990s, which together explain how they respectively express distinct 
dimensions of the common aspirations of their community. 
During this time, they saw each other as allies against a neoliberal government of 
traditional white elites or q'ara runas who had kept them marginalised. In the current 
period, there exists a populist government which is enacting institutional and legal 
reforms while promoting its own version of national citizenship based on a particular 
understanding of indigeneity. It is this which has sharpened tensions between the 
different authorities while also obliging them to articulate their differences in terms of a 
form of ethnic identification. The term originario therefore serves as the ethical-
political subject as each side argues for the legitimacy and authenticity of their vision. 
Despite the fact that the rift between the different forms of authority of the province 
does involve a contest for power and prestige it also expresses sincere differences in 
perspectives. Individuals involved in this dispute incorporate ideas and symbols from 
wider discourses as a result of their connections to larger political organisations and 
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networks. They do so while seeking to define the nature of the local social institutions, 
common identity and narrative of their community.  
 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis elucidates the way the different local authorities articulate these 
understandings of their community, identity and history and how the wider political, 
legal and institutional changes of the last twenty years have contributed to differences in 
perspective and provided the basis for the current rift, precisely during the period in 
office of a reforming government committed to a project of ‘plurinational’ state-
building. It does so by providing an analysis of a series of disputes which occurred 
during my fieldwork in 2015 and early 2016 and the wider processes in which these 
took place. 
Chapter 2 describes the nature of the field sites in which this research was carried out. It 
briefly describes Bolivia before providing an account of Bolívar province, its territorial 
divisions and system of local government as well as the way persons, institutions and 
communities are connected to wider society and may operate across multiple localities. 
It then describes two local field sites where I spent a considerable period of time: the 
town of Bolívar and rural hamlet of Vilaycayma and the neighbourhoods around Yuraq 
Rumi in the south of Cochabamba. Chapter 3 provides a history of Bolívar/Kirkiawi 
within the Bolivian nation, accounting for national-level social and political processes 
within the local history of the province. 
Chapter 4 discusses how legal changes that allow indigenous peasant communities to 
become quasi-independent entities with their own forms of internal administration 
based on traditional customs have served to further intra-community conflict among the 
different forms of authority of the province. The ambiguities of the conversion process 
and the ambivalence of the national government have not only led to conflict in Bolívar 
but also reveal some of the central tensions of the MAS project of political reform. The 
issue of how to to define the competencies of indigenous authorities alongside what 
constitutes their traditional customs, norms and procedures has led to debate over what 
are the authentic and legitimate forms of leadership and governance of their community. 
Nevertheless, in Bolívar province the different forms of authority and the practices of 
governance and leadership are significantly hybridised. 
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Chapter 5 deals with the longstanding debate between the traditional authorities and the 
peasant union over the legal status of land and whether it should be individually titled or 
collectively recognised as a Native Communal Land or TCO. This debate has arguably 
been influenced by the reality of rural-urban migration and double residence as families 
must adapt to changing circumstances in the city and in some cases decide on the need 
to alter the forms of land tenancy within their home comunidades. This issue reveals the 
differences expressed by certain figures within the union and traditional authorities over 
what it means to be originario, in the sense of being an authentic native member of the 
place they inhabit. 
Chapter 6 discusses the case of Piruani: how a dispute among families about land 
became a conflict between the different forms of authority that illustrates different 
understandings of justice, decolonisation and the meanings they attach to the term 
originario. Chapter 7 discusses how national-level discourses about the meaning of 
development are interpreted locally. In reality, much of the local debates about the issue 
of development concern how the local peasant union and MAS politicians are accused 
of re-creating forms of clientelism and prebendalism, against which they had previously 
fought. The role of the peasant union as a mediator for development funds alongside the 
status of development as a local emic concept is owed to the reforms of the 1990s which 
changed the relationship between rural peoples and the state. This also helps explain 
how a large part of the difference in the meanings attached to development by the 
different authorities turns on how they represent different dimensions of the common 
aspirations of highland peoples. These differences are expressed through distinct 
narratives of historic struggle. 
Chapter 8 concludes by summarising the data and arguments outlined above and 
considering what they say about the current period of reform in Bolivia. This will be 
related to the wider movement of democratically elected leftist governments in the 
region and the contradictions and conflicts generated by constitutional reform and 
attempts to re-define citizenship. 
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Chapter 2. Following Local Politics in Multiple Locations 
 Introduction 
As was explained in the opening chapter, my original interest in going to Bolivia had 
been to study the local politics of urban migrants from the highlands through a multi-
sited ethnography. While the nature of my fieldwork remained multi-sited, the political 
situation I was confronted with, which became the central theme of this thesis, centred 
around the rural community of Bolívar province. To follow this political situation and 
some of the key actors involved in it I travelled frequently between the countryside and 
various urban locations. This was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, a number of my 
informants did not live solely or primarily in the countryside, but rather in the cities of 
Oruro and Cochabamba and this pattern of migration and double residence had 
increasingly begun to shape and define the province and the content of its local politics. 
Secondly, a number of meetings I attended, mainly with the traditional authorities, took 
place in La Paz, Oruro, Sucre and Cochabamba. 
This chapter will describe the field sites in which I worked at various scales. The first 
section will begin with a brief description of Bolivia before discussing Bolívar province 
and the structure of its local government. I will then describe the nature of rural-urban 
migration, double residence and multi-locality, that have become increasingly common 
characteristics of not only Bolívar but Bolivian society more generally. Finally, I will 
describe two local field sites in which I spent time: the town of Bolívar and the 
comunidad of Vilaycayma and the peri-urban neighbourhoods of Copacabana and Yuraq 
Rumi in Cochabamba. 
I. Bolivia, Bolívar and Multi-locality 
 i. Bolivia: a changing landscape 
Bolivia is a landlocked country situated in the heart of the South American continent, 
bordered by Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, with a population of 
approximately ten million, divided geographically between the western Andean 
highlands, the central valleys, the eastern tropical lowlands and semi-arid Chaco region, 
each with different climates, peoples and cultures. The country’s primary political 
divisions are its nine departments that are further divided into provinces and local 
municipal governments. While a small nation in population and economic power, it 
48 
 
 
possesses an enormously diverse and complex culture and rich history. Bolivia’s ethnic 
make-up has gathered it some fame as the ‘most indigenous’ country in the Americas 
based on a 2001 census result (Postero, 2007). Since the election of the MAS to power 
and the passing of a new ‘plurinational’ constitution the state officially recognises 36 
indigenous groups, the largest two being the Aymara and Quechua speakers of the 
highlands. Nevertheless, the reality of ethnic identity in Bolivia is complex and escapes 
simplistic definition and as in much of Latin America ethnicity is a fluid concept that 
often interpenetrates with other social categories such as class. Contemporary 
understandings of ethnicity have evolved from the racial division of Spanish colonial 
society into indigenous subjects, criollos and peninsulares or the white ruling class and 
intermediate mixed-race categories such as mestizo or cholo, the latter referring to an 
upwardly mobile person of indigenous ancestry often involved in commerce (Lazar, 
2007, 2008; Albro, 2010).  Ethnic identity is not defined solely by an individual’s 
phenotype so much as by their use of certain cultural markers of dress and speech, 
residence, wealth or occupation and people can become more or less ‘Indian' by gaining 
education or employment or moving to the city (Weismantel, 2001).  
The fluidity of ethnic categories in Bolivia is relevant to understanding why indigenous 
self-identification dropped by approximately 20% in the 2012 census (INE, 2012). The 
reasons for this shift are not entirely clear. One factor could be the increase in migration 
from the countryside to the cities where the younger generation become bilingual or 
Spanish-speaking monolinguals and individuals may change their ethnic identification. 
The large decline among the category of Quechua and Aymara also suggests that many 
people, such as the inhabitants of valley regions and the colonists of the tropics, who 
had adopted indigenous identity in a limited and strategic fashion (Grisaffi, 2010; Albro, 
2005b), have decided to instead identify as mestizos, a phenomenon which may point to 
popular disaffection with the ethnic nationalist discourse of the MAS (Schavelzon, 
2013). Furthermore, the 2012 census, unlike in 2001, had used the term ‘peasant’ in 
formulating indigenous identity (indigéna originario campesino or native indigenous 
peasant person). The different notions of identity expressed by rural social organisations 
could have motivated some individuals to answer 'no' due to the use of this word 
(Stefanoni, 2013). As will be explored in subsequent chapters, the peasant union in 
Bolívar tend to prefix originario with campesino, while this use of the word is strongly 
rejected by various traditional leaders. Moreover, although most of my informants in 
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Bolívar referred to themselves as originarios, this term is linked to the MAS project of 
popular nationalist indigeneity (Ibid.). As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, while it 
is common among the comunidades of the province for people to have a strong sense of 
being different from individuals from towns and cities, it is important to distinguish 
these local notions of personhood from national discourse on ethnic identity. 
2001 Census 
Ethnic 
Group 
Quechua Aymara Guarani Chiquitano Other None 
Population
% 
30.7 25.2 1.5 2.2 1.4 37.9 
 
2012 Census 
Ethnic 
Group 
Quechua Aymara Guarani Chiquitano Other None 
Population
% 
18.7 17.5 1.2 1.4 1.3 58.2 
 
Figure 3: Bolivian ethnic composition. Source: Bolivian Census 2001 and 2012 (INE, 2001, 2012). 
In this thesis I frequently use the term indigenous. Nevertheless, many individuals from 
the communities of Bolívar province consider the Spanish word indígena a term for 
lowland peoples and will use the term originario if they wish to be identified in this 
way. However, originario is a word with many complex meanings, including both a 
category of ayllu membership, being a native of a place and being separate from white 
and mestizo society. In addition, I frequently make use of the word Indian, despite the 
fact that the Spanish indio is considered an insult, as it effectively denotes a particular 
subaltern group of rural highland peoples who share a common social and historical 
situation. It is also used in this sense by Aymara intellectuals and indigenous political 
activists who attempt to reclaim the word in an empowering and positive way (Hurtado, 
1986).  Two related processes that have accelerated in Bolivia in the last twenty years 
are its transformation from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society as a 
result of migration from the countryside and the entrance into the political arena and 
seizure of power by indigenous peoples, alongside the rise of indigenous politics. At the 
local and national level marginalised people who were previously excluded from power 
have taken control of the levers of government. Both processes have occurred in Bolívar 
province where the transformation of politics, identity and individuals’ relationship with 
the state and wider society is still under way. 
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 ii. Bolívar: Territory and Government 
Bolívar is located in the far corner of the department of Cochabamba. Although 
Cochabamba is considered a valley region, Bolívar is located among the dry and rugged 
highland terrain of the Andean altiplano and is in fact closer to the city of Oruro than 
the departmental capital of Cochabamba. Its location and lack of proper roads had 
maintained it in relative isolation until quite recently and prior to the construction of a 
bridge over the river Arque in the early 2000s it would have been cut off from the rest of 
the department by seasonal flooding during half the year.  
Bolívar is the smallest, least-populated, poorest and most geographically isolated 
province in the whole of Cochabamba department, with a population of approximately 
seven thousand dispersed over 58 scattered hamlets or comunidades and the provincial 
capital. Nevertheless, it has a long and proud history which stretches back to before the 
colonisation of the Americas. Previously, it had been ‘canton Kirkiawi’ of Arque 
province and gained its independent status in the 1980s, taking the name of the former 
canton capital of Bolívar. It is believed that the geographical division of Bolívar is 
almost precisely coterminous with the historic territory of Ayllu Kirkiawi (Mendoza et. 
al., 2002).  
It is this longer history that explains the region’s continued sense of identity and 
territorial integrity. In the past, the term ayllu would have referred to a system of 
territorial organisation among Aymara kingdoms and the Inca empire of tawintinsuyu, of 
which there is evidence the present-day territory of Bolívar province formed a part 
(Ibid.). In contemporary Bolivia, however, the term ayllu is often used to refer to forms 
of rural community dispersed over multiple locations with their own forms of 
government and understandings of territorial organisation. In Bolívar I heard the term 
ayllu used primarily in two senses. The first was in a global sense to refer to the place 
where people lived, the land and the different comunidades. The second referred to the 
traditional authorities who formed the social organisation of the ayllu. As in other ayllu 
regions that have been described in classic ethnographic accounts (Rasnake, 1988; 
Harris, 1978; Cusicanqui, 1990), there exists a Russian doll-like structure in which the 
same organisational features are repeated at each level of scale. Smaller territorial units 
are contained within larger ones and each of these possesses authorities with 
corresponding responsibilities for administering the land and performing associated 
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ritual activities. The ayllu can therefore be understand as a form of territorial and social 
organisation based around people’s relationship with the land, managing its use and the 
conflicts which result from it. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Map showing the location of Bolívar Province, Cochabamba Department 
and Bolivia 
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Figure 5: Map of Bolívar Province showing the areas of cantons and the locations 
of union sub-centrales 
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Figure 6: Map of Bolívar Province showing the ayllu divisions of jap'iys and 
pirañus 
54 
 
 
However, things are complicated in Bolívar by the fact that there exist multiple forms of 
territorial organisation and political authority. Alongside the ayllu authorities are the 
peasant union and the local municipal government. In addition to a historic ayllu, 
Bolívar is a province and a unitary municipality. The peasant union would have become 
a feature of local government following the agrarian reform in 1953. In the 1980s, 
Bolívar gained its status as a province and current name, resulting in the division of its 
territory into eight administrative sub-divisions or cantons. In addition to the cantons 
exist the sub-centrales, the intermediate level of organisation of the peasant union 
between the comunidad and the province. Prior to the reforms of the 1990s local 
government would have been decidedly limited in character and out of the direct control 
of the originarios of the comunidades. Typically, provinces in Bolivia are made up of 
multiple small municipalities. However, as Bolívar owes its existence as a province to 
its historical status as a territory and not its size, the entire province is served by a single 
municipal council. Moreover, since 2004 the municipal government has been composed 
solely of representatives from the ayllu and peasant union authorities, effectively uniting 
all the different forms of authority and political organisation into a single system. 
The most basic unit of territory and political authority in Bolívar is the comunidad. This 
is a small hamlet of around thirty families, all of whom engage in agricultural work. 
Access to land and its organisation are administered according to traditional custom or 
usos y costumbres and crucially land use is enjoyed as a usufruct right instead of 
through private ownership. Within the comunidad there exist various forms of local 
administration, including both a peasant union leader or dirigente and a jilanku; a 
traditional authority responsible along with his wife for managing the seasonal rotation 
and use of land, disputes that arise from it and associated rituals. Along with the 
dirigente, the jilanku also helps organise communal work and festive events and 
coordinates with the local government and NGOs. They also chair the monthly meeting 
of the comunidad: a communal assembly in which all residents discuss and take 
collective decisions on matters that affect them. Beyond the comunidad the territorial 
structure of the ayllu extends to include constellations of typically around five 
comunidades known as jap’iys, which in turn make up the two divisions of wichay 
pirañu and uray pirañu or aransaya and urinsaya. According to the emic geographical 
categories of the province these last two divisions reflect a difference in terrain between 
the lower and more fertile zona valle and the higher zona puna that is more suited to the 
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pasture of animals. Each jap’iy corresponds to a mountain peak: a cerro or apu. 
Although the jap’iys and union sub-centrales are not contiguous they are often spoken 
about as if they were, as a result of the popular belief that the different forms of 
authority form a single system.   
According to this commonly expressed notion, the different levels of authority within 
the ayllu and peasant union are equivalent to each other and serve complementary 
functions, as shown in Figure 7. The ayllu authorities were often referred to as the 
autoridades originarias or originario authorities, although this is frequently translated 
in this thesis to ‘traditional authorities’. At the level of the jap’iy are the Kuraj Tatas 
(literally in Quechua ‘the elder fathers’), who alongside their wives or Kuraj Mamas are 
responsible for resolving issues related to land among the different comunidades and 
who would have formerly been responsible for collecting the territorial head tax known 
as the contribución territorial or la tasa, before this practice ceased at some point after 
the agrarian reform. The equivalent union authorities are the dirigentes sub-centrales 
who chair meetings of the sub-centrales, attended in theory by the various 
corresponding jilankus, dirigentes and Kuraj Tatas, as well as assuming roles at the 
level of the province as secretaries of different areas such as education, transport or 
agricultural production. All these leadership roles or cargos, including those of local 
dirigente and jilanku, are changed each year in January as new figures take over. This is 
often described in terms of rotation or muyu and ensures that no one family or 
comunidad dominates the others. At the level of the comunidad, the rotation takes place 
between families, whilst at the higher levels it takes place between the comunidades 
themselves (although in the case of the peasant union sub-centrales individuals are 
nominated by their comunidad and elected rather than chosen according to a principle of 
rotation). Unlike the peasant union, all cargos in the ayllu are theoretically assumed by 
married couples, a practice referred to in Bolívar as chachawarmi. Moreover, the Kuraj 
Tatas, upon assuming their cargo take the name of the sacred mountain of their jap’iy 
and are said to embody the place they represent, referring to each other by these names 
during meetings. Traditionally their commitment to the cargo would have meant they 
would never have appeared in public without wearing the symbols of their office: the 
long, woven poncho, chalina scarf, chicote rope whip and staff of power or tata 
santísimo. Above the Kuraj Tatas are the pirañus, leaders of aransaya and urinsaya, 
who perform similar functions.  
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The highest forms of authority in the province are the head of the peasant union, 
sometimes referred to with the honorific Tata Provincial or simply as Dirigente, the 
leader of the ayllu or Kuraj Mallku and the municipal government. The municipal 
government consists of an elected mayor and a five-person council. The Mayor and four 
of the councillors are currently representatives of the MAS, while one councillor 
represents POKUY, the ‘political instrument’ of the ayllu. Due to the effects of the 
reforms of the 1990s the peasant union has a stronger relationship with the municipal 
government and plays more of a role in delivering and administrating development 
projects and public works, although both jilanku and dirigente exercise this function 
locally. Most of the local MAS politicians come from a peasant union background, 
although some, like the Mayor, Francisco Delgado, are individuals with a more 
apolitical professional background who worked previously as technical staff or técnicos 
in the muncipal government. In addition to the peasant union there exists a women’s 
union, the Bartolina Sisas, named after the wife of indigenous revolutionary Túpak 
Katari. They work alongside the male peasant union figures and are affiliated to the 
same parent organisation. The parent organisations or organizaciones matrizes of the 
union and ayllu involve the local authorities in wider regional and national political 
networks and discourses. The union is affiliated to the FSUTCC, the departmental 
division of the National Confederation of Peasant Workers or CSUTCB, which in turn 
forms part of the unitary Bolivian national trade union federation, known by its 
acronym of the COB. Meanwhile, the traditional authorities are linked to COAMAC, 
the departmental level of the national CONAMAQ federation of ayllus. While the 
FSUTCC offices are still staffed and located just south of Cochabamba’s city centre, the 
COAMAC offices have been abandoned as a result of a lack of funds and the national 
MAS government’s interference with CONAMAQ. Sabino Veizaga, an ex-Mallku from 
the comunidad of Tanqaleque was formerly a full-time employee of COAMAC and 
complained to me about the fragmentation of the organisation. Meanwhile, the 
municipal government, which receives and administers funds for development projects 
from various sources, is linked to the departmental and national government. The 
departmental and national congresspeople for the MAS party were both often present 
during the general provincial level meetings of the ampliado general. 
The aforementioned ampliado general is attended by the representatives of the 
municipal government and all the social organisations of the province. It is held on the 
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second Saturday of every month in the town of Bolívar and represents a space in which 
information is passed down from the departmental level, the different authorities issue 
reports and matters that affect the province are discussed at length. In addition, the 
Municipal Development Committee or CDM also takes place on a bi-monthly basis and 
is an opportunity for all the different social leaders to audit the development projects 
being carried out in the province. The traditional authorities also carry out their own 
regular meeting that takes place shortly before the ampliado general. These meetings 
will often include discussions of potential sources of funding for education or 
development but also frequently centre on discussions of national politics, such as 
legislation concerning mining and extractive industry or indigenous justice and 
sometimes feature external speakers from other ayllus or NGOS.  
It is worth taking note of the level of commitment required by someone who takes on a 
role in local government in Bolívar. For example, without taking into account meetings 
outside of the province, a Kuraj Mallku will typically attend the bi-monthly meetings of 
the CDM, the ampliado general, the ayllu, their local comunidad and sub-central. They 
will therefore end up attending a circuit of meetings at a pace of roughly one per week 
during the year. Often these meetings will last between six and ten hours and in some 
cases will take more than one day, as there is no time limit and issues are simply 
discussed until consensus is arrived at. I attended all the aforementioned meetings 
during my fieldwork and my overwhelming memory is of physical discomfort: of sitting 
cramped for hours in a chair or of feeling the cold slowly creep into my body as the day 
wore into evening. The extent to which participation in autonomous forms of self-
governing civic politics is an obligatory and somewhat onerous duty among local 
communities in Bolivia has been discussed by various authors (Lazar, 2008; Postero, 
2007; Linera, 2004). This is evidently no less the case amongst the inhabitants of 
Bolívar province. 
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Figure 7: Structure of local government in Bolívar Province 
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 iii. Multi-Locality, Movement and Migration  
Individuals from Bolívar province do not always live in one place but tend to move 
between areas and often maintain multiple residences. This feature of Andean life and 
social organisation has been studied extensively and is considered one of the defining 
attributes of ayllu communities (Platt, 1986; Harris, 1978). This is often expressed 
through the notion of ‘verticality’, first used in the works of Archaeologist John Murra 
(1956), which refers to the control of and access to discontinuous spaces and territories 
held together by networks of kinship and mediated through cultural institutions in a 
form of non-market economic and political organisation. For Murra, this is the product 
of the particular geography of the Andes, with multiple ecological zones suitable for the 
production of specific goods necessitating the control of discontinuous territories and 
the movement of people and resources between them, thus resulting in the historic 
structure of the great ayllus, in which communities were distributed between different 
islands of territory and held together through non-market exchange and seasonal 
migration, while smaller territorial units and political structures were contained within 
progressively larger ones. People in Bolívar today are entirely comfortable with the idea 
of moving between multiple places and residences while maintaining bonds that link 
them to larger communities and political entities. However, rather than keeping lands 
within an ayllu in different ecological zones and practising seasonal transhumance and 
economic exchange or integrating themselves within larger ayllu polities, this is 
characterised by temporary and definitive migration to the cities and eastern tropical 
lowlands, mediated through ties of kinship and cultural institutions that facilitate the 
flow of goods and persons, alongside the integration of political authorities into wider 
contemporary networks and spaces. 
Seasonal migration between the comunidades of Bolívar and the city and in some cases 
the tropical lowland regions has been a phenomenon for many years. Activity in the 
comunidades is centred around agriculture and seasonal changes in climate that permit 
certain forms of production. Life in the high altiplano is difficult and precarious. 
Environmental conditions mean that traditional agricultural practices aim to minimise 
the risks of catastrophic crop failure and seasonal rainfall dictates when crops can be 
sown and harvested. The calendar of cultural events follows this cycle of production, 
ritually marking the passage of time and providing occasions that bring the community 
together when it is necessary to mobilise individuals to work (Antequera, 2013; Sheild-
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Johannson, 2014). This agrarian-festive cycle, with its different seasons, activities and 
ritual events or fiestas is represented schematically below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Schematic of the agrarian-festive cycle 
Patterns of cyclical migration to and from the cities and the comunidades of Bolívar 
must be understood in terms of this agrarian-festive cycle, something which I witnessed 
during my time in Bolivia and was described to me by the local anthropologist Nelson 
Antequera, who has written on this topic in relation to Bolívar province (Antequera, 
2011). During the sowing period between September and November and particularly in 
the weeks following Todos Santos or All Saints Day on November 1st large numbers of 
double residents from the cities of Oruro and Cochabamba return to help sow potatoes 
and onions in family plots of land. This is a period of intense activity requiring the 
coordination of large work parties. By December there is a lull in agricultural activity as 
crops have been sown and people await the rainy season and many rural residents 
temporarily migrate to the city. Women will often beg in the streets and while men may 
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do the same, they typically find temporary work as porters in the markets or with a 
family contact. This is done in order to obtain cash for items such as school equipment 
and clothing. In Cochabamba in the weeks leading up to Christmas the streets fill up 
with women from various parts of the altiplano accompanied by their young children 
begging on the pavements, a somewhat uncomfortable sight for the middle-class urban 
residents of Cochabamba. Between March and April people begin to harvest potatoes 
while May is the period for harvesting onions. As with the sowing period this requires 
large work parties and families resident in the cities will return for short periods of 
intense activity. From June to July almost everyone in Bolívar dedicates themselves to 
the production of ch’uño as it is the month that marks the start of the period of dry and 
cold weather with very low overnight temperatures necessary for freezing potatoes4. 
Again, families will return to help make ch’uño and carry quantities with them to the 
city for their personal use or sale. The period from the end of July through to September 
is when there is no longer any agricultural production in the altiplano and individuals 
may seek work in the cities or the tropical regions.  
Definitive migration to urban areas or the tropics has increasingly come to characterise 
the province as many comunidades have become effectively emptied out of permanent 
residents, while younger families seek education for their children and access to the 
money economy of the cities. In some cases, the majority of their members live 
elsewhere and return periodically for festive and cultural events and to participate in 
agricultural work in the manner described above. Another way in which individuals 
resident in the city are connected to their home comunidad is through their more or less 
obligatory participation in civic political life. The traditional authorities described above 
could be described as a fiesta cargo system, as detailed in classic ethnographic accounts 
of the Andes (Rasnake, 1988). Such systems of local governance emerged during the 
colonisation of the Americas in response to the missionisation of native populations by 
the Catholic church and the partial integration into the state of semi-autonomous native 
communities. In the Andes, the cargo system is traditionally characterised by the 
rotation of authorities and a path of increased responsibility through which individuals 
pass, commonly referred to as thaki, alongside the duty to sponsor festive activities or 
fiestas, usually tied to traditional Catholic saints’ days. Participation is a civic duty of 
                                               
4 Ch’uño is made by leaving potatoes outside overnight to freeze. They are then defrosted and water is 
squeezed out by stepping on them before being left to dry in the sun. The final product is very durable and 
is either kept as an emergency food source or sold. 
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married couples that helps reproduce the community and define what it means to be a 
person within it. 
The extent to which the system of authorities and local governance in Bolívar province 
approximates to classic definitions of the cargo system is complicated by numerous 
factors, not least the fact that many individuals and entire comunidades no longer 
participate in Catholic festivals and that there exist multiple forms of authority. Much of 
the significance of the cargo system as far as it exists in contemporary Bolívar lies in 
the fact that assuming roles or cargos is a condition of continued membership of the 
comunidad and therefore of access to land, alongside participation in communal 
assemblies and other elements of civic politics. Those resident in the city continue to 
participate in the life of their home comunidades for a variety of reasons, yet the fact 
that they have access to lands to supplement their family resources in the city is 
undoubtedly a major factor. This contributes to the reproduction of the comunidad over 
multiple locations, the continued sense of identity and belonging of those resident in the 
city and the flow of people and resources between different areas. 
As shall be explored in greater detail in the following chapter, since before the 
colonisation of the Americas highland communities would have been integrated into 
larger state systems according to notions of reciprocal hierarchical relations. Moreover, 
the idea of leaders walking far to represent their community and to deal with higher 
authorities forms an important part of oral history in Bolívar. In the same way that 
migration and double residence arguably reflect long-standing cultural logics, so is the 
manner in which the political authorities of the province are integrated into larger 
governmental structures and political networks. By attending meetings, they walk, both 
literally and metaphorically, between different locations of the province and political 
spaces throughout Bolivia. Historically, leaders would travel on foot to visit the families 
and comunidades they serve and to negotiate with authorities outside of their ayllu. 
Today they travel along a circuit of local meetings alongside those of other ayllus and 
union authorities, NGOs, indigenous rights groups and branches of national 
government. In doing so they become involved in wider networks and discourses that 
affect the local politics of their province, as shall be explored in later chapters. 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  A Kuraj Tata's journey 'walked' between meetings 
The fieldwork I carried out in Bolivia was therefore multi-sited in at least two senses. In 
the first sense I followed the local authorities and the conflict between them through the 
circuit of political meetings they were involved with both locally and nationally. 
Secondly, I spent time among the people and local civic politics of the comunidad of 
Vilaycayma, which in reality was spread over multiple locations between the 
countryside and the cities of Cochabamba and Oruro. I spent time both in this 
comunidad in Bolívar and an urban location that is a destination for migrants from it. 
64 
 
 
While the political conflict between the different authorities will be explored in detail 
over the course of this thesis, the next two sections of this chapter will describe these 
local field sites. This will provide an understanding of the life-worlds of some of the 
people of Bolívar province within a smaller space closer to that of a traditional 
ethnographic study and the local forms of civic politics they are engaged in. The aim is 
to provide, albeit somewhat schematically, localised context in which to better 
understand the political conflict taking place between the different authorities of the 
province. 
 II. Local Field Sites 
 i. Local Field Site 1: Bolívar and Vilaycayma 
Most of my time in Bolívar was spent in the provincial capital and the nearby 
comunidad of Vilaycayma. The entire province is distinguished by an arid and dramatic 
landscape possessed of an austere beauty, with rugged and mountainous terrain and a 
climate so denuded of moisture that it is close to desert. The average altitude is just 
below 4000 metres above sea level, although this varies between about 3600 and 4300 
metres. While both the town of Bolívar and Vilaycayma are located in what is 
considered the lower valley region or zona valle, I often felt starved of oxygen upon 
arrival. The provincial capital is a village comprised of adobe-brick houses with a 
population of 700 people that owes its name to a mythical visit by ‘the liberator of the 
Americas’, Simon Bolívar, in 1825. Meanwhile, the town and some outlying 
comunidades are connected to Cochabamba and Oruro by a single-lane dirt road that 
weaves through the hills and mountains over sudden precipices of hundreds of feet. It is 
the location of the municipal government buildings and the only shops in the province, 
alongside recent public works constructed under the government of Evo Morales, such 
as a football stadium and a sports complex. Nearby, the imposing rust-coloured peak of 
Vilaje rises above the town and houses a newly installed communications tower which 
provides mobile phone and internet coverage to the surrounding area. In addition to 
being the seat of local government, it is where the ampliado general and the CDM 
meetings are held, as well as the site of public celebrations and cultural events which 
often coincide with political rallies.   
People from the nearby comunidades journey to the town on foot to buy food, kitchen 
supplies such as oil or matches and phone credit. The local townsfolk or llaqta runas are 
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themselves farmers and Quechua/Spanish bilinguals. However, they do not usually own 
lands within the communal areas of the ayllu comunidades but in private plots near the 
town and carry out commercial activities, such as shop keeping or the transport of goods 
and people. The llaqta runas are traditionally seen as separate from the people of the 
comunidades and were previously considered to have an exploitative relationship with 
them as middlemen and petty merchants. The well-observed cultural and economic 
divide between the indigenous inhabitants of highland communities and the mestizos of 
the local market towns (Rasnake, 1988; Harris, 1978; Platt, 1982) seems to have 
pertained in Bolívar province, although it has also broken down to some extent in recent 
years. I got to know various local families in the town, including Gregorio’s neighbour 
and padrino de matrimonio or marriage godfather Don Antonio and the local 
shopkeeper Don Preksy and his wife. I was invited to Don Antonio’s granddaughter’s 
uma ruthuku: a traditional ceremony in which a child’s hair is cut for the first time and 
which, like other events such as baptisms or weddings, provides an occasion for giving 
gifts and establishing ties of fictive kinship or compadrazgo. Around the time of 
November 1st, known in Bolivia as Todos Santos, I spent time with various families as 
they practised the custom of making shrines or mast’akus that celebrate the life of a 
recently deceased family member and invited neighbours to eat, pray and drink corn 
beer known as chicha or aqha. The following day, food, particularly bread shaped to 
represent a person (referred to as a t’antawawa) or as a ladder (that allows passage to 
the afterlife), cigarettes, coca leaves and all manner of alcoholic drinks are distributed in 
the cemetery next to the grave of the family’s loved one. Therefore, despite considering 
themselves culturally separate from the people of the comunidades, the townsfolk, like 
many people in rural and urban Bolivia, practice a form of folk Catholicism that 
contains syncretic elements of pre-Colombian beliefs. In fact, they practice these sorts 
of customs more than in some parts of the outlying countryside, given the conversion of 
many comunidades in Bolívar province to evangelical Christianity, an occurrence the 
townsfolk credit to their credulity, simplicity and lack of education.  
When I asked people from the town about their present relationship with the rest of the 
inhabitants of the province, they were somewhat ambivalent. They claimed that before 
they commanded more respect but now felt excluded, despite the welcome investment 
in their town from the MAS government. A major issue was that they no longer held any 
power or influence over local government and were unlikely to do so in the future given 
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that they represent less than 10% of the province’s population. When I spoke with 
individuals from the comunidades they told me that in the past the townsfolk were ‘like 
minor patrones’: exploitative masters who treated them with disdain in one-sided 
commercial dealings. They informed me that things have changed in the last ten years 
and that now relations between them are more like those of equals. Besides which, I was 
told, cultural differences have become blurred as many people live or travel to the city 
and young women have largely adopted what were described to me as ‘city clothes’, 
meaning the traditional pollera skirts associated with mestizo town people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Picture of Uma Ruthuku in Bolívar 
From Bolívar, the comunidad of Vilaycayma is just over an hour’s walk along the dusty 
road to Oruro, although I would often hitch a ride with lorry drivers or ride in the back 
of pick-up trucks that passed along the way. The comunidad is a semi-abandoned hamlet 
of adobe brick houses in the centre of a small valley set a few hundred metres from the 
road. Besides the central square is the sede sindical: a two-storey building in which take 
place meetings of the local communal assembly, the ayllu and visiting government 
officials and NGOs. On the side of the sede sindical there is painted in capitals the 
words, ‘VILAYCAYMA, CAPITAL OF JATUN AYLLU KIRKIAWI. VOTE POKUY!’ 
Nearby the central square there are two churches built from adobe, one that represents 
the Baptist Union and the other the ‘Church of God of Prophecy’, while what was 
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formerly the local Catholic church has fallen into complete disrepair. Amongst the rustic 
adobe houses, either roofed with corrugated iron or straw, are several modern concrete 
bungalows, being constructed as part of a project from the national housing ministry to 
provide high-quality accommodation to families in rural areas. 
Most permanent residents are grandparents whose children live in the cities or the 
tropical lowlands. At the time of my fieldwork there were only a dozen families 
permanently resident and one family with a child living in the comunidad. All 
Vilaycaymenses are Evangelical Christians as a result of a mass conversion that took 
place at some point in the 1980s. The original conversion was to the Baptist Union but 
more recently a number of residents have affiliated to an obscure Pentecostal Christian 
sect called the Church of God of Prophecy. However, it seemed that little importance 
was made of the difference between the two churches: the important distinction being 
that between Catholic and hermano, the term commonly used to refer to individuals 
converted to Evangelical Christianity. While some Catholic saints’ days and festivities 
are still celebrated alongside customs such as the chewing of coca leaves before sowing 
crops, they no longer practice the associated feasting and large-scale consumption of 
alcohol. The chewing of coca leaves remains ubiquitous in the comunidades, as it is 
both a deep-rooted cultural practice that ritually expresses everyday reciprocity in the 
form of giving and offering handfuls of leaves and is a necessary way of dealing with 
tiredness and the cold, its daily consumption being analogous in some ways to tea or 
coffee among people in the UK.  
Inhabitants, such as the septuagenarian Don Enrique Tola, told me how the most 
important thing for them now is God, who they referred to as Tata Dios, and that they 
were better people for having stopped drinking. Everyone who lives in Vilaycayma is 
primarily involved in agricultural work and I participated in and observed various forms 
of this during my fieldwork, including the making of ch’uño freeze-dried potatoes and 
pasturing llamas. A number of families have flocks of grazing animals which they take 
daily to the hills. Land is divided into different categories with distinct rights of access 
depending on its purpose (this will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5). 
Individual families possess plots of arable land within communal fields called ayonoqas 
or mantas, only some of which are used at any one time in order to preserve the fertility 
of the soil. 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Picture of a street in Vilaycayma 
The communal management of the land is the responsibility of the jilanku, who at the 
time of my fieldwork was Tata Maximo Mamani. The jilanku is also responsible, 
according to traditional custom or the usos y costumbres, for the resolution of conflicts, 
the organisation of certain types of communal work and the traditional rituals associated 
with these activities. Alongside the peasant union dirigente, Don Severino Condori, the 
two helped organise cultural events, solve common problems, organise communal work 
and chair the monthly communal assembly. This is held in the sede sindical on the first 
Saturday of every month and tends to vary in size depending on how many of the much 
larger double resident community from the cities of Oruro and Cochabamba are present. 
As with other meetings in Bolívar and elsewhere, issues are discussed openly until 
consensus is arrived at, although conflicts often take place over matters such as the use 
of land. During one of the first meetings I attended in July 2015 there was an argument 
concerning the use of arable land for pasture, as this is permitted in the cold season 
between July and September, leading to a disagreement mainly between those local 
residents who pasture sheep and llamas and individuals largely resident in the city with 
land in the ayonoqas, who believed it needed more time to rest. While speaking with 
Tata Maximo and Don Severino, I tried to discover the key difference between their 
roles but found that in reality they substantially overlap and that the distinction between 
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the ayllu and peasant union at the local level is blurred. Below the union dirigente are 
other roles, such as the secretario de actas (who takes the minutes of meetings and 
collects fines for non-attendance), the sports and cultural secretaries and the secretario 
de relaciones (who coordinates with other nearby communities) and all are present 
during meetings. All roles or cargos are rotated annually, and new incumbents are 
chosen in early January, meaning that individuals may take up various roles at different 
times. It has become increasingly common for those resident in the cities to exercise 
either the role of jilanku or dirigente, with failure to accept the cargo punished by a 
monthly fine. While Tata Maximo is a full-time resident of Vilaycayma in his early 
forties who also owns a house in Oruro where his children study, the union dirigente is 
Don Severino, a Vilaycaymense resident in Cochabamba for more than fifteen years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Schematic of the civic political structure in Vilaycayma 
Activity in the comunidad follows the agrarian-festive cycle described schematically 
above, which also marks the periods when double residents who reside mainly in the 
city will return. For example, during the period around Todos Santos in early November 
large numbers of people return to the comunidad to participate in the sowing of crops 
ahead of the rainy season in December and January as well as to visit extended family. 
When I visited Vilaycayma at this time it was transformed from a semi-abandoned 
hamlet of elderly residents to a bustling village full of children and young people 
playing football or with spinning tops next to dozens of cars and pick-up trucks parked 
along the roadside. These periods also coincide with the largest meetings of the 
communal assembly, which may become so crowded there is barely space in the sede 
sindical for people to stand. During harvest time in early May, Vilaycayma is famous 
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for its Toro Tinku or ritualised bullfight in which bulls are pitted against each other, 
again providing a significant cultural event for families who live elsewhere at the time 
they return to collaborate in harvesting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Picture of the author dancing the jula-jula in the fiesta of tata santiago 
A further event that draws people back to their home comunidad is the fiesta of Tata 
Santiago, a Spanish Catholic saint who has acquired great significance among people in 
rural Bolivia and is considered to have powers of prophecy and healing. Years ago, the 
different comunidades of the province would have congregated in the town of Bolívar to 
participate in a ritualised inter-community fight known as the Runa Tinku. Today this 
has been replaced by an inter-community football tournament and dancing contest and I 
was asked to take part in this alongside the people of Vilaycayma, much to the 
amusement of a number of spectators. The event is marked by an enormous influx of 
individuals resident in the city to their home comunidades, who descend in their 
thousands upon the town in what is a celebration of their identity and home community. 
Dressed in traditional originario clothing they fill up the central square where they 
wave wiphala indigenous flags. 
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 ii. Local Field Site 2: Copacabana and Yuraq Rumi  
The neighbourhoods of Yuraq Rumi and Copacabana are located in Distrito 14 or Villa 
Pagador in the south of the city of Cochabamba, an area that has been heavily settled by 
highland migrants, especially from the department of Oruro. The atmosphere is warm, 
dry and full of dust, as what was once an area of pasture in the hills overlooking the city 
has been transformed into a crowded peri-urban area with little space for vegetation and 
only the dry, rocky earth of the steep hillside. The neighbourhoods are constructed with 
each row of houses perched improbably atop the other until they reach the summit, 
hundreds of feet above the Cochabamba Valley. Most of the inhabitants are Quechua-
speaking migrants from Bolívar province, with many from the comunidad of 
Vilaycayma. The older and more established neighbourhoods of the zone, such as Villa 
Luz, are located closer to the central Los Angeles avenue, while the newer residences 
are precariously and tenaciously built further up the hill, their physical location and state 
mirroring their social position and status within the urban space. It was here I spent time 
with various families from Bolívar and Vilaycayma and initially made contact with 
people through involvement with the local Baptist Congregation in Yuraq Rumi, where 
my wife and I gave weekly English classes and made friends with the pastor, Don Victor 
Ari, himself from Vilaycayma. For the families I knew, various factors provided them 
with continuity with their home comunidad and a sense of community in the city, 
including their continued participation in rural civic duties, cultural events and the 
cultivation of communal lands. However, an important factor was their identity as 
Evangelical Christians or hermanos, either as part of the local Baptist Union 
congregation or the Church of God of Prophecy, which also held regular emotionally 
charged and confessional meetings in the neighbourhoods. 
The land that makes up these neighbourhoods had been divided and sold in small 
sections or lotes of approximately 300 square metres some 15 years ago, when it had 
been nothing more than an area of open hillside. In order to construct a home, it would 
have been first necessary to dig into the rocky earth, carve out a space in which to live 
and mark out the extension of the lote: an operation which symbolically mirrors the 
painstaking legal process of regularising the land and by extension individuals’ status as 
residents of the city. The lotes were purchased without title deeds or recognition in the 
official registry of derechos reales and with only a minuta de compra or receipt of sale. 
While families are effectively squatting and have little to no legal recourse against 
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others who may try to appropriate their land, they accept this situation as the only 
means of acquiring a foothold in the city.  In order to acquire full individual legal title of 
their lote the residents must engage in a long and uncertain bureaucratic process. In 
essence this consists of four steps: the first is the purchase of the lote and the 
construction of a dwelling with a perimeter wall, following this the inhabitants wait 
until the census includes their neighbourhood within the National Statistics Institute or 
INE, meaning the land is recognised as urban, allowing them to petition the government 
for projects and improvements under the LPP law, before finally paying an architect and 
topographer to draw up a detailed general plan of the neighbourhood including common 
areas and the extent of each individual lote, which is presented alongside other 
documents including those showing the original sale of the land and the payment of 
taxes to the offices of the city government. While it may appear relatively 
straightforward, this process can suffer numerous setbacks. During my fieldwork in 
Cochabamba the residents of the neighbourhood of Copacabana had been impeded in 
individually titling their lotes by the fact that not every family which appeared in the 
general plan corresponded to previous census records. Several residents had bought 
their lote from a prior occupant who in some cases had migrated to Spain or Argentina 
and were impossible to contact. None of the residents of the sector at the time of my 
fieldwork had gained full ownership of the land they lived on and by extension lacked 
legitimacy in the eyes of the state and full inclusion as citizens within the urban area.  
Much of the civic organisation within these neighbourhoods is a result of the common 
condition of legal precarity the residents find themselves in. As Don Victor’s wife, Doña 
Elsa, commented pithily while we were drinking mazamorra corn drink in the kitchen 
of her house one afternoon, ‘No one has regularised their land yet. For this reason, we 
are so united here in this sector.’ These forms of local community organisation also 
function to allow residents access to funds for public services and resources from the 
city government and external agencies and to carry out general improvements to the 
neighbourhood. The most common of these is the OTB or Organización Territorial de 
Base, brought about by the 1994 LPP law. For a residents’ council or junta vecinal to 
gain status as an OTB it is necessary to formally define the territorial extension and 
limits of the neighbourhood. Consequently, the individual private ownership of land 
provides the basis upon which individuals organise and make demands of the state. The 
general assembly of the OTB of Copacabana meets on a bi-monthly basis in the casa 
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comunal: a building that is functionally similar to the sede sindical in which meetings 
are held in the countryside, acting as a meeting point and the seat of local community 
organisation. Moreover, the form meetings take is remarkably similar. Residents 
assemble within the casa comunal in front of the directorio or committee of the OTB 
and discuss the issues in an agenda before taking decisions by collective assent.  
While the OTB consists of a directorio of various secretaries responsible for housing, 
health, culture, sport and so forth (in a similar fashion to the organisation of the 
comunidad) there is a core committee of about four members including the president, 
who assume a large amount of the responsibility for organising meetings and dealing 
with local government. Various residents take the role of jefe de manzana or block 
leader, responsible for communicating information and communal work among their 
immediate neighbours. Nevertheless, the asamblea represents the sovereign body which 
provides final assent to all actions.  
 
Figure 14: Schematic of the civic political structure of the OTB 
Meetings of the asamblea are compulsory: regular failure to attend may result in a fine 
and meetings do not conclude until there is agreement on what to do. If the assembly 
decides it necessary to carry out communal work, failure to comply is sanctioned with a 
fine equivalent to a day’s salary. During one meeting I attended of Copacabana OTB it 
was deemed necessary to carry out trabajo comunal or communal work to clear earth 
from the homes of families who had been affected by landslides during the rains and all 
present immediately organised themselves to meet after lunch and disseminated the 
information via the block leaders to those not present. This manner of self-government 
and collective decision making is very similar to that of the countryside and arguably 
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embodies similar notions of democracy and citizenship, which in turn resemble those of 
civic republicanism (Linera, 2004; Lazar, 2004, 2007; Postero, 2007). In addition, 
leadership is conceived of in a similar fashion, with roles referred to as cargos and 
viewed as a form of service to the community which both implies financial and personal 
costs and bestows prestige and growth on the person. Other local organisations include 
the junta escolar, similar in some respects to a parent-teacher organisation but with 
much wider scope. Through monthly financial contributions and communal work, the 
residents of Copacabana had helped build the local school, Centro Educativo Libertad, 
and continued to pay the salaries of some of the teachers. The comité de agua or water 
committee represents another organisation separate to the OTB but affiliated with it. As 
none of the neighbourhoods in the sector are included within the system of the public 
water company SEMAPA, the comité de agua arranges for the tanker trucks to deliver 
water to a self-constructed water system, measure usage and calculate the monthly 
contribution of each family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: View from the church in Yuraq Rumi 
While there are obvious continuities in local civic politics between the countryside and 
the city, the conditions of rural migrant’s inclusion as members of the community and 
the economic activities they are involved in represent a rupture to their way of life. 
Individuals in peri-urban neighbourhoods like Copacabana and Yuraq Rumi face 
constant uncertainty as to their inclusion in the city and must fight to acquire individual 
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title deeds for the land they occupy. A similar condition of uncertainty and precarity 
results from the way individuals make a living in the money economy of the city. Work 
in Bolívar province is distinguished by periods of intense activity and relative inactivity 
and is dictated by the agrarian cycle with its associated cultural activities and seasonal 
migration to and from the city. Meanwhile, work in Cochabamba is a constant process 
of acquiring money and maximising the amount one can earn. Comunidades like 
Vilaycayma exhibit certain characteristics of an agrarian subsistence or peasant 
economy (Wolf, 1966; Scott, 1976; Chayanov, 1986) in the sense that productive 
activity is directed towards the social reproduction of the family. In making a living the 
goal is not to maximise yields but to employ various strategies to hedge against the 
possibility of the catastrophic loss of crops, given the inherent precarity of agriculture in 
the highlands. Making a living in the city is also inherently uncertain given the nature of 
the informal economy but leads to different outcomes.  
Among the families I came to know men typically work as day labourers in construction 
and women in informal commerce in the vast open market of la cancha, while more 
affluent residents may work as taxi drivers or have small businesses, sometimes owning 
fixed stalls or puestos, or travel as salesmen between the city and communities in the 
countryside. When I asked people to describe what is characteristic of working and 
earning a living in the city, they would explain that in the city ‘todo es plata’ 
(everything is money) and that one must ‘trabajar en lo que hay’ or work in whatever is 
available. In the city, unlike the countryside, there is a need to constantly acquire money 
to pay for the necessities of life. These include food, transport, the cost of rent or the 
costs of paying for materials in the construction and improvement of their homes and of 
legalising their lote. Yet working in the informal economy as day labourers or street 
vendors provides no guaranteed income. Don Victor described it in the following terms: 
‘...over there [in the countryside] there aren’t that many hours: you can pass the time 
doing nothing. Here we can’t pass a single hour doing nothing but rather you always 
have to do something; in that way the people, shall we say, if you are selling until late 
then you have more. let’s say that’s the advantage. If you go early then, well, you have 
very little...but then you aren’t with your child, well the children become brought 
up...badly...That’s the disadvantage here, while there we all share.’ (S) 
The logic of hedging against uncertainty characteristic of the countryside is reproduced 
in the city in as much as residents describe their lands in their home comunidades as a 
form of insurance against change in the urban economy, providing them with food for 
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sale and consumption and a refuge in the event of economic disaster. Yet when it comes 
to trying to deal with the uncertainty of the money economy, maximising the amount 
earned becomes the best strategy to hedge against the possibility of poor business. 
Moreover, the hierarchy of economic roles gives a clear sense of the possibilities for 
financial progress as part of long-term project to gain inclusion in the city and improve 
the lives of their families. 
Much of this thesis will describe the political conflict which took place through the 
different spaces described in this chapter, the points of rupture and debates between the 
different forms of authority as well as the factors which explain how it has reached its 
present state. In Chapter 5, I will return to examine the phenomenon of multi-locality 
and double residence in order to consider its impact on debates surrounding land 
tenancy. However, the following chapter will describe the history of Bolivia and of 
Bolívar/Kirkiawi from before the colonisation of the Americas until the time of my 
fieldwork. 
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Chapter 3. A History of Kirkiawi and the Bolivian Nation 
 Introduction 
Despite its size and relative geographical isolation within the department of 
Cochabamba, Bolívar has a long history which can be traced to before the colonisation 
of the Americas. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, it had formerly been 
‘canton Kirkiawi’ of Arque province and gained its independent status in the 1980s, 
taking the name of the former ‘canton capital’ of Bolívar. Kirkiawi is the name 
attributed to the territory which existed prior to the colonisation of the Americas and it 
is the continued recognition of this historic entity that has provided the area with its 
ongoing territorial integrity and identity. Bolívar province exhibits a complex and 
unusual political geography in terms of both its local governmental structure and 
territorial status, as the area is simultaneously a province, a municipality and an 
ancestral indigenous territory, legally recognised as a Tierra Comunitaria de Origen or 
TCO. At the same time, it possesses a municipal government, a peasant union and 
traditional ayllu authorities, all of which are composed of individuals from the 
indigenous comunidades of the province. While these different authorities are involved 
in a local political rift, this ultimately turns on the question of what it means to be 
originario, a term roughly equivalent to indigenous that is used to denote authentic 
membership of their community. 
This current situation can only be properly understood through examining how these 
present forms of territorial organisation, authority, identity and political consciousness 
have emerged in the course of history. For marginalised rural peoples like the 
inhabitants of Bolívar province their historical interaction with the colonial and post-
colonial state has been one of cooperation, resistance and exchange. Their history is 
inseparable from that of the larger state structures with which they have had to 
negotiate, and which have defined their social institutions and sense of collective 
identity. In the course of this process they have, in a sense, gradually come to recognise 
themselves and to be recognised as part of the Bolivian nation. For this reason, the 
present chapter aims to sketch a history of both the Bolivian nation and of Kirkiawi, 
with the objective of providing an understanding of the present social and political 
situation in Bolivia as a whole and how the local politics of this tiny province fit into the 
larger reality. Through localising wider social and political changes in the regional 
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histories of Kirkiawi it will provide context for later analysing in detail the different 
elements of the rift between the ayllu authorities and the peasant union and alcaldía. 
When examining long and complex histories it is useful to divide the past into discrete 
periods and this chapter will do precisely that. The periods I describe correspond closely 
to those used by the historian Alan Knight (2014) to characterise the change in Latin 
American states from the time of independence until the present day, while also 
overlapping with the ‘cycles’ described by Rivera Cusicanqui (1990) in analysing the 
relationship between the Bolivian state and the ayllu. The first section will cover the 
period from prior to the colonisation until the 1952 national revolution. This in fact 
encompasses three distinct periods: pre-colonial history, the colonial period and the 
period of liberal democracy. The second section will describe the corporatist period, the 
period of neoliberal reforms following Bolivia’s return to democracy and the cycle of 
near-revolutionary protests that took place at the turn of the new century. The final 
section will examine how the MAS emerged as a national government in what can be 
described as the ‘post-neoliberal’ period. It will describe how and why the different 
elements of the alliance of social movements that helped bring the MAS to power have 
come into conflict with each other and the somewhat contradictory nature of much of its 
actions, relating this analysis to the local rift in Bolívar province. This section will 
address how a governing party which expresses a discourse of populist indigeneity and 
claims to have refounded the state for the nation’s ‘indigenous majority’ has entered in 
conflict with indigenous organisations and authorities at both the national and local 
level. 
 I. From the Conquest to the National Revolution 
 i. The Aymara federations and the Incas 
There is evidence from mention in historical documents that an Ayllu Kirkiawi has 
existed in some form for at least 400 years (Mendoza et al., 2002), although there exists 
debate as to whether this Kirkiawi formed part of a larger nation or existed as an 
independent kingdom inhabited by an ethnic group known as the Turpas (Izko, 1992). 
Evidence is relatively scarce regarding the history of the territory prior to the Spanish 
colonisation. A local myth that bears a striking resemblance to the biblical story of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, claims that the name Kirkiawi originally referred to an ancient 
great lost city that was destroyed in an earthquake. Whatever the precise history of the 
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territory it is reasonable to assume that it would have existed during the time of the 
Aymara kingdoms that stretched across the cordillera of the Andes from just south of 
Cuzco to the northern highlands of present-day Bolivia. The Aymara nations or gran 
ayllus have been characterised as a form of ‘segmentary state’ (Platt, 1988) that had as 
their base the smaller ayllu community. Like other societies in the Andes they were 
characterised by a form of discontinuous control of territory in the pattern of an 
archipelago, thereby permitting access to the varied resources necessary for their 
survival from the diverse ecological niches of the Andean landscape (Bouyouse-
Cassagne, 1978). This implied a complex organisational structure and an economy 
based on practices of reciprocity and redistribution rather than market exchange (Murra, 
1956). These forms of reciprocity and redistribution were not the expression of an 
egalitarian society but rather a social mechanism that responded to the ecological 
conditions of the Andes; they were linked to a system of centralised political control 
that allowed for the extraction of surplus by the ruling elites. The ayllu in its present 
form is the result of a long history of fragmentation and internal change. Nevertheless, 
the history of territories like Kirkiawi within the confederations of Aymara kingdoms is 
relevant to understanding the political imaginary and ambitions of some of the 
traditional authorities and organisations such as CONAMAQ, as well as the way the 
ayllu has co-evolved in relationship with the colonial and post-colonial state. 
By the middle of the 15th century the kingdom of Quechua-speaking peoples that came 
to be known as the Incas had expanded from its base in the valley of Cuzco to construct 
a major empire that stretched throughout the Andes. In the 1460s they were able to 
extend their influence over the Aymara kingdoms that became integrated into the wider 
empire through a combination of military conquest and diplomacy. The Inca allowed the 
traditional Aymara rulers to remain in place and the entire area was organised into its 
own administrative region or suyu, known as Qollasuyu: one of the four suyus of the 
Inca empire Tawintinsuyu. Some kingdoms would have been granted a greater degree of 
autonomy than others. The Charka federation, to which it is believed Kirkiawi belonged 
(Mendoza et al., 2002), maintained a position as subordinate allies to the Incas, 
providing them with soldiers for their army. Under the Inca ruler Wayna Qhapac, 
however, there occurred a process of intensification of military recruitment and the re-
ordering of lands and colonies (Bouysse-Cassagne, 1978). Large areas of valley lands in 
the region known as Qucha Pampa, corresponding to the three valleys of modern-day 
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Cochabamba, were appropriated by the empire and highland colonists or mitmaq were 
settled in the valley regions from the Charkas, Suras and other groups, establishing the 
Qucha Pampa region as the ‘breadbasket’ of Tawintinsuyu. The Inca allowed a great 
deal of autonomy and independence to the ayllus whilst utilising the existing principles 
of complementarity and reciprocity in order to absorb the surplus product of self-
sufficient communities (Murra, 2002). The peasantry was obliged to work in cultivating 
state land and to provide various forms of labour service, but in a fashion that bore a 
structural and ideological resemblance to the practices carried out for their Aymara 
ethnic lords and community. 
 ii. The conquest and the Toledo reforms 
With the arrival of the conquistadores in the 1530s the territories of the Inca empire 
quickly became subjugated under Spanish colonial rule. As had happened in 
Mesoamerica a decade earlier, the conquest of the Andes had been facilitated by 
superior weaponry, horses and the creation of military alliances with regional ethnic 
groups against the local hegemonic state. In the Andes the conquistadores benefited 
from a civil war between the royal brothers Huascar and Atahualpa, which in the 
Southern Andes allowed them to gain support among most of the Aymara lords, who 
supported the claim of Huascar to the Inca throne (Klein, 2003). Initially the Spanish 
treated the Inca Manku Yupanki as puppet emperor before he led a major rebellion in 
1537 in which the majority of the Aymara nations sided with him. However, by this 
point Spanish military strength was too great and Manku Yupanki’s forces were soundly 
defeated. He fled into exile, founding the tiny neo-Inca state of Vilacamba, which 
persisted for another 36 years until its eventual destruction and the execution of his son, 
Túpak Amaru (Ibid.). 
The basic pattern of early Spanish colonisation of the Americas was dependent upon the 
existence of pre-existing rural populations and governmental structures that allowed the 
use of indirect rule to extract surplus value and exploit native labour (Donghi, 1993). In 
the ayllu communities this took the form of a head tax known as la tasa and obligatory 
labour service. In what is present day Bolivia much of the Aymara ethnic nobility were 
allowed to keep their private lands and rights to community labour in exchange for 
acting as the official representative of their community to the Spanish crown and 
guaranteeing the payment of taxes and labour obligations (Rasnake, 1988; Klein, 2003). 
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The Spanish colony was legally divided into two realms or ‘republics’ under the rule of 
the crown: the Republic of the Spanish and the Republic of Indians, allowing for the 
continuation of internal structures of governance or usos y costumbres, as well as 
providing the basis for the racialised segregation of Bolivian society that has continued 
in some form to the present day.  
The fact that territories like Kirkiawi would have existed in relation to larger state 
systems prior to the Spanish conquest while retaining their own forms of internal self-
government and territorial and economic organisation shaped the ways in which they 
managed their relationship with the colonial and post-colonial state. However, this 
relationship was never one-sided and straightforward and involved indigenous peoples 
as active participants. Steve Stern (1992) has pointed out that the composition of Latin 
American society was not the result of a one-dimensional process of colonisation by a 
homogeneous group of conquistadors against a passive indigenous population but a 
complex development in which diverse constituencies competed with each other to 
define the form and meaning it should take and in which native peoples, 'engaged — 
assisted, resisted, appropriated, subverted, redeployed — European colonial 
projects...and relationships' (Ibid, p.23). This is no less the case than with the 
relationship between the state and the Bolivian ayllu communities, whose common 
history has been one alternatively of resistance, co-operation, enmity and negotiation 
and which explains the social imaginary through which contemporary highland 
indigenous peoples are able to define themselves and their place within the Bolivian 
nation. 
Among the earliest events to affect communities in the highlands and valleys of Bolivia 
were the reforms of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1572 in response to the decline of 
the native population due to European disease and the need to ensure tax revenue and a 
labour force for the growing mining economy around Potosí. In a series of forced 
resettlements or ‘Indian reductions’, Toledo attempted to convert ayllu communities into 
nucleated settlements that were easy to tax and account for and introduced a 
standardised corvée labour system that took its name, the mita, from the obligatory 
labour service which had existed under the Inca empire. While the Toledo reforms 
undoubtedly changed the nature of rural society, resulting in the destruction and 
fragmentation of the ayllus and larger polities to which they belonged, they inevitably 
ran up against the problem that they were profoundly incompatible with the cultural 
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logics and ecological imperatives of communities living in the Andean highlands. Even 
though rural populations were ‘reduced’ into towns, in many areas the inhabitants later 
re-established their territorial structures of ‘verticality’, with colonies distributed in the 
form of an archipelago between different zones of altitude, a pattern that has persisted 
until the present day in some regions (Platt, 1986; Bouysse-Cassagne, Harris and Platt, 
2004). It was from this period also that many highland ayllus, despite maintaining a 
sense of identity and continuity, lost their outlying valley lands (Rasnake, 1988). The 
first appearance in the colonial record of Ayllu Kirkiawi is in 1646, when the authority 
Miguel Fernandez Mamani made a petition to the colonial administration to regain lost 
valley lands from nearby Sacaca (Mendoza et al., 2002). These lost lands are still 
spoken about to this day. 
While throughout the colonial period communities like Kirkiawi retained their own 
internal forms of government, production and exchange, these evolved in interaction 
with the wider society and economy. Regarding the internal economy of the ayllu there 
has been revision among Andean scholars concerning its relationship with the market. 
Early ethnographers of the Bolivian Andes (Platt, 1982; Harris, 1982) emphasised the 
separateness of the ayllu from the market economy. For example, Olivia Harris used the 
term ‘the ethnic economy’ to describe the way exchange is mediated by reciprocity and 
kinship among the Laymi of Northern Potosí and describes their resistance to the 
incursion of market exchange within the ayllu. More recent scholarship suggests that 
highland indigenous communities have historically participated in wider networks of 
trade and that their relationship with the market economy has been one of complex 
interplay (Larson, Harris and Tandeter, 1995). A major change in the internal 
government of most ayllus took place following the series of uprisings against the 
Spanish crown in 1780-1782. The indigenous noble class had been gradually worn 
down by the exactions of the colonial government and their invidious position as 
landowners and labour exploiters who were simultaneously responsible for protecting 
the internal customs or usos y costumbres of their own communities and ensuring that 
taxes and labour obligations towards the Spanish state were met (Klein, 2003). 
However, it was the wave of rebellions towards the end of the 18th century that marks 
the point when hereditary positions gave way to the rotation of authorities among 
families, characteristic of most highland indigenous communities (Rasnake, 1988). 
Interestingly, as has been mentioned earlier, this change did not take place in Kirkiawi 
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where the positions of higher authority within the ayllu remain hereditary, an 
arrangement that, as we shall see later, continues to have consequences for the local 
politics of Bolívar province. 
Beginning in the 16th century large amounts of Indian lands were seized and converted 
into haciendas, landed estates controlled by a quasi-feudal landlord class of Spanish-
descended white criollos. Not only were people’s lands appropriated but they were 
forced into providing labour for the owner or patrón of the hacienda in order to be 
allowed to reside and farm land within the estate for their own subsistence: a system 
that became known as ponguaje. The landless Indians or pongos were responsible for 
supplying not only the labour for hacienda production but also the agricultural inputs 
and transport to market of goods, alongside obligatory domestic and even sexual 
services for the landowning family. In the valley regions of Cochabamba, the entire 
rural population were despoiled of their communal lands. Despite the exploitative 
nature of this system, many individuals from free highland communities migrated in this 
period to escape the onerous responsibilities attached to ayllu membership, both to 
haciendas and to other ayllus. Migrants settled in ayllus would have been granted 
usufruct rights to land only in exchange for sharecropping and service in the work 
parties of full members of the community and would have been exempt from payment 
of the head tax. Widespread rural migration therefore gave rise to different categories of 
ayllu membership that were simultaneously fiscal categories, determining the rate of tax 
payable to the government: with originarios paying the full rate, agregados a reduced 
rate and with less access to lands and forasteros occupying the position of landless 
workers exempt from taxation. In Bolívar province today, these colonial categories 
remain, although it is my understanding that in most comunidades the overwhelming 
majority of families possess originario status. At the same time, the state began to 
recognise ethnic groups or castas in addition to those of white and Indian, such as 
mestizo and cholo: legal categories that determined an individual’s social status based in 
theory on the relative proportion of their Spanish and Indian ancestry. However, in 
reality economic and cultural status would define ethnic identity (Harris, 1995). Mestizo 
was used in the countryside to refer to individuals who farmed lands as independent 
peasant freeholders (Platt, 1986) while cholo was often used contemptuously by the 
urban middle classes to refer to a ‘semi-indigenous’ person of rural origin who operated 
a commercial enterprise, such as the female market traders who remain a ubiquitous 
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presence in Bolivian cities to this day. Mestizo in contemporary Bolivia as in other parts 
of Latin America still refers to an intermediate, culturally and supposedly ethnically 
mixed social strata between Indians and the white criollo class of landowners and urban 
professionals. Until now in Bolívar the llaqta runas or townsfolk of the provincial 
capital remain a culturally separate group, despite being Quechua speakers and sharing 
certain folk Catholic customs with the people of the ayllu comunidades, with whom 
they had formerly held a somewhat exploitative relationship as petty traders and 
middlemen.  
 iii. Independence and the liberal era 
In the transition to independence after 1825 there was a continuity in colonial 
institutions and economic structures. Bolivia’s economy remained dependent on mining, 
the commercial activity of the haciendas and the proceeds of the Indian head tax. The 
colonial separation of the two republics was recreated in the post-colonial society in the 
failure to fully include the rural indigenous majority as citizens. Indian communities 
occupied a paradoxical position within Bolivian society. The underdevelopment of the 
national economy and its reliance on mining, with periodic cycles of boom and bust, 
meant the state had to continually recur to the collection of the head tax to plug gaps in 
funding. At the same time, the existence of a rural indigenous majority, with its own 
customs, languages and forms of government was regarded as both a threat to the 
physical safety of the white elite and to the social and economic advancement of the 
nation. From the colony until independence, the relationship between the ayllus and the 
Bolivian state remained one of mutual dependence and intermittent conflict. Tristan 
Platt (1986) talks of the notion of ‘the pact’ between state and ayllu: the perception that 
in paying the tasa or Indian head tax ayllu members secured autonomy over their 
territory and usos y costumbres. While ‘the pact’ was a widely held belief among ayllu 
members, the state administration for the most part saw the head tax as a simple 
extraction of ground rent with no corresponding obligations. Nevertheless, due to the 
importance of the tax for the revenues of the colonial and postcolonial state ‘the pact’ 
existed de facto until the late nineteenth century.  
In the second half of the 19th century various attempts were made to privatise communal 
lands, particularly under the presidency of Mariano Melgarajo. However, it was under 
President Tomás Frías that the most significant attempt to expropriate ayllu land and 
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turn it into hacienda was carried out with the 1874 disentailment act, legally dissolving 
Indian communities and reducing them to individually titled plots of land that could be 
publicly auctioned by the government in the event of non-payment of taxes. This 
happened during a change in the nature of the national economy that reflected 
transformations at the level of the entire Latin American region towards policies of free 
trade (Knight, 2014). A new mining boom, this time driven by tin and focused around 
the mining centres of Oruro and the construction of railways led to greater integration 
into the world economy and a decreased reliance on the head tax for the national 
coffers. This reform was motivated by a combination of laissez-faire economics and a 
political ideology which saw the continued existence of Indian communities as an 
obstacle for national development (Platt, 1986). Ostensibly the purpose of the law was 
to create a private market for lands and a modern system of commercialised agriculture 
that would replace the supposedly inefficient production systems of the Indian 
communities. In reality, the policy was a failure, instead creating a mono-export 
economy dependent on imports for industrial inputs, articles of consumption and basic 
foodstuffs (Ibid.). 
In the period 1880-1930 there was a large-scale shrinkage of ayllu lands and the growth 
of haciendas (Cusicanqui, 2010a). A number of indigenous leaders attempted to resist 
this via judicial means, unearthing old documents dating from the 15th and 16th centuries 
which designated the ayllu leaders, the kurakas or mallkus, as owners of the territory. It 
appears that precisely this sort of legal battle took place in the territory of Kirkiawi. 
There exists a sheep hide document dating from 1564 kept in the sede sindical of 
Vilaycayma, the product of the efforts by the heads of six originario families who it is 
claimed purchased the land from the colonial state in exchange for seven bushels of 
gold and silver. During the ceremony of misa mast’ay, these six ancestors or soqta 
achichilas are venerated and a ch’alla, or ritual libation is offered to the ancestral 
documents of the ayllu. This origin story was told to me repeatedly by various 
traditional authorities, who informed me with great pride how this meant that the 
landlord class or q’ara runas had never been allowed to enter their territory. 
Kirkiawi is not unique in holding onto its autonomy and territory in this way, as various 
other ayllu communities in the regions of Oruro, La Paz and Northern Potosi also did so 
(Ibid.). Nevertheless, much of the valley regions of Cochabamba and Sucre as well as 
large parts of the department of La Paz became converted into haciendas in which the 
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local populations became dependent tenant farmers who owed labour to the landlord or 
hacendado in exchange for the right to cultivate land (Platt, 1982; Larson, 1998). It is 
this class of hacienda owners that the traditional authorities referred to when they spoke 
of the q’ara runas. 
Legal action was not the only form of resistance that indigenous peoples have utilised 
against the incursion of the state and outsiders. Throughout the colonial and post-
colonial period there have been numerous incidents of open violent rebellion. The two 
best known examples of these were the uprisings of Túpak Katari in 1781 and Zarate 
Willka in 1899. In a series of rebellions against Spanish rule, which erupted in the 
period 1780-82, the Aymara peasant Julian Apaza, taking the name Túpak Katari and 
assisted by his wife, Bartolina Sisa, led an army of over 40,000 warriors to besiege La 
Paz with the aim of replacing Spanish rule with autonomous indigenous government. 
The siege was eventually ended and Katari was executed and quartered. Before dying it 
is claimed he uttered the words ‘I die but I shall return tomorrow as millions’ (Canessa, 
2000). The millenarian nature of Katari’s uprising and the dramatic pathos of his 
downfall has formed an important part of the imaginary of peasant social movements 
and both Túpak Katari and Bartolina Sisa remain powerful political symbols in 
contemporary Bolivia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Picture of the ancestral documents of the ayllu 
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The rebellion of Zarate Willka took place in the context of a civil war between the 
Liberal and Conservative parties. While the war was effectively between the 
representatives of two different elite groups (the traditional silver mining oligarchy 
based in Potosí and Sucre and the new mining and commercial elite linked to La Paz), 
the Liberal party was able to develop linkages with ayllu communities and offered them 
the promise of recovering lands lost during the preceding 25 years. The Aymara mallku, 
Zarate Willka, placed his army at the service of the Liberals with the goal of reclaiming 
lost lands and establishing autonomous indigenous government. However, following the 
victory of the Liberal side various indigenous groups led violent uprisings, looting and 
burning hacienda property and occupying local towns. At this point Kirkiawi again 
enters into the historical record, as the originarios of Kirkiawi took part in the 
occupation of the town of Sacaca, declaring ‘death to the white and mestizo race’ and 
their ‘unconditional allegiance to President Willka’ (Condarco, 2002, p.387). For his 
part in the uprising Willka was imprisoned and later murdered. According to Silvia 
Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) this rebellion marked the last autonomous Indian rebellion 
and secured in the imaginary of the urban classes the terrifying image of being besieged 
by the Indian masses, an image that ultimately harks back to the great rebellion of 
Túpak Katari a century earlier. 
The Chaco war in 1932 marked a point of profound change in Bolivian society and 
politics. The war, fought between Bolivia and Paraguay for control of the semi-desert 
region of the Chaco, is widely considered a disastrous folly, with casualties 
proportionally similar to those suffered by Britain in World War One (Klein, 2003). 
While the causes of the war are debated and the events that led to it too complicated to 
relate here, it had been preceded by a period of political crisis precipitated by the 
decline in the Bolivian economy following the collapse of commodity prices in the 
world markets due to the effects of the Great Depression. Despite representing a 
humiliating military defeat, the war had an important nationalising effect on Bolivian 
society (Cusicanqui, 2010a). The Bolivian army was organised along the lines of its 
ethnic hierarchy, with the bulk of ordinary conscripts made up of Quechua and Aymara-
speaking Indians, while the non-commissioned officers were mestizos and the officers 
were white members of the urban criollo middle and upper-classes. For a section of the 
urban educated middle-classes, the ‘poor relatives of the oligarchy’ (Rene Zaveleta in 
Cusicanqui, 2010a, p.94) who would later form leftist nationalist political parties such 
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as the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the experience of being sent to fight a 
bloody and pointless war alongside Quechua and Aymara soldiers made them both 
bitterly angry with the prevailing political and social order and aware for the first time 
of the problems faced by the country’s indigenous rural majority. Simultaneously, 
indigenous groups were able to legitimately articulate their demands using the language 
of citizenship, given their purely formal recognition as such in the course of mass 
conscription (Cusicanqui, 2010a). The war transformed Bolivia from a politically 
conservative country to one of the most radical in the region. The militant sectors of the 
urban middle classes agreed on the need to nationalise the nation’s mining industry and 
redistribute lands in an agrarian reform, summed up in the popular slogan, ‘Minas al 
estado! Tierras al indio!’ (Mines to the state! Land to the Indian!) (Klein, 2003). 
In the years prior to the Chaco war highland peoples had continued to organise 
themselves and had begun to forge alliances between different leaders, establishing 
common aims and objectives. The first peasant unions were formed in the period 
immediately after the war in the valleys of Cochabamba, with relatively modest goals 
such as limited reform to the system of ponguaje and the construction of schools. 
Education and the promotion of literacy, so as to ‘learn the language of their oppressors’ 
(Cusicanqui, 2010a, p.114) was a shared objective among all rural indigenous peoples in 
the highlands and valleys at this time. Following the end of the war, ayllu leaders in the 
highlands, known as caciques apoderados, continued to expand their co-operation with 
each other, the nascent peasant unions and the urban union movements (Ibid.). In 1942 
the first ‘national congress of indigenous Quechua-speakers’ was held in Sucre with 
support from the National Workers Federation and the student movement. This was 
followed in 1945 by a national indigenous congress held in the centre of La Paz, calling 
for an end to the system of ponguaje and the restitution of lost lands. The 1945 congress 
was carried out with the support of the reformist leader Gualberto Villaroel, who had 
come to power in a military coup and was sufficiently popular among the peasantry to 
earn the indigenous honorific of tata, meaning literally ‘father’ in both Quechua and 
Aymara (Ibid.). Despite offering concessions to both the labour movements and the 
peasantry, such as recognition of the unions and the formal abolition of ponguaje, he 
was opposed by Conservative elements and large sections of the left and in July 1946 a 
crowd stormed the Palace of Government and publicly lynched the President.  
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The six years of political and social turmoil following Villaroel’s death are known in 
Bolivia as the sexenio. During this time the traditional political parties, representing the 
established mining and landowning oligarchies, returned to government but were unable 
to control the constant cycle of protest and rebellion from the peasantry, workers 
movement and sectors of the urban middle classes. The miners, organised in the 
powerful FTSMB union had become increasingly radical in their demands and methods, 
publishing at their national congress in 1946 the Pulacayo Thesis (which called for 
permanent revolution and the armed struggle of the working class) and engaged 
repeatedly in strikes and armed uprisings. At the same time, the Quechua and Aymara 
peasantry were engaged in various forms of resistance and open rebellion. In the valley 
regions this largely took the form of sit-down strikes in haciendas and negotiation 
through the peasant union and with help from urban activists to establish better 
conditions and obtain ownership of parcels of land. Meanwhile, in the highlands this 
more generally took the form of occupying hacienda property adjacent to ayllu lands 
and destroying crops, buildings and tools. In the department of La Paz there emerged a 
degree of cooperation and hybridity between union organisations and ayllu leaders 
(Ibid.). 
The National Revolutionary Movement or MNR, whose leadership was composed of 
radicalised sections of the urban upper and middle classes, had emerged as the largest 
and most politically moderate of three leftist parties who pursued the goals of 
nationalisation of the mines and support for the Indian peasantry. In the crisis of the late 
1940s it entered into increasing confrontation with the government, eventually leading a 
civilian revolt that was put down by the army. Despite the heterogeneous nature of the 
different groups involved in rebellious activity, the way they were repressed by the 
ruling regime had a homogenising effect on them and helped establish support for the 
MNR among all sectors of the labour movement (Dunkerley, 1984). Activists from the 
MNR and workers movement who were imprisoned shared cells with rebel Indian 
leaders, establishing links that would play an important role in the future (Cusicanqui, 
2010a). In the 1951 elections the MNR won an overwhelming victory but the army 
stepped in and installed General Hugo Ballivian as President. The MNR reacted by 
arming the workers and peasants and declaring full-scale military opposition. After three 
days of fighting in La Paz in April of 1952, in which the miners marched on the city, the 
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MNR finally came to power and enacted the most dynamic program of social and 
economic change carried out in the region since the Mexican revolution of 1910. 
II. From the National Revolution to the Resource Wars and Bolívar’s Indigenous 
Takeover 
 i. The national revolution and the military-peasant pact 
When the MNR came to power in 1952 they were faced with a complete collapse of the 
old regime and armed militias of peasants and workers clamouring for change. Despite 
being the most politically moderate of the major leftist parties they were forced by 
circumstances into carrying out revolutionary reforms and a reordering of Bolivian 
society (Klein, 2003). The national government of Victor Paz Estenssoro supported the 
creation of a national union federation, the COB, headed by the FTSMB leader, Juan 
Lechin, and the nationalisation of the major tin mines and petroleum reserves in the 
state corporations COMIBOL and YPFB. In the countryside ponguaje was abolished 
and following a campaign of occupations and seizures of land by peasant militias an 
agrarian reform was carried out. Hacienda land was confiscated and distributed to 
families in individual title deeds, a process that took many years and was never fully 
completed (Kohl and Farthing, 2014). The effect, however, was to abolish the hacienda 
and the landlord class, who largely reinvented themselves as urban professionals and 
businesspeople, while massively increasing the class of independent peasant small 
holders. In addition, the nation’s rural majority were suddenly enfranchised by the 
abolition of literacy requirements in voter registration while universal schooling and 
education in the Spanish language were declared goals of the revolution. These reforms 
were carried out under a modernising ideology with similarities to that of the late 
nineteenth century. However, while the liberal period promoted a laissez-faire economic 
model and free trade on the world market, the 1952 revolution established a period of 
corporatist state capitalism and policies of import substitution in line with the direction 
of other countries in the region during the cold war era. While the goal of these reforms 
was once again to modernise the rural economy and create a market for land and 
agricultural goods, this was to be achieved through the abolition of the inefficient and 
antiquated hacienda system and the creation of a new class of peasant smallholders 
(Dunkerley, 1984). Rural peoples were no longer referred to as Indians but as 
campesinos or peasants and under the MNR’s stated ideology of mestizaje, the Indian 
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majority would be assimilated into wider society through linguistic and cultural 
Hispanicization, creating a culturally homogeneous modern nation. Peoples in the 
valleys and highlands had imposed upon them what amounted to a class identity as a 
way of mediating with the state, which in turn shaped the forms of representation and 
collective action available to them. 
It was during the MNR government that peasant unions were formed throughout the 
highlands and valleys of Bolivia. In many regions this was carried out with the help and 
participation of the COB and miners, although the formation of peasant unions was 
eventually encouraged by the state as a way of establishing relations with the peasantry. 
It has been argued (Platt, 1986; Cusicanqui, 1990) that as civil society organisations that 
contain practices and ideologies of citizenship and democracy closer to those of western 
liberalism and which serve to integrate rural populations into the wider nation, that 
peasant unions are key to the process of modernisation through cultural assimilation that 
defines the project of mestizaje. However, the emergence of peasant unions and their 
integration into the life of rural communities did not follow a universal pattern or course 
of development. Broadly speaking, in the valley regions, particularly those of 
Cochabamba, pre-Hispanic forms of territorial and social organisation had been lost due 
to hacienda expansion; unions had already been established a generation prior to the 
agrarian reform and were viewed as a natural form of local social organisation. 
Moreover, among the Quechua-speaking peasantry in these areas there already existed a 
large class of independent smallholders known as piqueros who controlled a significant 
share of the market in commercial agriculture (Larson, 1998). Arguably, the peasant 
unions in this region most closely resemble ‘unions’ in the sense commonly attributed to 
the term: organisations that collectively represent the interests of their members as 
workers or producers (Cusicanqui, 2010a). Following the agrarian reform, the peasant 
unions became the primary form of local civic political organisation throughout almost 
the entire Cochabamba valley region. Meanwhile, in much of the altiplano of La Paz 
the traditional ayllu authorities and the peasant union achieved a degree of hybridity in 
which peasant unions were adopted but integrated into traditional forms of organisation 
and values of leadership and governance. In other areas, such as Northern Potosí, the 
union and ayllu authorities remained ideologically and culturally distinct from each 
other and exhibited a more antagonistic relationship (Cusicanqui, 1990). However, these 
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are generalisations and the way sindicatos became adopted would have differed from 
place to place.  
While Kirkiawi is located within Cochabamba, unlike much of the rest of the 
department, it had not previously been hacienda and therefore did not adopt the peasant 
union as its sole form of civic political authority. In this sense, the impact of the agrarian 
reform was likely closer to that of other ayllu communities in nearby Northern Potosi 
and Oruro (Ibid.). In Kirkiawi the majority of the comunidades would have gained 
peasant union leaders following the national revolution in addition to the existing 
traditional authorities of jilanku, who were still responsible for organising the rotation 
of land, festive and ritual events and adjudicating over matters of justice. Union 
dirigentes would have assumed some of these functions in addition to acting as external 
representatives and intermediaries with the state. 
The peasant unions were powerful allies of the government and in many cases became 
organisations that served to control the peasantry and turn them into a passive 
instrument of state support. The generation of rural peoples who had lived through the 
national revolution and agrarian reform prioritised holding onto their lands and newly 
acquired rights to education and political enfranchisement. For this reason, they were 
generally willing to uncritically support governments who promised to preserve this 
new status quo. Union leaders became brokers who were able to ‘deliver’ the votes of 
their communities in exchange for promised cash or investments. These sorts of 
practices, alongside the insertion at the regional and national level of ‘pseudo-leaders’ 
who were motivated by ambitions of political office, with links to the MNR or other 
parties, resulted in a culture of political clientelism and prebendalism within many 
peasant unions. Following the end of MNR government in 1964, Bolivia entered an 
eighteen-year period of predominantly military governments. The bulk of the Quechua 
and Aymara peasantry continued to lend their support to the dictator General Rene 
Barrientos, an intelligent political operator who made sure to declare his unswerving 
support for the agrarian reform and increased the distribution of land titles and 
investment in rural education, while simultaneously waging a hostile battle against the 
organised left and wider trade union movement. This alliance was recognised as a ‘pact’ 
between the military dictatorship and the indigenous peasantry. For this reason, among 
others, the peasantry was regarded by the left and workers movement during this period 
as a deeply conservative force within Bolivian society (Dunkerley, 1984).  
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 ii. Katarismo and the struggle against clientelism 
Nevertheless, during the dictatorships of the 1970s there emerged a cultural and 
political movement of indigenous revindication which changed the course not only of 
peasant unionism but wider political consciousness and the relationship of rural peoples 
with the state. Moreover, as an ideology it continues to exert influence on national and 
local politics in contemporary Bolivia. The general name given to this movement is 
Katarismo, although it was a diverse tendency made up of peasants, students and urban 
intellectuals of mainly Aymara descent. Influenced heavily by the ‘Indianism’ of Fausto 
Reinaga (1970) it provided a counterpoint to the class reductionism of Marxism as the 
dominant ideology of the Bolivian left. While acknowledging both class and ethnicity as 
categories of social analysis, Katarismo objected to processes of cultural 
homogenisation and the disarticulation of rural ways of life, seeking the revalidation of 
‘Indianess’ and what is native or lo propio. Central to this is the perception of a 
continuation of a colonial society imposed oppressively over a civilisation that was 
originally free and which embodied a distinct ethical order (Cusicanqui, 2010a). The 
heroic struggle against this colonial system and the possibility of a return to a free 
society is exemplified by the figure of Túpak Katari, whose claim at his execution to 
one day ‘return as millions’, is interpreted to mean the eventual awakening of the 
sleeping giant of the Bolivian ethnic majority (Tiwanaku Manifesto, 1973). 
In its dimension as a cultural movement in the cities, Katarismo was a product of the 
increase in rural-urban migration that had taken place in the years following the national 
revolution. The revolution had caused the breakdown in the sociocultural barrier 
between countryside and city that had maintained the separation of the two republics 
following Bolivia’s independence. Moreover, the fact that the agrarian reform was slow 
to be implemented encouraged the migration of individuals from ex-hacienda areas to 
the cities. It was during the early 1960s that individuals from Bolívar began to migrate 
to urban areas to pursue higher levels of education than were available in the rural 
schools, including a key informant of mine, Severino Condori, who was later elected as 
MAS congressman for the provinces of Bolívar and Arque. By the late 1960s, a 
significant proportion of the urban population of La Paz were Aymara speakers who 
retained cultural and economic links with their communities of origin in the altiplano. 
For these indigenous urban residents, the reality of their exclusion by white urban 
society was made clear to them in countless daily acts of discrimination. Access to 
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higher education led to the emergence of an Aymara intellectual class, who participated 
in the creation of Katarista student movements and cultural and political centres. 
In the countryside a new generation of peasant union leaders decided to bring an end to 
the culture of clientelism and political cronyism that was common at the time. Unlike 
their parents they had grown up after the 1952 revolution, with the benefits of schooling 
and bilingualism and the notion that they were free and equal citizens within the 
Bolivian nation. This relative privilege allowed them to more fully perceive the 
hypocrisy behind the claims of formal equality of the national revolution, as they 
continued to experience the reality of being a culturally and socially subordinated 
group. The clientelist domination of the peasant unions by the government and 
established parties they identified as part of ponguaje politico or political serfdom, from 
which they had to free themselves. A key figure within the rural movement was Jenaro 
Flores, who helped establish the United Union Federation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTCB) to replace the moribund and discredited National Peasant Workers Union 
(CNTCB). The CSUTCB became formally affiliated with the COB, leading to Flores 
election as the leader of Bolivia’s union movement. 
In the late 1970s there emerged a split in Katarismo between two tendencies: The 
Revolutionary Movement Túpak Katari (MRTK), which came from a rural union 
tradition, emphasising a class-based analysis and the Indian Movement Túpak Katari 
(MITKA), that prioritised indigenous ethnic revindication. In her classic work on the 
history of highland peasant politics, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui viewed this as the 
political expression of different dimensions of the experience of highland rural peoples 
(Cusicanqui, 2010a). She claimed that there exist two aspects of collective historical 
memory among highland indigenous peoples: the ‘distant’ memory related to the 
struggle for autonomy against the colonial and post-colonial state, often experienced 
more acutely by rural-urban migrants brought into contact with white-mestizo society 
and made to feel ‘like foreigners in their own country’ and the ‘recent memory’, related 
to the ‘historic point of rupture’ of the 1952 revolution and the acquisition of political 
and social rights. The political expression of these differences articulates itself in a 
process of struggle over the definition of the collective indigenous subject: conceived of 
as either an oppressed and excluded class that must gain control of the state and its 
resources or as the heir to the great Aymara and Quechua nations of the past. 
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 iii. The neoliberal era and new forms of politics 
Bolivia finally returned to the current period of stable democracy in 1982. This followed 
a four-year period that contained three general elections and six military coups. A 
coalition of leftist parties, the UDP, was elected into power and was faced with an 
inflationary and sovereign debt crisis that severely weakened the conventional left as an 
electoral force and initiated a twenty-year period of neoliberal governments. In 1985 the 
MNR returned to power with Victor Paz Estenssoro re-elected as President, who then 
proceeded to carry out a series of structural adjustment reforms to the Bolivian economy 
in line with the directives of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These 
measures, which were known as the New Economic Policy or NPE, were designed to 
stabilise the Bolivian economy by ‘shock therapy’. In exchange for a stabilisation loan 
and credit from the IMF and World Bank, Paz Estenssoro signed into a law a reform that 
devalued the national currency, slashed public spending, liberalised the economy and 
dismissed the majority of the employees in the government owned oil and mining 
companies. Following the failure to reverse the mass layoffs of mine workers in the 
1986 ‘March for Life’, the FTSMB, described as the columna vertebral or ‘backbone’ 
of the COB for being its most highly organised, ideologically radical and militant 
element, was routed as a political force. This marked a major defeat and the start of a 
prolonged period of relative quiescence for the labour movement and the traditional left. 
Moreover, it also led to further waves of migration, this time from the mining centres, to 
the major cities and increased the pace of urban expansion that had been taking place 
since the national revolution (Gill, 2002). 
It was not only the left and labour movement that suffered defeat and fragmentation 
during this period. In the 1980s there emerged a complex process of further division 
within the Katarista movement. One tendency became involved with pursuing the sorts 
of multiculturalist reforms that allow for the formal recognition of indigenous groups 
within the liberal state and was largely co-opted by the neoliberal governments of the 
1990s, the ultimate example of this being the decision of Katarista leader Víctor Hugo 
Cárdenas to run for Vice-President alongside Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR. 
Nevertheless, a second wave of indigenist political movements began to develop at the 
same time that Katarismo became increasingly fragmented and discredited (Albó, 1989; 
Yashar, 2005). The first of these movements emerged in the tropical region of El 
Chapare in the department of Cochabamba. A combination of highland and valley rural 
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migrants and ‘relocalised’ miners began to settle in large numbers in El Chapare during 
the 1980s and many of them started to cultivate coca leaf for sale on the national 
market, a large proportion of which would have been used for the processing of cocaine 
paste. Combining the unionism of the miners and the native forms of organisation of 
rural migrants, the coca producers organised themselves in unions, which like the 
peasant unions in the highlands and valleys, were effectively forms of local government 
based on communitarian notions of direct democracy (Grisaffi, 2013). Evo Morales was 
elected in the early 1990s as the leader of the nascent movement which affiliated itself 
to the CSUTCB and sought to valorise the coca leaf and legalise its production and 
consumption (Yashar, 2005). The cocaleros claimed to be defending an Indian culture, 
tradition and worldview, symbolised by the ‘sacred leaf’, from the racist and unjust 
neoliberal governments and foreign imperialism. They were able to construct an ethnic 
discourse about culture, rights and autonomy that mixed Katarista ideas with the 
traditional left’s hostility towards the US as an oppressive imperialist power, neatly 
expressed in popular Quechua slogans such as Coca kawsachun, Yanki wañuchun! 
(Long live coca, death to the Yankees!). While the cocaleros followed the rhetoric of the 
Kataristas, they were less concerned with regional autonomy than promoting the 
interests of their members and with economic goals (Ibid.). During the 1990s, they 
began to influence the CSTUCB while converting themselves into an electoral force. 
The cocaleros first had success in the local elections of 1995 and later came to dominate 
the Sovereign Peoples Assembly or ASP: a project launched by a coalition of peasant 
union organisations to create a ‘political instrument’ for the direct representation of rural 
peoples and to end the domination of peasant unions by establishment political parties. 
While the cocaleros were becoming a major force in Bolivian politics, other 
organisations devoted to promoting the rights of indigenous peoples began to emerge in 
both the lowlands and highlands. The diverse populations of different indigenous groups 
in the tropical lowlands started to organise themselves into a larger federation which 
eventually became known as the Indigenous Peoples Federation of Bolivia or CIDOB 
(Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 2005). In 1990, CIDOB organised the ‘March for Territory and 
Dignity’ in which thousands of lowland indigenous peoples walked from the capital of 
the Beni department to La Paz, demanding the recognition of their territories by the 
state but also their status as citizens of the Bolivian nation. This march brought the 
plight of lowland indigenous peoples to national attention and forged links with 
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highland groups as well as helping to popularise the idea of creating constitutional 
changes to truly include indigenous peoples within the nation, an idea that had been 
proposed by the CSUTCB in their 1983 Agrarian Reform Proposal, which suggested the 
recognition of communal lands by the state alongside the existence of indigenous 
authority structures, customary law and economic production on the basis of cultural 
pluralism (Yashar, 2005). 
These demands by indigenous organisations helped bring about reforms in which their 
cultural identity and communal land were formally recognised by the state. This took 
place at the same time that changes occurred in the manner in which international 
human rights law conceived of indigenous peoples. These perspectival transformations 
in international law reflect ideas of multiculturalism which had emerged in Europe and 
North America in the 1980s and were embodied in documents such as ILO convention 
169 concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, in turn influencing both national 
governments throughout Latin America and NGOs that worked among populations 
considered indigenous. In the context of these developments, highland ayllu federations 
emerged with the goal of ‘reconstituting the ayllu’: a process which included both 
reaffirming ancestral values and forms of social life and reconstituting the pre-colonial 
territories and their governing structures that had become fragmented and lost during 
centuries of colonisation. These federations eventually become consolidated in 1997 in 
the national level ayllu organisation CONAMAQ. CONAMAQ reproduced much of the 
Katarista discourse and symbols but emphasised local autonomy and a process of 
cultural revindication that began with rediscovering lost practices and values in their 
everyday lives and local communities (Escobar, 2010; Schavelzon, 2012). The 
processes which led to the formation of CONAMAQ were undoubtedly influenced by 
foreign NGOs, who facilitated workshops on leadership and recovering customs as well 
as publications and radio programmes made by organisations such as the Andean Oral 
History Workshop (THOA). Those involved in this project included younger people 
who were critical of the tactics and orientations of the CSUTCB and wanted to build 
something that was more locally rooted and ‘organic’ (Yashar, 2005). As mentioned 
earlier, many former and current traditional authorities of Kirkiawi, such as Mallku 
Gregorio and Tata Sabino Veizaga were involved in this process as part of the regional 
Cochabamba ayllu federation, COAMAC, an involvement that Tata Sabino Veizaga 
claimed ‘woke him up’ and allowed him to understand who he really was. 
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In the 1990s the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada carried out a series of 
reforms ostensibly aimed at including rural indigenous peoples within the nation and 
widening their ability to participate in local governance. This period has been described 
by some commentators (Postero, 2011; Albro, 2005b) as one of ‘neoliberal 
multiculturalism’, since its purpose was arguably to ease the implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies. While limited recognition and legal rights were granted to 
subaltern groups, this came at the expense of the state co-opting indigenist discourse 
and parts of the indigenous movement, furthering governmental decentralisation and the 
dismantling of social rights. In Bolívar province two laws passed in this period initiated 
processes that revitalized both the peasant union and the traditional authorities and led 
to the idea that they form parallel and complementary governing structures. At the time, 
communities would have possessed both jilankus and peasant union leaders, but the 
larger structures of the ayllu had atrophied, in part explained by the fact that by the 
1970s the head tax or contribución territorial was no longer tributed, its collection 
having represented one of the major responsibilities of the Kuraj Tatas. Meanwhile, the 
peasant union was neither organised at the level of the province nor lacked an ‘organic’ 
role in which it served a clear purpose. 
The first of these laws was the Popular Participation Law or LPP and the second was the 
INRA law, designed to bring about a new wave of agrarian reform, which among other 
things legally recognized the collective land rights of indigenous communities as Native 
Communal Lands or TCOs. The LPP brought about the ‘municipalisation’ of 
government funds, meaning that local governments and community organisations would 
receive a small fraction of the national state budget to invest in basic infrastructure and 
other public works. As a result of the LPP and municipalisation not only did local 
government take on a new importance, but within the comunidades the sindicato 
adopted the role of negotiator to gain access to money for local development projects. 
At the same time as the sindicato was becoming revitalised in its new role as financial 
mediator the traditional authorities embarked on a process of cultural revindication 
whilst seeking the saneamiento or collective titling of their territory under the INRA law 
and working towards the creation of CONAMAQ. The ayllu authorities were able to 
mobilise many people behind the task of gaining recognition of nearly all the land in 
Bolívar as a TCO. These new-found roles both legitimised the respective organisations 
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while helping to reinforce the idea that they serve separate but complementary 
functions. 
During this period, the ayllu and sindicato saw each other as allies against the 
oppressive neoliberal state and together they were able to wrest control of the provincial 
government from the MNR and ADN parties that had traditionally denied direct 
political representation to the gente humilde from the countryside. Following the 
national revolution, the traditional parties had exercised a clientelist form of politics in 
the Bolivian countryside, often going to the extent of offering to supply specific projects 
or resources in exchange for the leaders ‘delivering’ the votes of their community to 
their party. Through ensuring the election of originarios from the comunidades to the 
municipal government, the ayllu and sindicato together were able to assume direct 
control over the state resources available through the LPP.  This ‘indigenous takeover’ 
was part of a wider process of organised resistance which emerged out of the 
contradictions of neoliberal reforms. While rolling back the state through mass 
privatisation, freezing wages and deregulating the economy resulted in a widening of 
poverty and the massive increase in migration to the major cities, the government of 
Sanchez de Lozada effectively offered civil and political rights in exchange for the 
social rights that were being taken away. As a result of the decision to formally 
acknowledge the multi-ethnic nature of Bolivia and promote ‘neoliberal multicultural’ 
reforms, indigenous groups began to articulate their demands within the framework of 
civil rights, while social movements began to increasingly present themselves as 
indigenous in character (Albro, 2005a). Although the LPP and INRA laws were 
intended to increase ‘governability’ as a means of boosting foreign direct investment, 
they ultimately provided the basis for civil society organisations to demand social rights 
and to undermine the neoliberal state. In Bolívar province the reforms shaped not only 
the nature of local government but the perspectives of the different authority leaders, as 
shall be detailed further in chapters 4 and 7. 
The election of an ‘indigenous president’ in Evo Morales can partly be understood as a 
reaction to the way these neoliberal reforms created new forms of representation and 
claimed to respect the cultural rights of distinct groups while simultaneously 
undermining the means for their material existence and social reproduction (Postero, 
2005). This can be seen in the cycle of popular protests which took place between 2000 
and 2005 centred around the ‘resource wars’ in the departments of Cochabamba and La 
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Paz. This began with the ‘water war’ in Cochabamba, when the privatisation of the 
public water company SEMAPA gave rise to civic revolt. As a result of the ‘water law’, 
ley 2029, all systems of water provision were made property of a subsidiary of the 
multinational Bechtel corporation, while alternative systems of distribution were 
outlawed. Yet in peri-urban Cochabamba and its rural hinterlands water is collected and 
distributed through communal wells and irrigation systems and maintained by 
cooperatives. A broad coalition comprised of peri-urban residents, farmers and the urban 
middle classes organised opposition to the law through the newly created Coordinadora 
por la defensa del agua y la vida (Coalition for the Defence of Water and Life), 
denouncing the gobierno vendepatrias (sell-out government) (Albro, 2005a; Perrault, 
2006). The coalition united around a belief that the state that had lost its moral 
legitimacy in the context of years of privatisation and the undoing of the former 
corporatist model, alongside the notion that water forms an inalienable public resource 
managed by and for the benefit of the people (Albro, 2005a). This was expressed 
through a discourse of Andean identity as involving pre-Colombian indigenous 
traditions and traditional customary rights or usos y costumbres (Perrault, 2008, 
Goldstein, 2004). The cocaleros in the nearby province of Chapare, under the direction 
of Evo Morales, played a prominent role in the protests and added their demands of an 
end to US sponsored coca-eradication policies. The water war marked the first major 
public victory against the neoliberal reforms of the previous 15 years, as the waves of 
demonstrations and increasingly violent confrontations with the police and army led to 
the repeal of the water law and the renationalisation of public resources. 
Three years later the focus of public dissent and protest shifted to the department of La 
Paz. This took place in the context of unpopular tax reforms and further budget cuts that 
affected the salaries of public employees, including the police. This time the cause that 
united protestors was the decision to sell Bolivia’s gas reserves to an international 
consortium that would pipe them to Chile to be exported via tanker, a decision that had 
huge negative symbolism given Bolivia’s defeat and loss of its coastline to Chile in the 
1879 War of the Pacific. Bolivia’s highland peasants, led by the CSUTCB leader Felipe 
Quispe, participated in roadblocks throughout the country but particularly in the 
department of La Paz. Indignation and protest spread to the largely Aymara city of El 
Alto (Lazar, 2008) when the government attempted to use the army to take control of 
the situation, resulting in the massacre of at least 80 civilians. A coalition of diverse 
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social organisations and members of the public turned out to protest the violence en 
masse and president Sanchez de Lozada was forced to flee the country. The demands of 
the various social organisations that came together to oppose the government were 
crystallised in the ‘October Agenda’: a list of demands which included an immediate 
stop to gas exports to Chile, the nationalisation and public control of natural resources 
and a constituent assembly to found a new state with a new vision of the nation. 
Bolivia had reached a crisis of near-revolutionary proportions and a diverse array of 
citizenry had been united in opposition to the government through a popular discourse 
which combined notions of indigenous identity with control of natural resources and the 
restoration of a just social and moral order based on the communitarian practices of the 
popular classes, alongside traditional Latin American leftist notions and discursive 
terminologies of imperialism, dependency and foreign exploitation. This combined 
ideological elements of Katarismo with left popular nationalism and conceptions of 
ethnic identity and the rights of indigenous peoples from international human rights law 
and NGO discourse: seemingly unrelated and even contradictory currents whose 
convergence can only be understood in the light of Bolivia’s unique history of political 
syncretism. The reproduction and widespread assimilation of Katarista ideas, legal 
changes in international law and the introduction of multiculturalist reforms, alongside 
the decline of the traditional left, had provided the discursive space for the idea of 
refounding the Bolivian nation, of fundamentally altering the Bolivian state so that it 
truly represents and is responsive to its population, instead of continuing to reproduce 
colonial divisions of race and class. A range of social constituencies and organisations 
were therefore unified in their use of notions of ethnicity and indigeneity to mobilise 
and legitimise themselves, alongside commitment to a project of redefining the state and 
citizenship. 
Nevertheless, what is concretely understood by ethnic identity and the refounding of the 
state is subject to wide-ranging debate. In December 2005 the MAS-IPSP, the party that 
had been adopted by Evo Morales, won the national elections with 53 per cent of the 
vote. With Morales’ victory the period of crisis came to an end, as the MAS stepped into 
the power vacuum created by the total collapse of the neoliberal order, espousing a 
discourse which reproduced the key ideological elements that had united people during 
the cycle of protest described above. Yet as we shall see, the ambiguous definition of 
these ideological elements provided the subsequent space for conflict. The indigenous 
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takeover of Bolívar’s local government in 2004, one year before Morales’ election as 
president, was part of the general movement that led up to Morales’ election, as the 
local social organisations together sought to gain real power and political representation 
for the people of the comunidades.  During this time, the term originario would have 
served to unify both ayllu and sindicato behind their common goal of opposing the 
excesses of the neoliberal government and ending the political control of their province 
by outsiders. Yet gaining long sought-after political representation would only raise the 
question of how to define the process of change that had been brought about and the 
collective subject that this was presumed to serve, both nationally and at the local level.  
 III. The Election of ‘Tata Evo’ and Bolivia’s ‘Post-neoliberal’ Era 
 i. Evo’s new Bolivia 
After his official inauguration in January 2006 President Morales took part in an 
indigenous inauguration ceremony in front of the Tiwanaku archaeological complex. 
This took place before a crowd of thousands of mainly highland peoples who had 
travelled to see him. In a ceremony which evoked the ritual transfer of authority 
between ayllu members Morales was handed a baston de mando to demonstrate his 
assumption of power as leader of the nation, while the crowds of supporters waved the 
wiphala flag, said to represent the former Inca confederation of Qollasuyu, and blew the 
traditional phututu bull horns still used to summon meetings in the highlands. As a 
symbolic act this event resonated nationally and internationally. It is difficult to 
underestimate the impact that Morales’ arrival to power has had in generating a sense of 
pride among large sections of the population who had suffered discrimination because 
of their forms of dress, speech and ethnic appearance. Moreover, this moment was 
interpreted by many activists to mark a decisive change in Bolivian history. For some 
within the ranks of the peasant union movement it represented a pachakutiy: an epochal 
time of return in which there exists the possibility of tremendous change, while for 
others it was the realisation of Túpak Katari’s promise to one day ‘return as millions’. 
Thomas Grisaffi (2013) describes how among the cocaleros with whom he carried out 
fieldwork it meant that they too ‘were presidents’, implying that their communitarian 
forms of direct democracy would be extended to the highest levels of the state. Outside 
of Bolivia much was made of Morales’ indigenous ancestry, while the new MAS 
government was associated with the more radical end of the spectrum of ‘pink tide’ 
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democratically elected leftist governments alongside Venezuela and Ecuador. In this 
vein he was enthusiastically embraced by the international left as a socialist and anti-
imperialist. 
In his public discourse Morales made clear that his presidency would carry out a 
decisive break with neoliberalism and refound the state to include the nation’s 
indigenous majority (Postero, 2016), a transformation that became referred to as el 
proceso de cambio. Nevertheless, various Western academics and journalists have 
questioned the extent to which there has occurred a genuinely transformative ‘process of 
change’ in Bolivia (Webber, 2011; Postero and Goodale eds., 2013; Farthing and Kohl, 
2014). While ostensibly implementing the main points of the October Agenda it has 
been observed that Morales’ government is a ‘hybrid’ economic regime that retains 
numerous continuities with the policies of its neoliberal predecessors (Webber, 2011; 
Postero in Postero and Goodale eds., 2013). What Pablo Stefanoni (2009) refers to as 
Evo’s ‘discursive ambivalence’ is evident in the radical nature of much of his rhetoric 
and the relatively modest or even seemingly inconsistent nature of the government’s 
concrete policies. Morales presents himself as a defender of environmentalism, a 
political radical and a defender of indigenous rights, neatly expressed in moments of 
rhetoric such as his declaration at the 2010 World People’s Summit on Climate Change 
in Cochabamba, ‘Pachamama or death!...Long live the rights of the mother earth! Death 
to capitalism!’ (Goodman, 2010). In contrast to this rhetoric the Bolivian economy 
continues to rely on extractive industry, promoting policies which actively damage the 
environment alongside relatively modest social reforms, while entering into direct 
conflict with indigenous communities and social movements. The most significant 
reforms the Morales administration has carried out have been largely through legal 
means and attempts at redefining citizenship rather than structural social or economic 
change. As Nancy Postero (2016) has pointed out, this places Bolivia in the company of 
other pink tide governments such as Venezuela and Ecuador which emulate the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the older left while aspiring to bring about radical change 
through constitutional reform and redefining citizenship, thereby engaging in a form of 
liberal state-building.  
It is clear that the MAS government has taken seriously the idea of redefining 
citizenship so as to include the nation’s ‘indigenous majority’ that had previously 
suffered exclusion and attempts at cultural extermination and assimilation. The problem 
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for the diverse elements that made up the coalition of social movement who supported 
the MAS both nationally and regionally is precisely how this indigenous subject is to be 
understood and what is really meant by reform and el proceso de cambio. In trying to 
explain the development of a rift between the MAS and the indigenous movements that 
initially supported them this section will concentrate on describing two key events: the 
debates that occurred surrounding the constituent assembly process in 2006-7 and the 
consequences of the decision to build a road through the TIPNIS national park in 2011. 
These two events mark crucial points of tension between the CONAMAQ federation, 
the CSUTCB and the MAS nationally and in the local politics of Bolívar province. It 
will then analyse how indigeneity has come to be understood in contemporary Bolivia 
and how this explains the way the term originario is used by the different authorities in 
Bolívar province to articulate competing views of the ethical life of their community. 
 ii. From the constituent assembly to the TIPNIS protests 
In government the MAS immediately sought to institute a process that would lead to a 
new constitution, passing a law in March 2006 to convoke a national constituent 
assembly. This law was itself a compromise that took into account the concerns of 
various right-wing social forces and included a selection procedure for the 255 deputies 
which privileged smaller right-wing local parties, a stipulation of a two-thirds majority 
among the assembly for the terms of the constitution to pass and a national referendum 
on the final document (Webber, 2011). However, when the assembly eventually met in 
Sucre in August 2006 there was a great sense of elation among large sections of the 
population at the improbable sight of groups of chola women dressed in pollera skirts 
and indigenous peoples meeting to decide the basic legal framework of the nation 
(Schavelzon, 2012). Yet the process was beset by various problems, including civil 
unrest in Sucre that placed the safety of the assembly in jeopardy, motivating its 
relocation to the mining city of Oruro. Given the selection procedure that denied the 
MAS an absolute two-thirds majority, the final document was necessarily a work of 
consensus which took into account the views of the political right as well as being 
shaped by extra-legal pressure from protests in the eastern lowlands and in Sucre itself. 
In addition, in the course of the debates that took place in Sucre and elsewhere there 
emerged a considerable ideological schism between the delegates of the various popular 
social organisations representing the MAS and the major indigenous and peasant bodies. 
Two ‘blocks’ developed: on one side the CSUTCB, the Bartolina Sisas peasant 
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women’s union and the ‘intercultural colonists’, representing Andean tropical migrants 
such as the cocaleros, and on the other an ‘indigenous block’ composed of CONAMAQ 
and CIDOB (Albó, 2011; Schavelzon, 2012). 
It is in these debates that the ideological tensions between the MAS and the peasant 
unions, represented at the national level by the CSTUCB federation and the ayllus, 
represented by CONAMAQ, initially manifested themselves. Disputes emerged 
concerning the nature of indigenous autonomy, collective rights, legal pluralism, the 
ownership of natural resources and the definition of ‘the people’ used in the 
constitution. In all these debates there appeared opposing tendencies towards greater 
centralisation or decentralisation of state power and the meaning of indigeneity 
(Schavelzon, 2012). Defining the Bolivian nation meant formally delineating the 
popular collective subject around which the new society was to be built in the process of 
change, in contrast to the traditional republican state, political parties and elites that had 
always governed. Yet this implied elucidating a diffuse concept that encompassed 
diverse and sometimes contradictory identities. Despite privileging indigenous identity 
in the definition of the Bolivian nation, the ayllu and union organisations disagreed over 
whether to use the term inclusively, allowing it to stand for peasant communities with 
individual private property, or exclusively, with reference to communitarian ways of life 
and identity within a specific territory (Ibid.). These differences in conceptions of 
indigenous identity also played a role in discussions concerning the issue of indigenous 
autonomies and control of natural resources. The peasant unions did not support the 
‘indigenous block’ over rights to non-renewable natural resources found within 
indigenous territories. They were less concerned about the issue of local autonomy than 
ensuring the use of hydrocarbon and mineral resources to fund social programs and 
national infrastructure projects. In this sense they recognised themselves as indigenous 
but in discussions over national resources thought of themselves as Bolivians and 
supported the economic programs of the traditional left (Ibid.). While the goal of the 
peasant unions had been to win demands and gain political representation within the 
institutions of the liberal state for the benefit of the nation’s ‘indigenous majority’, 
CONAMAQ was wedded to the idea of reconstructing the Gran Qollasuyu, of 
ultimately re-establishing the pre-colonial structures of the gran ayllus.  
In February 2009, Evo Morales, joined by the Nobel Prize-winning Guatemalan 
indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchu, gave the official promulgation of the new 
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constitution in the largely Aymara city of El Alto. The members of the constituent 
assembly joined a parade which included representatives of every Bolivian ethnic 
group, while in front of the main stage a group of highland indigenous ritual specialists 
or yatiris performed a ch’alla or blessing of copies of the new constitution (Ibid.). In his 
speech Evo described the moment as a ‘democratic cultural revolution’ and the 
culmination of centuries of struggle by Bolivia’s poor and indigenous majority, making 
special reference to the rebellion of Túpak Katari. He described how Bolivia was now a 
nation that stood against colonialism, imperialism and neoliberalism while guaranteeing 
social rights and which incorporated the ethical principles of its indigenous peoples, 
ending with the rhetorical flourish ‘Kawasachun Bolivia Digna!’ (Long live a dignified 
Bolivia!). Yet in reality, the final document, shaped by various pressures and 
compromises both within and outside of the MAS coalition, was an ambiguous mixture 
of Katarista, multiculturalist, left-nationalist and standard liberal-democratic 
understandings of the nation, justice, pluralism and social rights. While its purpose had 
been to include all the Bolivian nation within a ‘plurinational state’, by not resolving 
these ambiguities the constitution provided the discursive space for continued 
disagreements over the nature of the process of change that would divide the nation’s 
social movements. 
In 2011 these differences came dramatically into the open when the government gave 
the green light to the construction of a road through the TIPNIS indigenous territory and 
national park that would link Villa Tunari in Cochabamba department with San Ignacio 
de Moxos in Beni. As a result, the lowland indigenous federation CIDOB organised a 
series of protests including a march to La Paz. CONAMAQ and various representatives 
of ayllus around Bolivia, notably among them Kirkiawi, joined in the march. This 
breakdown in the MAS-supporting coalition of social organisations, known as the pacto 
de unidad, resulted in a prolonged political crisis that saw the MAS, which referred to 
itself as ‘the government of social movements’, attempting to violently repress popular 
protest. While the COB trade union federation also initially supported the protests, 
calling for a general strike in the wake of violence against unarmed protestors, the 
peasant unions sided with the government. The construction of the highway had been 
motivated by two factors. Firstly, the plan to open a trade corridor between Brazil and 
Chile, allowing the movement of goods to ports in the pacific, furthering Bolivia’s 
integration with its neighbouring economic giant, while creating transport links for the 
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large-scale producers of agroindustrial mono-crops in the country’s eastern tropical 
lowlands with whom the MAS had formed a tacit alliance (Webber, 2012). Secondly, 
the need to provide transport routes and access to domestic markets for Aymara and 
Quechua migrants to the tropical lowlands with small and medium-sized commercial 
interests in the production of coca leaf or other crops. This group represents the political 
base of the MAS as many are rank and file activists within the tropical cocalero 
federations that exert influence over the wider CSUTCB. Despite the continued support 
of this political base, the government was forced to back down on its plans in the face of 
an escalating crisis that saw Evo’s approval rating drop to 30% (Ibid.). 
The split between CONAMAQ and the CSUTCB over this issue is revealing of their 
differences in outlook and political allegiance. Roberto Coraite, the president of the 
CSUTCB caused outrage by referring to the lowland indigenous protestors as ‘savages’, 
while the leaders of CONAMAQ responded to the call to support their ‘lowland 
brothers’ (Ibid.). While the CSUTCB leadership emphasised national economic 
interests, many traditional authorities in places such as Kirkiawi and elsewhere saw in 
the demands of the lowland indigenous groups the shared value placed on local 
autonomy and traditional ways of life. However, the aftermath of this public split in the 
pacto de unidad was government repression of the national indigenous federations. The 
offices of CONAMAQ in La Paz were raided and seized by the police and a new 
CONAMAQ leadership loyal to the government were installed. This resulted in the 
existence of two parallel national-level ayllu federations: CONAMAQ oficial, 
supporting the government and CONAMAQ orgánica, consisting of the original 
leadership. The result was widespread disorganisation between different ayllus and 
sometimes disunity within them between those who supported the ‘official’ and the 
‘organic’ leaderships. In the case of Bolívar province the ayllu authorities were 
particularly closely allied to the CONAMAQ orgánica and were strongly opposed to the 
direction of government policy, including the intensification of extractive industry and 
legal changes that allowed state access to subsoil resources in indigenous territories, 
limitations to the juridical autonomy of indigenous communities as well as the presence 
of right-wing technocrats in the midst of the MAS government. Consequently, the 
division in Bolívar was experienced as a deepening rift between ayllu and sindicato, 
with the union actively campaigning on behalf of the MAS government and the 
traditional authorities equating the union with its worst excesses. Sabino Veizaga, a 
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former leader of Kirkiawi and full-time staff member of COAMAC, told me that 
following the events of 2011 he and others who had supported CIDOB had been 
tachados: marked so as to be kept out of any positions of influence in local government 
or in the peasant union movement and he concluded that despite the possibilities offered 
by Evo’s election they had been ‘deceived and manipulated’ from the time of the 
constituent assembly. 
 iii. Ethnicity and class in Kirkiawi and Bolivia 
In contemporary Bolivia the notion of indigenous identity enters virtually every area of 
political debate and has arguably become a national ideology (Canessa, 2008; Postero, 
2016). As discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, in Bolívar province the term 
originario rather than indígena (which implies lowland indigenous peoples) is used in 
much the same fashion as ‘indigenous’ or ‘first-nations people’ by those who choose to 
identify themselves in this way, despite being a word with multiple complex meanings 
and connotations. However, it is important to distinguish this idea of being indigenous 
from local notions of identity. In Bolívar and in other communities in the Andean 
highlands individuals normally identify themselves in contrast to local and national 
mestizo society. What it means to be a member of an ayllu comunidad, in contrast to the 
local townsfolk of the provincial capital or urban city-dwellers, has to do with having 
land within a comunidad and engaging in agricultural labour and the responsibilities 
that come with membership of the community. Miranda Shield-Johannson (2014), who 
carried out long-term fieldwork in Bolívar in the isolated and predominantly 
Evangelical Baptist hamlet of P’iya Qayma describes how her informants sense of being 
runa (the Quechua word for person) as opposed to a q’ara or outsider is linked to local 
understandings of llamk’ay or agricultural labour and the way this defines the 
relationships between people and the land they inhabit, reflecting particular moral 
values and conceptions of personhood. 
Historically, people living in rural communities like Bolívar province have lived in a 
relationship with the state that has determined the identity they must assume in order to 
negotiate some degree of autonomy and collective rights. From the time of the Spanish 
colony, ethnic difference was reproduced by the interaction between coloniser and 
colonised, as highland people needed to act as ‘Indians’ to be granted certain rights, 
considered a separate category of person for the state to collect taxes and labour 
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obligations (Platt, 1986; Stern, 1992; Abercrombie, 1998). The fact that terms of ethnic 
identity in contemporary Bolivia derive from categories that were formed in the process 
of a colonial encounter explains why they still function primarily as exonyms, a 
phenomenon that has been observed by numerous anthropologists throughout the Andes 
(Van den Bergh, 1967; De la Cadena, 1995, 2000). As Mary Weismantel (2001) has 
observed, terms such as indio, cholo, misti or q’ara frequently express a binary divide 
between in-group and out-group along a vertical axis of power: for an upper-class 
person from the city, a cholo or indio could include educated middle-class mestizos they 
see as their social inferiors, whereas highland Indians will use the term q’ara to describe 
a wide variety of outsiders who do not share their values and identity. 
This reality also explains how what it means to be Indian has been shaped by the 
historical interaction between rural peoples and the state: how the category of Indian has 
been reproduced despite successive reforms and attempts to ‘civilise’ highland 
indigenous people and eradicate the ayllu and how elements of European culture have 
been adopted and hybridised (Abercrombie, 1998). Evocations of successive struggles 
for independence and autonomy form, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the 
individual, a further component of the local identity of many people in Bolívar and 
inform their sense of belonging to the territory they inhabit. Moreover, this long history 
of interaction and negotiation indicates that rural peoples have for a long time seen 
themselves as in some sense located within the nation state. Tristan Platt (1993) 
describes how following the wars of independence, the inhabitants of Chayanta 
Province in contemporary Northern Potosí developed their own vision of the new nation 
in which they would remain as ‘tributary citizens’ and be granted recognition of their 
usurped lands, while also assimilating many of the symbols and invented traditions of 
the nascent fatherland and using them to express their own notion of a just social order. 
Throughout Bolivian history rural peoples have represented themselves within the 
prevailing citizenship regimes (Yashar, 2005) of national society; that is the social and 
legal frameworks that establish how persons are included within the nation state, the 
rights they possess and the institutional mechanisms that allow access to them.  
While both class and ethnic identity have been used by highland peoples to organise 
resistance and legitimise claims throughout at least most of the 20th century, this has 
been inflected by the dominant modes of representation available to them. Following 
the national revolution in 1952, class became the primary framework through which 
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individuals could seek recognition from governing institutions and make claims to 
rights. While movements such as Katarismo sought to oppose the class reductionism of 
the left and revindicate highland indigenous culture, this included a Marxian reading of 
exploitation that viewed class and ethnicity as complementary analytic categories, 
expressed in the notion that ‘the poor of Bolivia are Indians and the Indians are the 
poor’ (Schavelzon, 2012). However, by the 1990s this situation was reversed, as ethnic 
rather than class identity became the basis upon which social movements and political 
parties organised and legitimised themselves. Groups and individuals who would have 
previously identified as mestizos or expressed their political claims in the language of 
class began to reclaim their rights as indigenous peoples. The ‘intercultural colonists’ of 
the tropics, from whom President Morales draws his strongest support are a clear 
example of this phenomenon. Predominantly Quechua speakers drawn from a wide 
range of backgrounds they would have in the past been considered mestizos or cholos, 
as would Morales himself. Yet they use the term originario to organise and legitimise 
themselves, despite not being the original inhabitants of the areas they settle in and 
distancing themselves from being ‘too indigenous’ (Grisaffi, 2010). It was this broad 
and inclusive use of the notion of indigeneity that facilitated political mobilisation in 
opposition to the neoliberal state and brought Morales to power, explaining the 
importance of presenting his presidency as indigenous and using indigenous symbols as 
a unifying discourse, bringing together diverse social constituencies with distinct 
histories, needs and values. Whilst during the neoliberal period indigenous terms of 
identification such as originario allowed different movements to overcome disunity in 
opposition to a common enemy, it has now become the territory in which competition 
for ideological legitimacy is fought. 
In this context, criticisms of groups and individuals that come into conflict with the 
government are made in terms of their lack of authenticity as indigenous persons or as 
representatives of indigenous communities. During the TIPNIS crisis, Vice President 
Álvaro García Linera denounced the ‘fake environmentalism’ of the leaders of CIDOB 
and CONAMAQ and claimed that they were the pawns of NGOs representing foreign 
interests. This idea was echoed by a government minister I spoke with, who claimed 
that many of the ayllu leaders in the highland communities he has worked in were 
representing a romantic essentialised view of indigenous identity that was not consistent 
with reality and resulted from the influence of foreign NGOs. Moreover, in Bolívar 
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province technical staff from the alcaldía and union figures had claimed the ayllu 
leaders were ongeizados: unduly influenced by foreign NGOs and in their pay. These 
claims of inauthenticity were met by the contention that the ayllu figures are the true 
originarios, representing the territory and ways of life that have existed prior to the 
Spanish conquest, unlike the peasant union that is a ‘political’ organisation with no 
‘organic’ connection to the communities it seeks to represent. 
Broadly speaking, two different visions of indigeneity have emerged as part of national 
discourse. One is an inclusive conception of indigenous identity that includes the 
diverse marginalised groups that make up most of Bolivia’s population within a single 
subaltern indigenous subject, while the other is exclusive and conceives of indigenous 
groups in terms of rootedness within a particular place and culture. What Salvador 
Schavelzon (2014) refers to as ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ has become the official 
discourse of the MAS, which identifies itself in its political constitution as the 
expression of all marginalised sectors of society (Postero, 2013). While the person of 
Evo Morales can be said to represent a sort of ‘pan-indigenism’ (Canessa, 2006), some 
figures, such as the peasant union leader Gualberto Choque, have gone as far as to claim 
that all the peoples of Bolivia, including those of white European descent, who are poor, 
practice communitarian forms of resource sharing and are united in common struggle 
are indigenous (Ibid.). The populist nationalism of the present period, inflected with 
indigenous symbols and rhetoric concerning native values, bears definite similarities to 
the unifying national project of mestizaje following the 1952 revolution, forging a 
common identity through a single national subject. Yet while mestizaje sought to unite 
the nation through a notion of a culturally and racially mixed identity while privileging 
whiteness and European culture (Wade, 2001), the reverse is arguably the case in 
contemporary Bolivia. The Morales administration and the 2009 constitution have 
created a new citizenship regime, one which privileges indigenous identity in the 
definition of the nation and in making rights claims. 
While the CSUTCB tends to support the ecumenical indigeneity of the MAS, the 
indigenous block of CONAMAQ and CIDOB defend an exclusive conception of 
indigeneity linked to territory and communitarian practices. CONAMAQ developed a 
position that arguably expands upon the indigenous revindicationism of Katarismo, 
while incorporating many of its ideas and symbols. It is therefore worth enquiring why 
ideological differences expressed around different versions of indigeneity have emerged 
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in the post-neoliberal period between an organisation such as CONAMAQ and the 
CSUTCB, which was created by the Kataristas and moved away from the 
assimilationist project of mestizaje that followed the national revolution. Salvador 
Schavelzon (2012) has argued that, despite its origins in Katarismo, the CSUTCB as a 
national organisation still incorporates much of the mentality of mestizaje because of the 
historical trajectory of the peasant union as an organisation directed towards the 
incorporation of rural peoples within the nation state as ‘modern’ citizens. In analysing 
the TIPNIS conflict, Andrew Canessa (2014) distinguishes between a conception of 
indigeneity that is closer to the sense of ‘authochthony’ used by the Africanist Peter 
Geschiere (2009), of a native majority fighting against marginalisation, and indigeneity 
for minority groups that need protection from the state. He claims the divide in these 
two conceptions falls between territorialised and de-territorialised groups: for the former 
indigeneity is largely about land and autonomy while for the latter it is a national 
identity which promotes the use of natural resources for the benefit of the majority. 
However, Canessa does not consider that this divide can take place within indigenous 
communities, between those individuals and social organisations who emphasise 
autonomy and regional identity and those who prioritise inclusion within the nation.  
The traditional authorities and peasant union leaders in Bolívar province are the local 
representatives of larger national federations that share links with wider networks of 
international political, indigenous rights and environmental organisations and are 
influenced by a range of discourses that operate through these channels. Moreover, as 
will be explored in subsequent chapters, their present organisational form within the 
province has been shaped by local processes that were set forth by the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1990s and the way the two organisations have engaged in parallel 
projects which represent different dimensions of the aspirations of marginalised rural 
peoples. As Deborah Yashar (2005) has contested, through links with wider 
organisations and discourses, individuals form a sense of being indigenous that goes 
beyond their more local notions of self and identity, rooted in the everyday practices of 
their communities and concepts of personhood. The peasant union, alongside the MAS 
controlled alcaldía in Bolívar, accept a view of being originario which is strongly 
influenced by the ecumenical indigeneity of the MAS, while many of the traditional 
authorities emphasise the importance of local identity and communitarian practices. 
Within the spaces of political discourse of the province these respective ideas of 
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indigeneity have been articulated in ways that engage with more specific local 
understandings of identity, history and values, while also renegotiating their contents 
and meaning. In this way the local political rift between ayllu and sindicato represents 
what has been described by Habermas (1983, 1991) as an ethical discourse: a dispute in 
which different sides attempt to alternatively define the basic symbolic constituents of 
the culture they belong to and in doing so make competing claims to authenticity. For 
the two sets of authorities, the term originario denotes what it means to be an authentic 
member of their community, it is what I refer to as the ethical-political subject: the 
idealised notion of a good person to which people aspire, used as a referent against 
which standards of behaviour may be judged.  
Conclusion 
Communities like Kirkiawi have existed within larger state structures for many 
centuries. The history of ayllu communities since the time of the colony has been one of 
collaboration and co-evolution with and resistance against a colonial and post-colonial 
state that has helped to reproduce the ethnic divisions of Bolivian society while 
simultaneously seeing this as a problem for the development of the nation towards 
modernity, attempting in various ways to break up, reform or assimilate Indian 
communities. This interaction has helped shape both the local identities and conceptions 
of personhood of rural peoples (Abercrombie, 1998) as well as the forms of collective 
identity and action available to them in seeking recognition of their rights and 
autonomy. The latter, which I have referred to as ‘citizenship regimes’ (Yashar, 2005), 
have varied considerably over time. During the colony and the early years of the 
republic, highland rural peoples would have been granted autonomy while effectively 
inhabiting a separate socio-legal realm, before the liberal governments of the late 
nineteenth broke ‘the pact’ and attempted to bring about the end of the free Indian 
communities. This was followed by the corporate assimilationist regime of the mid-
twentieth century, the neoliberal multiculturalism of the turn of the century and finally 
the contemporary period which has seen the creation of a new citizenship regime which 
privileges indigeneity while leaving its definition ambiguous. Indigeneity has become 
not only the way popular social movements tend to define and legitimise themselves but 
the prevailing expression of citizenship and is multiply contested by various social 
actors. The MAS promotes a form of ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ that has similarities with 
the notion of mestizaje, while other social organisations such as CIDOB and 
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CONAMAQ contest a less inclusive notion of indigenous identity closer to that 
contained in international human rights law and NGO discourse. These differences were 
expressed during the period of the constituent assembly and were brought into sharp 
relief following the TIPNIS protests in 2011.  
The territory which constitutes the province of Bolívar has undergone tremendous 
changes while retaining a sense of identity and this is in large measure the result of 
successive struggles for autonomy and recognition. The historical interaction between 
its inhabitants and the state has helped form not only a sense of identity linked to a 
specific territory but has shaped the institutions through which the territory governs 
itself internally and represents itself to wider society. The existence of multiple forms of 
political authority within this relatively small area and the differing positions they take 
on issues including land tenancy, development, regional autonomy and the 
administration of justice are the result of this process. The traditional authorities and the 
peasant union representatives alongside the MAS local government partly derive these 
views from the larger national-level organisations they are linked to and articulate them 
in a way which engages with more specific local understandings of history and identity. 
Moreover, their longer history as social organisations explains how they embody 
different aspirations of rural peoples and their relationship with the state and wider 
society. In this manner, despite the disputes that took place during my fieldwork 
representing an attempt to define the common values, collective narrative and identity 
of a small and isolated locality, they were linked to ideological conflict taking place 
throughout Bolivia. The contents of these disputes will form the basis of the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4. Autonomy, Leadership and Governance 
 Introduction 
One of the centrepieces of the incipient plurinational state is the provision for 
indigenous peasant communities to become quasi-independent entities with their own 
forms of internal administration based on traditional customs. Since 2009, indigenous 
communities have been able to apply, subject to a somewhat labyrinthine bureaucratic 
legal process, for their conversion into an Autonomia Independiente Originaria 
Campesina or AIOC. Nevertheless, the long-term consequences of this reform are 
uncertain. The national MAS government has displayed a certain ambivalence over the 
issue, while the details of the law have become an item of debate between national 
indigenous and peasant social organisations. A major issue with the concept of 
indigenous autonomy as it currently stands is how to define the competencies of local 
authorities within a majority indigenous community, alongside what constitutes their 
traditional customs, norms and procedures.  
This chapter will examine how the possibility of becoming an autonomous indigenous 
community divided the traditional authorities and the peasant union and MAS municipal 
government in Bolívar province during the time of my fieldwork. The form the dispute 
took resulted in part from the nature of the territorial and governmental structure of the 
province and in some measure represented a power struggle over what institutional 
reform would mean for the different authorities and who would stand to win or lose 
from different arrangements. Nevertheless, it quickly transposed into a debate 
concerning questions of political legitimacy, governance and the values of leadership. 
Recent commentators have remarked that the present legal and institutional framework 
for conversion to an AIOC produces a hybrid system with an inherent tension between 
the forms of governance native to indigenous communities and the ‘liberal democracy’ 
of municipal governments (Tockman, 2014, 2017; Tockman and Cameron, 2014; 
Postero 2016). Moreover, classic anthropological commentaries have maintained that 
the ayllu and peasant union represent different versions of democracy: one liberal-
democratic and the other communitarian (Platt, 1986; Cusicanqui, 1990). In contrast, 
this chapter will argue that in Bolívar province the different forms of authority are 
already hybridised to a significant degree and have been held together in a 
complementary tension in which they are commonly regarded as a single system of 
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authority. Despite differences in outlook, ‘communitarian’ and ‘representative’ practices 
of democracy exist alongside each other and various figures accommodate values and 
logics normally attributed to the Andean ayllu. It has been the constitutional reforms of 
the MAS government, alongside national-level disputes regarding the direction of 
policy, that have destabilised the balance of forces in Bolívar and produced the current 
ethical discourse in which the different authorities seek to define the meanings and 
limits of their respective roles. 
The first section of this chapter will describe the details of a meeting in Cochabamba 
regarding indigenous autonomy attended by representatives of the social organisations 
of Bolívar province, before explaining the details of the AIOC reform and the debates 
surrounding it. It will then outline how the possibility of converting to an AIOC 
developed into a dispute concerning the internal forms of governance of Bolívar and the 
putative authenticity of the respective authorities. The chapter will then examine the 
validity of the claim frequently made by union figures and local MAS politicians that 
the different social organisations are really ‘mixed’ and should not be considered 
separate and bounded institutions.  
I. Indigenous Autonomy: National and Local Conflict 
In September 2015 I attended a meeting near the bustling central square of the city of 
Cochabamba. The site of famous demonstrations during the Water Wars, it today serves 
a function analogous to Hyde Park’s Speaker’s Corner, as groups of people will 
congregate to discuss matters of social and political import underneath the shade of the 
trees that line the centre of the plaza. However, that day the discussion I witnessed took 
place entirely indoors, within a large meeting hall on the second story of the 
Cochabamba departmental government building. The meeting had been organised by 
functionaries of the Ministry of Indigenous Autonomies to explain the details of the 
process of converting to an AIOC and to share thoughts and experiences among 
different indigenous groups in the department. Representatives of four communities had 
been invited to participate. These included the Yuracaré, a lowland indigenous group 
who inhabit a section of territory along the Chapare river which they have successfully 
consolidated as a Native Communal Land or TCO, two highland communities, Ch’alla 
from Tapacari province and Kirkiawi, alongside Raqaypampa from the region of 
Mizque. Nearly all the representatives wore some form of traditional clothing. The 
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Yuracaré were dressed in white robes and headdresses that clearly marked them out as a 
lowland indigenous people while the representatives of Raqaypampa wore identical 
white stovepipe hats, the men dressed in woollen trousers and waistcoats and the 
women in pollera skirts. The representatives of Ch’alla dressed in nearly identical 
fashion to those from Kirkiawi, with traditional ch’ullu hats topped with white wide-
brimmed sombreros decorated with black bands and colourful woven textiles.  
Unlike the representatives from other communities, the various dignitaries from Bolívar 
province were conspicuously seated apart from each other in two groups. The 
representatives of the MAS municipal government of Bolívar alongside several peasant 
union figures, including the departmental union leader, Severina Wayatola, were seated 
next to me, while Mallku Gregorio, his wife Dominga and some of the Kuraj Tatas sat 
in a different group near the front of the room. The latter were dressed in their long, 
woven ponchos, while the union and municipal government figures wore jeans and 
jackets underneath their traditional ch’ullus and sombreros, some of them bearing the 
insignia of the departmental government. Vincente Condori, the local council leader, 
was sat next to me and while we waited for the meeting to start, he amused himself by 
asking me to translate simple sentences from Spanish to Quechua, the cause of his mirth 
being the improbability of hearing Quechua phrases spoken with a ‘gringo accent’. 
The chair of the meeting was a young woman in her twenties who provided us with a 
PowerPoint presentation on the necessary bureaucratic steps for a community to gain 
status as an AIOC. She explained that what they were doing today was an important part 
of the process of change and the decolonisation of Bolivia and that through sharing 
experiences and knowledge they could find solutions to their common problems. She 
then acted as a translator for the speaker from Raqaypampa, Sub-Alcalde (Sub-Mayor) 
Don Aran Salazar, who shared in Quechua their experiences of having completed the 
initial steps of the conversion process. Raqaypampa is a community that was previously 
hacienda land and which governs itself through a peasant union that has been 
recognised as a central of the FSUTCC since 1997. They had a strong sense of shared 
identity and culture that had been reinforced through struggles over bilingual education 
in the 1980s and 1990s and this had led to them titling their territory as a TCO before 
becoming one of the first communities to begin the process of converting to an 
autonomous indigenous community in 2009. Following this, figures from the other three 
communities introduced themselves and explained their local forms of government, 
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history and their reasons for wanting to pursue indigenous autonomy. The 
representatives of the Yuracaré explained to us in Spanish that their situation as a 
relatively small group whose territory, consolidated in three separate TCOs, was spread 
through different municipalities and provinces compelled them to pursue indigenous 
autonomy. The representatives of Ch’alla stated that in their case they represented one 
district of the municipality of Tapacari but within the district they governed themselves 
as three ayllus that represent 27 comunidades. There was broad agreement among the 
comunidades and ayllus that the district should become an AIOC, partly because of the 
hope that it would bring more investment in projects to improve agricultural production. 
However, the fact that the land had been titled as 11 separate TCOs made the process of 
reaching consensus slow. 
Kirkiawi was the last community to make a contribution, which was by far the longest. 
Mallku Gregorio addressed the rest of the room in Spanish and acknowledged the 
presence of the other authorities from Bolívar province, including Mayor Francisco, the 
councillors and the provincial and departmental peasant union leaders. However, he 
claimed, ‘as an organización originaria we remember the history of what came before’. 
In this history they still remember that it was thanks to the traditional authorities, the 
leaders of three families who marched to Lima Peru and bought the ancestral title of 
their land from the Spanish crown with seven mules loaded with bushels of gold and 
silver, that their territory still exists today. It is for this reason that until now only 
individuals from families with the surnames Mamani, Apaza and Jacinto may assume 
the highest cargo within the structure of the ayllu. It was thanks to the efforts of these 
ancestros apoderados that the patrones never took control of their land. Today Kirkiawi 
has been recognised as a TCO that occupies the entire territory of the province of 
Bolívar minus some areas of ex-hacienda land and the provincial capital. Within this 
territory the role of jilanku has always existed and has been responsible alongside his 
wife for ensuring the production of crops and resolving all the problems that occur 
within the comunidad. Gregorio then outlined the larger structures of jap’iy, pirañu and 
ayllu, with their corresponding authorities. They were, he pronounced, trying to 
reconstitute these authorities, which meant not only reconstructing the larger structures 
within which the authorities operated but also their function, for example in resolving 
questions of justice according to the ways of their ancestors. It was for this reason that 
he and others had helped found POKUY as their political instrument. The traditional 
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authorities did not involve themselves in politics and POKUY was not a political party 
but rather a means by which they could progress things at a local level. He concluded by 
stating that the integrity of their territory as a TCO and the hierarchy of authorities 
provided a clear basis for conversion to an AIOC. 
Following Gregorio’s contribution, Mayor Francisco asked to speak and gave his 
greetings to the various communities and figures present. ‘Our brother Gregorio has 
spoken about history, about what has taken place in our province before,’ he stated, ‘but 
the truth is that nowadays we are very mixed and our Kuraj Tatas are not the same as in 
the past’ (‘ya estamos muy mezclados y los Kuraj Tatas no son los de antes’). He 
explained that in Bolívar there not only exist the traditional authorities but three sets of 
authority at every level: the ayllu, peasant union and the Bartolina Sisas, who together 
coordinate with the municipal government. It is normal for people to pass through all 
these different cargos and they really form one organisation. When it came to the 
possibility of becoming an AIOC, he claimed that people he spoke with in the province 
were concerned about what this would mean and were far from enthusiastic about the 
idea. For one thing, they were happy with how the municipal government was working 
to provide them with projects and investment along with the support of the national 
government and it was unclear whether indigenous autonomy would improve the 
matter. Moreover, many people already felt that the collective titling of land as a TCO 
had been a mistake because of problems resulting from it. Converting the TCO to an 
AIOC was a step further in a direction that a lot of the residents of the province were not 
comfortable with. Moreover, as the TCO did not include the whole province, if it were 
to become an AIOC, a number of comunidades would be excluded and it is uncertain 
what would happen to them. The whole issue was divisive and Gregorio had been 
slightly dishonest in claiming that the traditional authorities were not involved in 
politics. After all, he pointed out, they have a councillor within the municipal 
government. This last comment elicited objections from some of the Kuraj Tatas who 
insisted that this was unfair and that they only wanted to defend their usos y costumbres 
and what was written in their ancestral documents. 
At this point the atmosphere had become rather tense and the chair of the meeting 
acknowledged that there was obviously a conflict in Bolívar but that this was no one’s 
fault. Rather, she declared, it was the consequence of how colonisation had divided 
them all. She suggested the different communities break up into working groups and 
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report back. The various authorities from Bolívar province formed a circle in one corner 
of the room and discussed how indigenous autonomy could come about. It was agreed 
that the possibility would be made public through the various levels of local government 
of the province, starting with the ampliado general and then through the sub-centrales 
in order to gauge what people felt about it. They agreed upon the need to find a single 
approach for administering justice and defining the roles of the different authorities. 
However, Mayor Francisco and the representatives of the municipal government and 
peasant union all maintained that whatever happened the TCO should not be converted 
into an AIOC. Instead the way forward would be to convert the province and 
municipality of Bolívar into an autonomous indigenous community. Following this 
meeting in Cochabamba the same issue was discussed in several meetings of the 
provincial ampliado general and continued to publicly divide the traditional authorities 
and the peasant union and MAS local government. In order to understand why, it is first 
necessary to outline the legal framework of indigenous autonomy established since 
2009 and the wider political dispute over its contents and implementation. 
The 2009 constitution recognised the right of indigenous communities to establish self-
governance and provided basic guidelines for the creation of AIOCs, while the 2010 
Autonomies and Decentralisation Law or LMAD specified in greater detail the 
requirements for the creation and operation of an autonomous indigenous community. 
As small-scale political units recognised by the state and afforded autonomy over the 
allocation of resources they are similar to the municipalities already created by the 1994 
Popular Participation Law (LPP), although the communities are permitted to design 
their own institutions in accordance with traditional customs, including those 
responsible for the administration of indigenous justice. There exist three routes to 
indigenous autonomy: through the conversion of an existing municipality, through the 
conversion of a TCO and through the joining together of various municipalities that 
have already converted to form a regional autonomy. Subject to limits regarding 
population and the viability of the proposed AIOC set forth in the LMAD law, 
indigenous communities may start the process of conversion by first holding a 
consultative referendum. Should the population vote in the affirmative they are then 
required to hold an autonomy assembly to draft a statute of autonomy to be approved by 
the constitutional court. This then begins a further lengthy bureaucratic legal process to 
determine finally whether the conversion process should take place and the nature of the 
121 
 
 
final administrative details. Raqaypampa, one of the first communities to initiate the 
process in 2009, only began to operate as an AIOC in January of this year (Flores and 
Villagomez, 2018). 
As noted in the previous chapter, from the time of the constituent assembly there existed 
a considerable difference between the ‘indigenous block’ and the various peasant union 
organisations on the issue of autonomy, with the final nature of the AIOCs falling far 
short of what CIDOB or CONAMAQ leaders would have wanted. Meanwhile, the 
peasant unions were less concerned with local autonomy than with increasing the 
central power of the state in order to guarantee positive social rights. A significant 
problem for the leaders of CONAMAQ had been that the administrative-legal 
jurisdiction of AIOCs does not include control over nonrenewable natural resources. 
This was an issue that was frequently brought up in meetings of the traditional 
authorities during my time in Bolívar and was described as a betrayal of the indigenous 
movement by Evo and the MAS, in addition to a 2013 mining law that further 
undermines the right of prior consultation of indigenous communities over the 
exploitation of subsoil resources within their territories. Moreover, further legislation 
since 2009 has placed limits on the forms of legal pluralism indigenous communities 
may practice, an issue that will be explored in more detail in chapter 6. While 
individuals involved in the original ‘organic’ CONAMAQ leadership have been 
strongly critical of these developments, the peasant unions have been largely indifferent 
to them (Tockman, 2014, 2017). These issues point to the more fundamental ideological 
difference between organisations such as CONAMAQ and the CSUTCB regarding the 
meaning of autonomy and their relationship with the state. That is, between a project of 
gaining representation and power within the structures of liberal democracy or of 
replacing the liberal state and its system of laws in a process of decolonisation. For this 
reason, various highland leaders have expressed their disapproval of the fact that the law 
recognises small political units that are essentially similar to municipalities and not the 
suyus or markas that were the territorial units that made up the Gran Qollasuyu (Ibid.). 
This has been further compounded by the fact that the 2010 LMAD law specifies that 
TCOs that are not continuous territories cannot be converted into AIOCs. It is the view 
of such leaders that while purportedly recognising the autonomy of indigenous 
communities, the AIOCs represent an attempt on the part of the state to make 
indigenous communities legible within territorial and administrative frameworks that 
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are the product of colonisation, a process that has countless precedents in Bolivian 
history (Platt, 1982). 
While the MAS government has introduced AIOCs as a centrepiece of the new 
plurinational state it has been slow and at times obstructionist in supporting their 
implementation (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2012; Tockman, 2017). There are two principal 
factors that explain this somewhat paradoxical attitude. Firstly, as has been explained in 
the previous chapter and will be dealt with more fully in chapter 7, the national MAS 
government is committed to funding social programs and growing the economy and 
must do so to appease its key political bases. This commits it to the expansion of 
extractive industry and makes it opposed to measures that could restrict its ability to 
exploit subsoil resources. The second factor is a general tendency on the part of the 
MAS to hold on to and centralise power (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2012; Postero, 2016). This 
can be observed both locally and nationally. At the national level the construction of a 
plurinational state with a genuinely federated structure would mean a reduction of the 
powers of the central government. The national government therefore shows somewhat 
contradictory impulses in on the one hand creating a Ministry for Indigenous 
Autonomies and promoting AIOCs as part of the process of change while 
simultaneously failing to invest sufficiently in the process and placing bureaucratic 
procedures in the way of conversion. At the local level, a number of MAS leaders are 
generally hostile to indigenous autonomy because they wish to retain political control 
over municipal governments and view conversion to an AIOC as a threat to this. 
These differences at the level of national politics between organisations that continue to 
support the MAS government and echo its populist nationalist discourse and position of 
progressive extractivism is reproduced locally. The traditional authorities are linked to 
the ‘organic’ CONAMAQ leadership and publicly state many of the concerns outlined 
above, while the peasant union and MAS are the beneficiaries of the increased 
investment of national hydrocarbon revenues (this will be dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter 7). However, in Bolívar province the dispute that arose over the possibility of 
conversion to an AIOC was in large measure the result of the nature of the territorial and 
governmental structure of the province as well as the local histories of the different 
social organisations involved. The impact of the legal changes that allow for conversion 
to an AIOC are felt differently throughout the many local communities in Bolivia that 
have a majority indigenous population. Even the very brief description at the start of 
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this section of the communities in Cochabamba department who are considering or have 
already started the process of conversion to an AIOC should illustrate the specificity of 
territorial and political structures, histories and identities and the way these shape local 
interaction with the new law, generating conflict or consensus and particular challenges 
for defining their internal structures of governance and traditional norms. 
In the case of Bolívar, the province, TCO, municipality and peasant union central are 
roughly coterminous and considered part of the same historic territory and community. 
Moreover, recent history helped consolidate the union, traditional authorities and 
alcaldía as a hybrid governmental structure. The institutional changes offered by 
conversion to AIOC status have created the basis for a power struggle between these 
different elements, who stand to win or lose depending upon if and how the conversion 
process was to take place. In negotiating their position, they are forced to define and 
justify their respective roles, leading to disputes over what constitutes authenticity in 
regard to the internal forms of governance and the values of leadership and public 
service of their community.  
II. The Paths to Indigenous Autonomy and the Virtues of Leadership 
Following the meeting in Cochabamba the issue of whether the different comunidades 
of Bolívar province should begin the process of becoming an autonomous indigenous 
community was broached in the ampliado general. The ampliado general was normally 
held on the second Saturday of every second month in the town of Bolívar in a large 
adobe brick building and was attended by more than a hundred people representing the 
ayllu authorities, peasant union, the Bartolinas and the local municipal government. The 
mayor, members of the council, the union leaders, the Kuraj Mallku and the two 
Pirañus (the representatives of Urinsaya and Arinsaya) would sit behind a large table at 
one end of the room. The rest of the union and ayllu representatives and members of the 
public would sit on rows of plastic chairs or on the floor. Attendance would be 
registered by the secretaria de actas, a local schoolteacher from the town of Bolívar, 
and an enormous twenty-pound sack of coca leaves would be hauled in front of the table 
and distributed in fistfuls to everyone present. The Kuraj Tatas and jilankus tended to sit 
in one corner of the room. 
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Figure 17: Picture of the dirigente provincial addressing the ampliado general 
A major concern among all present was how indigenous autonomy would affect money 
available for public works that had previously been available through municipal funds 
as well as national level programs such as Bolivia Cambia: Evo Cumple. Alongside the 
members of the municipal government and the union and traditional authorities were a 
number of técnicos: technical and administrative staff who helped run the various 
branches of local government. One of these was Jesus Aguayo, a man in his early 
thirties from Pampajasi who had studied in Oruro before returning to work in his home 
province and who was often present and made contributions to public meetings. Jesus 
echoed earlier points made by Mayor Francisco and the dirigente provincial, Olker 
Nina, that the municipal government was functioning well to provide them with 
investment and that conversion to an AIOC had risks. Most crucially was the choice 
between the two different routes open to them in the legislation: through conversion of 
the TCO or of the municipality. Should they opt for ‘vía TCO’ over ‘vía municipal’, this 
would mean the traditional authorities would take control of the province and become a 
ruling caste (‘una casta aparte’) who dominated everyone else without their consent. 
He pointed to the fact that only individuals from certain families were able to assume 
the role of Kuraj Mallku and that this would hand power to a small group who would 
not be accountable. ‘After all,’ he stated emphatically, ‘All of us are originarios, 
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comrades!’ (‘Tukuyninchis kanchis originarios, hermanos!’). Moreover, an important 
point was that should they convert by ‘vía TCO’ then the collective ownership of the 
land would be part of the make-up of the AIOC and it would be impossible to revoke 
the TCO and create individual land titling.  
Concerning this last point Olker Nina agreed that many individuals were unhappy with 
the TCO and that they were going to consult their bases over the issue. As shall be 
explored in greater detail in the following chapter, several figures within the municipal 
government and peasant union had argued for replacing the collective titling of the TCO 
with individual land titles. Mayor Francisco also agreed that if they were to pursue 
indigenous autonomy then ‘vía municipal’ was the only workable option that would 
represent everyone in the province. At this point Mallku Gregorio responded by stating 
that all they were doing was looking after the usos y costumbres and what was written in 
their ancestral documents. They had not defined the nature of any future AIOC but they 
were the only social organisation that possessed a collective land title and could prove 
they existed before the colony. As the meeting wore on the atmosphere became 
increasingly hostile and Gregorio’s claims were met with the argument that they did not 
have a monopoly on what it meant to be originario. At one point a peasant union 
dirigente shouted angrily, ‘I am tired of these gentlemen who think they represent us 
when they do not!’. After the meeting I spoke with Gregorio about the issue and he 
claimed that the Mayor and the peasant union, in as much as they supported indigenous 
autonomy, simply wanted to ‘put a poncho on the municipality’ (‘poner un poncho 
sobre la municipalidad’). He told me that while individuals like the Mayor wore 
traditional clothing at meetings and claimed to be originarios they really considered 
themselves criollos and didn't care about creating an AIOC based on the usos y 
costumbres that reflected the ways of their ancestors.   
The fact that the political geography of Bolívar province allowed for two routes to 
conversion to an AIOC meant this became a central point of division between the 
different forms of authority. The peasant union and local MAS politicians claimed that 
they would potentially endorse conversion by ‘vía municipal’ if their bases supported it, 
while the traditional authorities argued for ‘vía TCO’. On one level this represented a 
straightforward struggle over power as each of the two routes embodied potentially 
more favourable outcomes concerning the degree of control over the administration of 
any future autonomous indigenous community. Should the TCO be converted to an 
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AIOC, then the traditional authorities would exert greater influence over the definition 
of the internal forms of governance in their statute of autonomy. Meanwhile, conversion 
of the municipality would result in a hybrid system of government which would define 
procedures over the administration of indigenous justice, while retaining the election of 
a mayor and council members alongside the union and traditional authorities. 
Nevertheless, this situation meant that both sides sought to define the nature and limits 
of their respective roles within the overall system of governance of the province. The 
claim made by the técnico, Jesus Aguayo, that in creating an autonomy by ‘via TCO’ the 
traditional authorities would become a ‘caste’ that only represents the ancestral families 
of the ayllu I heard repeated a number of times. Moreover, it was maintained that they 
had no right do to so because all of them were originarios and played a role in 
governing the province. These debates continued during my remaining time in Bolívar 
and focused on the supposed authenticity of the different authorities and the principles 
of leadership and public service. 
‘All of us are originarios but we're divided by politics. Whether the Kuraj Tatas like it 
or not they have become politicians. They got involved in politics with the POKUY 
party...I'm a politician too with the MAS, but as people we are all originarios. For 
example, the very same persons that make up the peasant union, they fulfil the roles of 
jilanku and Kuraj Tata...But the Kuraj Tatas and some leaders now...we're confronting 
each other for various motives. Above all over the issue of autonomy. This is what we're 
fighting over, right?...They say 'we want to go by via TCO'...But for me it doesn't work 
because first they would leave behind the part of the province that is not titled…and 
they [the traditional authorities] want to govern on their own. They say 'we have 
ancestral documents' but the truth is we are all of us originario authorities. I’m 
originario and I’ve assumed the role of authority of the municipality.’ (S) 
       - Francisco Delgado, Mayor of Bolívar 
‘[Mayor] Francisco is calling us politicians, but the originario authorities are not 
politicians. Bolívar has only been around for barely thirty years as a province while the 
traditional authorities have fought for over five hundred years. There was no 
government here until Victor Paz Estenssoro...The ayllu is from before the Spanish. Our 
ancestors bought it with gold and silver...For that reason there exist authorities such as 
Kuraj Tatas.’ (S) 
    - Juan Apaza, former Mallku and POKUY councillor 
The question of the limits of the roles of the different social organisations in the 
province was often referred to as la parte orgánica. The term orgánica in Bolívar 
province is used to refer to a sort of idealised structure, set of procedures and division of 
labour within the forms of local government. An organisation functions ‘organically’ in 
as much as it is natural, reciprocal and serves the community and its interests, operating 
outside of the sphere of external political control and in accordance with values of 
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leadership and public service. La parte orgánica was often brought up in the meetings 
of the ampliado general by representatives of the peasant union in reference to the fact 
that the traditional authorities were acting outside of their legitimate function by 
involving themselves in politics. For them, the formation of a political party in POKUY 
was not a legitimate role for the traditional authorities to occupy. While they recognised 
the importance of the traditional authorities, they pointed out that the Kuraj Tatas of 
their fathers’ generation were never involved in politics and simply looked after the usos 
y costumbres, which they took to mean primarily matters related to the land and the 
resolution of conflicts, agricultural production and associated rituals. Sabino Veizaga, a 
former Mallku and administrator of the regional COAMAC federation in Cochabamba 
told me ‘those of the peasant union and the MAS, they want to consign us to nothing 
more than wearing the poncho, baston de mando and all that…they say all this about 
meddling in politics but I’m not a politician nor have I ever wanted to be one. I only 
want to defend what it says in the documents, our usos y costumbres.’ Gregorio 
commented to me in private that it was impossible to defend the usos y costumbres 
without creating a political instrument to represent them in local government, otherwise 
they would be ‘just sat there barking like a dog’ (‘sentado ladrando como un perro’). 
‘According to their usos y costumbres, they can’t become tainted by politics. They can 
lend their support to whichever government that arrives, but they cannot form political 
organisations. Only we can do that here and it is for this reason that people are getting a 
little annoyed…because they are becoming involved with politics with POKUY. They 
should only take care of their territory, of justice and the usos y costumbres. But 
unfortunately, it is no longer like that, it’s the other way around: we are seeking to look 
after the usos y costumbres and they are moving towards the level of politics.’ (S) 
- Olker Nina, Dirigente Provincial  
In addition, the Kuraj Tatas were often not present in the comunidades, meaning the 
union had been forced to assume their role. According to the sindicato leaders there was 
a problem with la parte orgánica in the province as the different meetings were not 
being attended by authorities from all the social organisations. According to the 
commonly understood hybrid notion of the political organisation of the province shown 
in Figure 7, the ayllu and sindicato correspond to each other at different levels of 
hierarchy in such a way that a jilanku is at the level of a dirigente, a Kuraj Tata at the 
level of a dirigente sub-central and so forth. Consequently, the monthly meetings of the 
comunidades, sub-centrales and the province should include representatives from the 
ayllu, the sindicato and the women’s union. In addition to the ampliado general there is 
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a monthly meeting of the Municipal Development Committee or CDM, charged with 
auditing the different development projects being carried out in the province and 
guiding overall policy. Not only were the peasant union leaders displeased with the fact 
there was not a full set of representatives in all the local and provincial meetings, but 
they claimed that the fact the ayllu organised its own separate meetings was illegitimate 
and ‘discriminatory’. The collective meetings of the ayllu, many of which I had 
attended, had their origins in the process of seeking the collective titling of the TCO. 
Now that this process had come to a completion they were being attended in fewer 
numbers, something that was complained about by individuals associated with the ayllu 
and used by sindicato leaders to demonstrate the relative weakness of organisation 
among the traditional authorities.  
The lack of presence of leaders in communities owing to high levels of double residence 
was one of the criticisms often made of the traditional authorities and it was claimed 
that for this reason they no longer command the respect they had in the past. Before, the 
Kuraj Tatas would never remove their ponchos or go anywhere without their tata 
santísimo. According to the union leaders the current Kuraj Tatas were playing at make-
believe, dressing up in their traditional costumes to attend meetings only to later return 
to Oruro or Cochabamba the same day where they would take off their ponchos and put 
on urban clothing. Moreover, according to union leader critics, the principle of 
chachawarmi, meaning that the cargo of an authority is in fact held by the married 
couple no longer exists in practice. Although the Kuraj Tatas would occasionally appear 
in public with their wives, this, claimed the union leaders, was just to pretend, as in 
reality their wives had nothing to do with the decisions they made and in most of the 
meetings the traditional authorities attended they appeared ‘as if they were single men’ 
(‘como solteros’). This phrase was often repeated in the presence of the ayllu leaders 
with an air of mockery, to point out that they were not practicing the traditions they 
claimed to embody. These criticisms of the traditional authorities were intended to 
undermine their claim to more fully represent the usos y costumbres in the light of the 
changes brought about primarily through migration and double residence. In reality, 
they claimed, the union was increasingly assuming responsibility for the usos y 
costumbres by resolving the problems which come from the land. 
Part of the traditional political norms spoken about in the province are the concepts of 
muyu and thaki, also referred to in Spanish as el turno and el paso: the turn and the step. 
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These concepts refer to the virtues of disinterested leadership. Within the traditional 
cargo system, muyu or el turno refers to the rotative nature of leadership roles in which 
no one person or family is allowed to dominate. The cargos of jilanku and Kuraj Tata 
are rotated every year and the new authority is chosen by the community, often 
following discussion in a public assembly, rather than through voting for candidates 
who nominate themselves. I was told that in some cases individuals will be hesitant to 
assume the role, despite the great prestige it brings, as it implies sacrifice and 
responsibility. Muyu therefore also refers to the fact that assuming a cargo is an act of 
disinterested public service. Thaki or el paso refers to the path an individual takes 
through the different cargos in becoming a valued and respected member of the 
community. An individual must follow the correct path, serving their community and 
passing first through the lower cargos before reaching a higher level of authority. Ayllu 
figures will typically maintain that serving as a traditional authority such as jilanku or 
Kuraj Tata is about developing as a complete person, while serving the needs of their 
ayllu. 
‘The union is not about being a whole person. For example, anyone can become a 
dirigente, you do not have to be married. They don't follow the usos y costumbres 
because they are a European invention. We are pre-existent to the colony. To be a leader 
of the ayllu is to follow the cargos. You cannot leave the path [descarillarse].’ (S) 
- Gregorio Jacinto, Kuraj Mallku 
However, the union leaders claim that in practice they embody these principles as much 
as the traditional authorities and are equally engaged in public service. Meanwhile, the 
traditional authorities maintain that the union, being a European institution imposed on 
them by the 1953 agrarian reform, does not follow the same norms of organisation and 
leadership. The union elects the leaders of its sub-centrales by popular vote, who have 
to declare their intention to run for office, unlike the traditional authorities who are in 
theory chosen to serve by the community. There is no theoretical limit on the number of 
times a union leader may seek re-election and it is not necessary to have passed through 
the lower levels of authority to seek a higher post. Several traditional authorities I spoke 
with emphasised the fact that their manner of taking decisions was by consensus in 
assemblies and not through ‘European’ forms of voting, as were practiced by the union.  
Moreover, the fact that the union is a ‘political’ organisation with the responsibility of 
representing the community and soliciting funds from NGO and government sources 
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means union leaders are almost automatically caught up in external political alliances 
which undermine their neutrality.  
Against this claim, the union leaders and MAS politicians pointed out that Gregorio 
Jacinto, the Kuraj Mallku at the time of my fieldwork, had not passed through all the 
lower cargos and was relatively young at the age of thirty-three when he assumed the 
role. Gregorio became the leader of the ayllu in part because of his fluency in the 
Spanish language (unlike the previous Mallku, Juan Apaza, whose Spanish was more 
limited) which made him a more effective representative of the ayllu authorities outside 
of the province. More importantly, it was maintained that the ayllu and union were 
hybrid organisations that operated together in a complementary way through shared 
values, together with the local municipal government. They were all originarios and 
each form of authority had roles in representing their community and defending their 
interests. The final section of this chapter will consider the extent to which this claim is 
valid. 
 III. ‘Liberal’ and ‘Ayllu’ Democracy in the Political Authorities of Bolívar 
Province 
The discourse espoused by the traditional authorities suggests that they embody 
different values when they take on their roles as jilankus or Kuraj Mallkus compared to 
the peasant union leaders or members of the municipal government. This is a puzzling 
claim when one considers the fact that at the level of the village comunidad the peasant 
union dirigente and jilanku fulfil similar roles. In a highly influential (1990) paper 
‘Liberal Democracy and Ayllu Democracy: The Case of Northern Potosí’ Silvia Rivera 
Cusicanqui made the claim that peasant union and ayllu organisations represent two 
distinct forms of democracy with different notions of citizenship. She contrasts the 
‘direct democracy’ of the ayllu with the ‘representative democracy’ of the peasant union 
and suggests that unions represent an attempt to ‘modernise’ highland indigenous 
populations which only serves to reproduce forms of colonial oppression. Moreover, she 
argues that peasant unions are the natural allies of development organisations and that 
the entrance of NGOs into the Bolivian countryside during the 1980s undermined the 
traditional ayllu authorities and fostered a culture of dependency. This last point is 
interesting considering that since the neoliberal multiculturist reforms of the 1990s, 
ayllu authorities became strongly associated with and received funds from various 
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international NGOs, leading to the contemporary accusation in Bolívar province and 
elsewhere that they are ‘ongeizados’: unduly influenced by the foreign development 
organisations which provide them with money and training.  
While Rivera Cusicanqui’s analysis of the ideological divide between ayllu and union is 
useful, it represents them as fundamentally separate organisations locked in an 
internecine struggle. Miranda Shield Johannson, who carried out long-term fieldwork in 
the isolated community of P’iya Qayma in Bolívar province, has argued that this picture 
is at odds with the reality of relations between union dirigente and jilanku at the local 
level and the perceptions of her informants (Sheild Johannson, 2014). She maintains 
that the division between the ayllu and sindicato leaders was not an issue in the 
everyday life of P’iya Qayma and that many of her informants conflated the different 
sets of authorities as they both participate in the material and symbolic reproduction of 
the ayllu, understood in the broad sense of their shared territory and community. Sheild 
Johannson’s description of the close working relationship between dirigente and jilanku 
and the ultimate similarity of their roles was reflected in my own experience of 
Vilaycayma, where I saw people seek out the advice of both the jilanku Tata Maximo 
and dirigente Don Severino in equal measure. Moreover, the two leaders worked 
together to organise events, such as their participation in the fiesta of Tata Santiago or 
the coordination of trabajo communal. 
Nevertheless, I believe it is important to distinguish between the different levels at 
which the authorities operate and how these generate collective identity. As illustrated in 
figure 7, above the level of the comunidad is the union sub-central and jap’iy and above 
this the ayllu, provincial central and the municipal government. While the distinctions 
between the roles are not absolute, at the higher levels of organisation the traditional 
authorities such as the Kuraj Tatas are more focused on the mediation of conflicts 
regarding lands and the peasant union is more directed towards dealing with the 
municipal government and securing funds for public works. Moreover, as is common 
with grass roots social organisations in Bolivia (Nash, 1979; Lazar, 2008) both the 
traditional authorities and the peasant union serve as a ‘school’ in which individuals 
have access to and engage with wider discourses. This happens both through the 
organisation of training or capacitaciones by NGOs or through the wider national and 
international networks in which they are embedded. It is quite normal in meetings of 
NGOs, sub-centrales and the ampliado general to hear reference to ILO Convention 
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169, the 1952 revolution and the uprising of Túpak Katari. These wider discourses and 
the fact that the authorities have different focuses at the higher levels of organisation 
produce ideological differences that do sometimes impact at the local level. In the case 
of Vilaycayma, the politics of the province and the rift between ayllu and sindicato was 
an issue that was discussed in meetings of the comunidad. This was primarily because 
Vilaycayma had a long history as an important comunidad within Kirkiawi and was the 
location where the ancestral documents of the ayllu were kept. It was believed they 
were being punished by the municipal government for their close association with the 
traditional authorities by not being granted public works. 
In February 2016 I was staying in the home of Severino Condori in Vilaycayma to 
attend the final meeting of the traditional authorities before Gregorio ended his term as 
Kuraj Mallku. The meeting took place in the sede sindical of the comunidad and 
Gregorio had printed a timetable of the event on headed paper with his official seal as 
Mallku and those of his Kuraj Tatas. The timetable included a lunch and a miskichina or 
cuarto intermedio: a moment of rest in which they would play musical instruments and 
fill themselves with cheer while celebrating their traditional customs. Sadly, the meeting 
was not especially full of cheer because of the failure of a number of members to attend 
and a lack of funds. The first hour or two of the meeting was dominated by a discussion 
concerning the failure to attend of POKUY’s one councillor, Augustina Condori. As she 
was a salaried public servant it was expected that she should pay for the sheep that 
would be slaughtered and turned into kanka de oveja. Eventually someone was sent on 
foot to the town of Bolívar to demand that she be held accountable. Once this matter 
was concluded discussion turned to the details of their internal constitution as an ayllu. 
This had originally been defined in 1997 in a conference organised with help from 
CONAMAQ but a number of details were out of date and it was suggested needed 
revision. One of these was the fact that the leader of the ayllu was referred to as the 
Cacique rather than the Kuraj Mallku. It was argued that this was a colonial Spanish 
word that was an inappropriate way to refer to the highest cargo within their ayllu and 
they had stopped using the term many years ago. This led onto a discussion concerning 
how only certain families were able to ascend to the cargo of Kuraj Mallku and the 
procedure for selecting Gregorio’s replacement. Gregorio suggested that the fact the role 
was semi-hereditary was a problem as it limited the potential candidates, was unpopular 
with a lot of people and was frequently used to criticise them. What was surprising to 
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me was that despite not taking a decision on making this constitutional change, no one 
present raised any strong objections to Gregorio’s suggestion and there was some 
degree of support for the idea. 
The details of the meeting described above illustrate several points that are relevant 
when considering the claims made by the different authorities of the province and the 
extent to which they are hybridised. Firstly, the fact they were calmly discussing the 
possibility of altering the rules on the selection of the Kuraj Mallku shows the degree to 
which their practices are ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) and not 
the timeless usos y costumbres which endow them with authenticity. In addition, much 
of the organisational form and protocols of the traditional authorities are similar to the 
sindicato and clearly owe their origins to peasant unionism. Meetings follow an agenda 
and minutes are taken in Spanish (despite discussions being carried out largely in 
Quechua) as this is the only language in which anyone is literate. Attendance is recorded 
and those who are not present are called to account (sometimes through being issued a 
fine). Decisions that are arrived at are issued in decrees signed by those present, who 
then provide their official seals. The sello, the official stamp used to verify the 
signatures on documents, is a ubiquitous accessory of individuals involved in peasant 
unionism in Bolivia, while among the traditional authorities it has become every bit as 
much a symbol of authority as the tata santísimo.  
Most importantly, the form in which decisions are arrived at is essentially the same for 
the peasant union and traditional authorities. Taking decisions in popular assemblies is 
something I observed not only in meetings of the traditional authorities but also in the 
communal assembly of Vilaycayma, the OTB of Copacabana and the ampliado general 
of Bolívar. In all cases, rather than taking a vote, issues are spoken about for as long as 
necessary by whoever wishes to speak, until consensus has been arrived at as to the 
course of action to be taken. This is despite the fact that leaders like Sabino Veizaga and 
Gregorio Jacinto emphasised the ‘assemblistic’ character of the ayllu, referring both to 
how decisions are arrived at and the fact that participation is a right and duty of 
membership. However, the existence of regular meetings and the duty to attend them is 
the result of both the traditions of peasant unionism and the reforms of the 1990s which 
provided the traditional authorities with a reason to meet regularly in pursuing the 
collective titling of the TCO. This happened at the same time that organisations such as 
CONAMAQ began to formally document the customs and authority structures of 
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highland peoples (Mendoza et. al, 2002) and encouraged individual communities to do 
the same as part of the process of ‘reconstituting the ayllu’. Traditionally, meetings 
would have been of a festive or ritual character and authorities such as the Kuraj Tatas 
would have communicated with their bases not through public assemblies but by 
walking among the comunidades they represent and visiting individual families, much 
in the manner described by Roger Rasnake in his classic (1988) ethnography of the 
ayllu authorities of Yura in Northern Potosí. It would appear that the ‘assemblistic 
democracy’, commented on by a number of writers (Linera, 2004; Lazar, 2007; Postero, 
2007), which embodies notions of citizenship and democratic procedures closer to the 
tradition of civic republicanism, is not a unique characteristic of the ayllu. As was 
outlined in Chapter 2, it is a feature of both peasant unions and the social organisations 
of urban migrants. Moreover, the fact that the leaders of Ayllu Kirkiawi would consider 
reforming their processes for electing authorities to more closely reflect the ‘European’ 
protocols of the union and local government illustrates the extent to which there is both 
similarity and movement of ideas between them. 
While the traditional authorities have absorbed much of the organisational form and 
procedures of peasant unions, the sindicato and elected politicians also understand their 
roles in terms of logics and values that are more commonly attributed to the social 
organisation of the Andean ayllu. The Bolivian anthropologist, Nelson Antequera, with 
whom I met and conversed with on a number of occasions, had studied the political 
organisation of Bolívar province in the early 2000s. In his (2013) PhD thesis he 
suggested that the path of thaki could be observed in the life histories of various 
individuals who served as authorities in the peasant union, ayllu and government, 
illustrating the extent to which they overlap and form a single system of authority 
(Antequera, 2013). One of my key informants, Don Severino Condori, had by his own 
admission always worked on ‘the side of the union’ but described his political career 
using the notions of thaki and muyu. Severino had served as secretary of the sub-central 
of Vilaje during the 1980s, before being elected as MAS congressman in 2002 and later 
returning to work as union dirigente in his home comunidad of Vilaycayma, the role he 
was exercising during my fieldwork. Nevertheless, his description of what it meant to 
be a political leader echoes the ideals espoused by traditional authorities in several 
ways. Severino frequently referred to the importance of el turno and the fact that 
working as a politician is an act of public service that represents a personal burden. He 
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described how it was the understanding of the bases within the union that his salary as 
an elected official should be used to pay for costs associated with official union business 
such as transport and food, which meant he was unable to save anything. Another 
burden had been the frustration of having to work within a national government 
dominated by right wing parties. In his own words, a good dirigente or elected official 
must ‘leave something for the community’ (‘dejar algo a la comunidad’), meaning a 
public work of some kind. The fact that he was elected in 2002 during the national 
government of Sanchez de Lozada meant that it was difficult to secure investment for 
the province and failure to do so reflected badly on him. That a public official has these 
expectations placed upon them illustrates how in Bolívar province power can be 
understood as service to the community, regardless of whether this refers to cargos 
within the union, ayllu or government. 
When I asked Severino to provide a definition of la orgánica, a term used frequently in 
union settings, including in urban unions (Lazar, 2008) he provided the following 
description: 
‘Before, the traditional parties always placed people from the town in the political 
positions. They didn’t follow the ‘organic’ path...la orgánica means that our dirigente or 
elected representative should be chosen by consensus...But more than that la orgánica 
has more to do with the organisational structure, right? We always organise ourselves 
from above to below, from this side to that side. Things complement each other. One 
day it is your turn to be authority and the next it is mine. So, this is la parte orgánica. It 
isn’t going to just be you because I’ll resent it. It’s your turn, then mine, then someone 
else’s, right? This is el turno in the ‘organic’ way.’ (S) 
It is noteworthy that, despite being a self-described union figure who has never 
occupied a cargo of the traditional authorities, Severino’s comments regarding the 
structure of the social organisations of the province and their norms and procedures 
includes many of the key ideas of rotation of authority, public service and 
complementarity that are described as defining elements of the ayllu (Rasnake, 1988; 
Cusicanqui, 1990; Albó, 1977, 2011). Yet in Bolívar province they are espoused in equal 
measure among local peasant union and MAS political figures. Rather than being 
bounded institutions that maintain a rigorous ideological and organisational division 
between each other, people and ideas flow between these forms of authority. If this were 
not the case, then the debates that take place would not be possible. The fact that terms 
such as la orgánica, muyu, thaki and originario are argued over is the result of shared 
ideas concerning what it means to accept a role of public service and to become a good 
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person in one’s path through life. The differences expressed between the different 
authorities concerning governance and leadership are therefore a matter of degree and 
emphasis rather than of kind. These differences can be explained largely by their 
institutional roles, the larger networks in which they are embedded and, as shall be 
explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, the extent to which the different 
authorities embody separate dimensions of the aspirations of highland rural peoples. 
 Conclusion 
Legal and institutional changes that purport to further the decolonisation of Bolivian 
society through recognising indigenous forms of governance have served to further 
intra-community conflict among the inhabitants of the highland indigenous community 
of Bolívar province. At the national level, the details of these reforms are the subject of 
fierce debate amongst indigenous and peasant social organisations and turn on questions 
to do with the meaning of decolonisation and the process of change. Meanwhile, the 
dispute in Bolívar has much to do with the particular history of the region and its 
territorial and governmental structure. While the neoliberal multiculturist reforms of the 
1990s served to establish the notion that the different forms of authority of the province 
are a hybrid structure, the possibility of converting to an AIOC has helped destabilise 
the balance of power and obliged the different authorities to define the meanings and 
limits of their respective roles. A discussion over the possibility of conversion to 
autonomous indigenous community and the technical details of this process therefore 
transposed into a debate concerning the values of leadership and the authenticity and 
legitimacy of the different authorities. Nonetheless, contrary to the picture that has been 
painted by classic anthropological accounts of ayllu and sindicato, the different sides 
are not separate and bounded entities and share certain protocols and values. The 
traditional authorities in their current form owe much of their procedures and decision-
making processes to peasant unionism, while logics and values traditionally attributed 
to the Andean ayllu form part of the understandings of leadership and public service of 
union leaders and MAS politicians. While differences do exist between them, these are 
explained in part by the different roles they assume as institutions at the higher levels of 
organisation and the wider networks in which they are embedded.  
As will be explored in subsequent chapters, the different outlooks of the authorities are 
to a large extent the result of projects they have engaged in that represent different 
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dimensions of the aspirations of highland rural peoples. For the last twenty years, the 
traditional authorities have sought the revindication of their traditional culture and the 
defence of their historic territory. While their greatest success has been the collective 
titling of their ancestral territory as a TCO, some of the leaders of the peasant union at 
the time of my fieldwork supported the idea of individual land titling. This debate, more 
than the question of leadership and democracy, explains some of the core disagreements 
between ayllu and sindicato. 
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Chapter 5. Jallp’a: Territory and Identity 
 Introduction 
During my fieldwork the ongoing legal status of people’s lands, or in Quechua jallp’as, 
became an issue that was aired in numerous meetings of the ampliado general in 
Bolívar. The fact that most of the territory of the province has been collectively titled as 
a TCO or Native Communal Land means that the arable fields corresponding to 
individual families are legally the property of the entire community and their 
management and use subject to traditional customary law or the usos y costumbres. This 
has a number of consequences and not everyone was happy with them. The peasant 
union leader, Olker Nina, had declared it the intention of the sindicato to replace the 
collective titling of the TCO with individual land titles for all families. This was met 
with considerable hostility by Mallku Gregorio and other traditional authorities and the 
subject was one that divided people, with some supporting the position of the peasant 
union and others that of the traditional authorities. Of all the issues I heard debated 
during my fieldwork this was the one which elicited the strongest reaction. For Gregorio 
and other traditional authorities, it was proof that the peasant union and local MAS 
politicians did not truly consider themselves originarios and were determined to 
‘desaparecer el ayllu’: meaning to get rid of the traditional system of territorial 
organisation and management of land alongside its system of customary law and 
political authority. Meanwhile, the union leaders claimed they simply wanted to provide 
a solution to the problems resulting from migration to the city and internecine conflicts 
over lands. 
On the one hand, dissolving the collective titling of the TCO would represent a shift in 
the balance of power between the different authorities. As was shown in the previous 
chapter, the TCO may potentially provide the legal basis for the traditional authorities to 
exercise greater control over the province in the event of its conversion to an AIOC and 
is a source of prestige and legitimacy for them. Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that 
the dispute over the status of the land also reflects deeper differences among prominent 
local social leaders regarding how they conceive of belonging to their community, 
expressed in the contemporary ethical discourse of what it means to be originario. This 
raises the question of how two forms of authority may express different understandings 
of identity when they are commonly regarded as being all part of a single governmental 
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structure with complementary roles and are from the same comunidades and families of 
the tiny province of Bolívar. 
The first section of this chapter will describe the traditional system of land tenancy 
within the comunidades of Bolívar province, the way families make a living and the 
forms of social obligation through which access to land is granted. It will then explain 
the nature of the TCO before providing a brief account of the process which led to 
Kirkiawi gaining its collective land title and how this project shaped the role and 
outlook of the traditional authorities. The second section will describe how this issue 
was talked about in a meeting of the ampliado general in which interaction with the 
new plurinational Bolivian state provoked its discussion. It will then further detail the 
perspectives of both sides before considering the role of rural-urban migration and 
double residence as a factor in the debate. The final section will look at how this dispute 
ultimately illustrates different understandings on the part of prominent members of the 
peasant union and traditional authorities of what it means to belong to their community, 
expressed in terms of what it means to be originario. 
 I. Access to Land and the TCO 
 i. Jallp’a and the usos y costumbres 
In many ways land or jallp’a is the centrally important feature of social life and cultural 
identity amongst the communities that form Bolívar province. For many people in 
Bolívar their historical identity as a community is linked to the land and their struggle to 
maintain autonomy over their territory from the colonial and post-colonial state. For 
those who were involved in the process of titling Ayllu Kirkiawi as a TCO the formal 
recognition of their ancestral lands was one battle in a long and constant war to preserve 
their independence. They would often recount the story of how the territory of Kirkiawi 
had been purchased in exchange for seven mule-loads of gold and silver by the soqta 
achichilas and express pride in the fact that the q’ara runas had never taken control of 
their lands. Land is the most important resource someone can have access to and it is a 
source of bitter jealousy and acrimonious disputes surrounding its ownership. 
Agricultural land is divided by qanipus, lines of stones which mark the boundaries 
between one family’s parcel of land and another’s. Such is the intensity of feeling that 
people are willing to physically fight each other over the incursion of a few meters 
beyond the perceived boundary of their land by a neighbouring family. 
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Moreover, the traditional social and cultural institutions of the communities of Bolívar 
province are to a large extent built around the relationship people have with the land and 
the way it is communally managed. In most of the province the traditional authorities or 
jilankus are still responsible for resolving disputes surrounding land and managing the 
system of communal land tenancy. According to the usos y costumbres, land in the 
comunidades is collectively owned and managed. While families enjoy access to 
individual plots of land, this is a form of usufruct right rather than full legal ownership. 
As a result of the collective titling of the majority of the territory of Bolívar province as 
a TCO this traditional practice is legally enforced, meaning land cannot be sold, rented 
or mortgaged and using it is dependent on fulfilling social obligations and the collective 
assent of the community. 
Within each settlement or comunidad land is divided into areas with different purposes 
and rights of access. These include small plots of individually owned land or canchones 
near peoples’ homes (typically used for the cultivation of alfalfa to feed livestock) and 
areas of pasture in the hills where families have second homes where they stay while 
pasturing their flocks of sheep and llamas. These lands are communal and all have the 
right to use them. Meanwhile, the mantas or ayonoqas are large areas of arable land in 
which individual plots corresponding to particular families are contained. The right to 
use them is dependent upon their ongoing membership of the community. Should a 
family definitively abandon their home community and fail to return to work the land, 
to assume responsibility for cargos or take part in communal work, then the community 
as a whole may determine that their lands should be redistributed to other families who 
need them. Until recently the lands of each comunidad were recognised in title deeds 
granted to the families who lived in the comunidades at the time of a census carried out 
in 1881. The areas of land recognised by these title deeds are referred to as the urigen 
and they have been divided into much smaller plots over time because of the custom of 
equal division of inheritance among offspring. 
Only some of the ayonoqas pertaining to a community are used for cultivation in a 
given year. The others are left fallow, described as being allowed ‘to rest’. One ayonoqa 
will typically be cultivated for three years consecutively and will then be left fallow for 
6-8 years. The successive ‘opening’ of each ayonoqa takes place in a rightward 
direction, so the rotation of land follows a circular pattern. The system of land rotation 
or muyu symbolically mirrors the rotative nature of the cargo system and is referred to 
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with the same word. It is the jilanku who is responsible for administering this whole 
system and the associated rituals. The system is highly logical given the fact that the 
earth in Bolívar province lacks a layer of natural humus topsoil and would quickly 
become sterile if cultivated in consecutive periods. The parcels of land belonging to 
families and the ayonoqas themselves do not consist of neat wholes but are rather 
divided into smaller non-contiguous units. The ecology of the highlands leads to 
fluctuations in agricultural production and as frosts, hails, droughts and floods may 
destroy entire areas of crops, if a family were to cultivate only one large contiguous plot 
of land, they could risk losing everything. 
Only families with the status of originario have automatic access to the ayonoqa land, 
while those who do not are known as forasteros or arimakis and are given access to land 
by mutual agreement with originario families. Theoretically, the originarios are those 
descended from individuals categorised as such during the 1881 census and who would 
have been charged a higher rate of the head tax or contribución territorial. In reality, 
and as has been discussed in classic literature on this topic (Platt, 1986; Harris, 1978), 
these categories are not fixed and over time it is common for individuals to pass from 
one to the other by marriage or other means. In the comunidad of Vilaycayma nearly all 
the families permanently resident at the time of my fieldwork had originario status and 
I understand this situation was common in the province. In Vilaycayma, as in other 
comunidades, many more families were permanently resident in the city or tropics and 
returned during times of sowing and harvest and to celebrate cultural events. However, 
many of these families, some of whom I knew from the Baptist church of Yuraq Rumi in 
Cochabamba, had not lost usufruct rights over their ayonoqa lands.  
While the main social obligations necessary to enjoy usufruct are continued 
employment of the land for productive purposes alongside participation in communal 
work and civic politics, it is unclear precisely how these are met. Some individuals told 
me that it is only necessary to be available to assume a cargo such as jilanku within the 
village should the time come that it is their family’s turn to take the responsibility. I was 
present in the communal assembly of Vilaycayma in January 2016 when a new jilanku 
was chosen to replace the outgoing Tata Maximo. While Maximo had a house in Oruro 
and lived between the countryside and city, his replacement was a young man called 
Elker who had spent most of his life in Cochabamba. Elker was quite open with me that 
his appointment had been ‘a la fuerza’ or imposed upon him and that he did not want 
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the job. Don Enrique explained to me that while Elker was ‘nada más que un chango’ or 
just a young man it had been difficult to find a replacement this year and they thought it 
important to have someone of the younger generation take the cargo. Elker pointed out 
that he would face a fine of 120 bolivianos (or about £10 sterling) for every meeting he 
failed to attend and the ultimate sanction of having his family’s lands taken from them if 
he refused. This event contrasted with the description I had heard from others about the 
pride and dignity bestowed upon an individual assuming a cargo and suggested that at 
least for some of the younger generation resident in the cities this is not the case.  
Other urban residents in Cochabamba, such as the Baptist pastor Don Victor, explained 
that they still had their lands in Vilaycayma but usually made arrangements with 
relatives to cultivate and harvest it in exchange for a share of the crop. While Don 
Victor had not carried out agricultural work in more than a decade, he had assumed the 
role of jilanku in Vilaycayma only a few years prior to the time of my fieldwork. 
Moreover, while participation in communal work by urban residents was common, it 
was unclear as to what extent it was expected. Don Pancho, a former artisanal gold 
miner who worked as a hospital orderly in Cochabamba and who lived near Yuraq 
Rumi, was the foreman of several communal works, most notably an irrigation system 
or microriego in some of the ayonoqa fields. In sum, while in Vilaycayma the 
conditions of land access were participation in civic politics and a sustained link with 
the comunidad through agricultural and communal work, the requirements were never 
precisely defined. 
The traditional system of land management in the comunidades of Bolívar regulates 
agricultural production and therefore forms part of the traditional internal economic 
organisation of the territory. Much has been written about the internal economy of the 
Andean ayllu, with early ethnographic work (Platt, 1982; Harris, 1982; Bouysse-
Cassagne, 1978) emphasising the separateness of the ayllu from the market economy. 
Olivia Harris (1982) coined the term ‘the ethnic economy’ to describe how among the 
Laymi of Northern Potosí the exchange of goods and labour takes place according to a 
logic of ‘ecological complementarity’ in which distant areas are connected via links of 
reciprocity and kinship and exchange agricultural goods for their mutual subsistence. 
This work was heavily influenced by the writings of John Murra (1956, 2002) and the 
notion of a unique Andean logic of economic organisation, in turn influenced by Karl 
Polanyi’s notion of economic embeddedness (Polanyi, 1944). More recently, there has 
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been some debate as to how resistant Andean indigenous communities are to 
participating in wider markets and the extent to which highland peoples have 
historically acted in networks of trade and moved between communities (Larson, Harris 
and Tandeter, 1995; Platt, 1982). Others have critiqued the idealisation of Andean 
communities and the ayllu as a pre-modern institution holding continuity with a 
romanticised past (Starn, 1991; Weismantel, 2006). This body of literature in turn fits 
into both the Marxian anthropological analyses of the partial integration of peasant 
economies into capitalist markets (Wolf, 1982; Bloch, 1975; Nash, 1981; Taussig,1980) 
and their subsequent critique (Kearney, 1996) as well as the wider formalist-
substantivist debate in economic anthropology (Firth, 1946; Bohannon, 1968; Popkin, 
1979). 
In contemporary Bolívar province the way land is rotated and divided in non-contiguous 
ayonoqa parcels could be observed as a ‘logic of vertical control’ following Murra 
(2002) as well as a ‘hedging strategy’ which, given the ecological conditions of the 
highlands, prioritises production for subsistence over the maximisation of yields to 
ensure the survival of the family unit, something which may also be viewed through the 
anthropological typology of the ‘peasant economy’ (Scott, 1976; Chayanov, 1986; Wolf, 
1966). Nevertheless, in Bolívar people enter into market forms of exchange at the same 
time as practising forms of non-market reciprocity. Among these non-market methods of 
regulating exchange and organising production are the barter of goods or trueque and 
different forms of mutual obligation and labour exchange known as ayni, mink’a and 
choqu. Until recently it was common for individuals to take long journeys with donkeys 
or llama caravans to neighbouring valley lands in Arque and Cliza to exchange potatoes 
and ch’uño for valley products such as squash, tomatoes and corn. Additionally, a 
Sunday barter market or feria de trueque had been held regularly in the town of Bolívar 
in which townsfolk would trade products such as coca leaves, fruit, bread, sweets, 
cigarettes and alcohol for fixed equivalences of potatoes, ch’uño and other goods. This 
form of barter was essentially a form of petty merchant capitalism which was viewed as 
exploitative by people from the comunidades. The ease of direct access to the cities to 
buy goods in the market economy has led to the decline of the latter form of trueque and 
the complete disappearance of the llama caravans which are now spoken about with 
nostalgia. Individuals will more often journey directly by bus to Oruro to sell 
agricultural produce and use the money to buy necessary items. 
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‘They always went to the valley. For example, in Pampajasi they didn’t produce corn or 
broad beans. Now they are doing so, but before they didn’t make corn or wheat, 
anything. So, with trueque they would walk with donkeys, with llamas to the valley, to 
exchange with potatoes or ch’uño. In the valley there are no potatoes or ch’uño. There 
was qañawa. I myself did this...no this exchange no longer exists. It’s over. Because 
before there were no cars or buses to go to the valleys or the city.’ (S) 
- Don Eucenio Tola, jilanku of Pampajasi comunidad 
In the comunidades it is necessary to mobilise large quantities of labour during periods 
of intensive agricultural activity, principally sowing and harvesting; ayni, mink’a and 
chuqu may each refer to different forms of labour exchange or service which facilitate 
this. While ayni is a Quechua term that signals a notion of generalised reciprocity it can 
refer to help given in agricultural labour by family, neighbours and fictive kin or 
compadres. Chuqu refers to a traditional work party in which someone will invite 
neighbours to participate in sowing or harvesting while providing a feast of roast 
mutton, potatoes and chicha corn beer for all who help out. Mink’a can be a form of 
contracting individuals to work on a plot of land, either by promising to repay this 
favour at a later date or through sharing a proportion of the land’s harvest. In the course 
of my fieldwork I found it difficult to obtain unambiguous definitions of these terms. It 
seemed they were used interchangeably at times, as mink’a was used to refer to a work 
party ostensibly similar to a chuqu. Moreover, mink’a was also used to refer to 
communal work which benefited the entire community and required the obligatory 
lending of labour.  
‘Before in the comunidades they exercised more ayni, mink’a, choqu...Ayni is, let’s say, 
today for me, tomorrow for you. Today we’re going to work for him and the next day for 
ourselves and the day after for him and in this way between the whole comunidad…they 
lived in a lovelier way before...Mink’a was always done with coca. Things were always 
announced or requested with coca. Mink’a means I’m going to ask you with coca. 
Mink’ay in Quechua is to request or to notify...Choqu is considered group work, 
communal work. It is still practised among some families, in order to crop barley or dig 
up potatoes or to sow the fields just the same. Also, to build homes they carry out ayni 
and mink’a.’ (S) 
- Gregorio Jacinto, Kuraj Mallku 
The use of traditional forms of labour exchange has also declined according to various 
informants I spoke with. It was claimed that instead of receiving crop sharing or 
participating in communal harvesting individuals prefer to be paid for work on others’ 
fields. As Don Eucenio Tola from Pampajasi put it succinctly, ‘Ya quieren pago nomás. 
Quieren su jornal. No quieren dar gratis.’ (Now they just want payment. They want 
their salary. They don’t want to give for free). However, the extent to which these 
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practices have really been lost is unclear. Mink’a can mean both a form of contracting 
people to work through offering a share of the crop and the organisation of communal 
labour for public works. I saw mink’a in the latter sense being carried out on several 
occasions in Vilaycayma.  Among the families I knew, including that of Mallku 
Gregorio, I saw them carry out work on the fields of family members and fictive kin or 
compadres free of charge, referring to this as ayni. This sort of reciprocal labour 
exchange took place in Vilaycayma in the weeks around the Todos Santos festival, as 
people were anxious to prepare their fields ahead of the rainy season.  
Beyond the individual comunidad there exists an organisation of lands into jap’iys and 
pirañus. In some of these areas, for example in jap’iy vilaje, various ayonoqas are inter-
communal, meaning that they belong not just to one comunidad but are managed at the 
level of the entire jap’iy. The term ayllu refers to these forms of territorial organisation 
in addition to the authorities associated with them. It means the territory where people 
live, their customs and ways of life. Even individuals I knew who were strictly involved 
in peasant unionism, such as Don Severino, used the term in this way. Severino 
commented to me once, while we were drinking hot chocolate during a recess in the 
meeting of the ampliado general, ‘Estoy siempre orgulloso de mis origines, de mi ayllu. 
El ayllu es la gente, las tierras, los usos y costumbres, todo.’ (I’ve always been proud of 
where I come from, of my ayllu. The ayllu is the people, the land, the usos y 
costumbres, everything). While the usos y costumbres may refer to customary law, it is a 
broad term that can mean all the customs and ways of life that are representative of a 
particular comunidad or the ayllu as a whole. These can include ways of managing land 
and the economic practices of exchange and reciprocity described above. As the 
traditional authorities’ role is largely centred around administering access to land and 
facilitating agricultural production within this form of territorial organisation with its 
associated economic practices, their validity as a social organisation depends to a large 
extent on its continued recognition. The titling of their territory as a TCO is seen to 
support these structures and practices which provide them with a function and source of 
legitimacy. 
 ii. The TCO 
The ability for indigenous communities to create Native Communal Lands or TCOs 
dates to the implementation of Law 1715, or as it came to be known, the INRA law, 
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named after the acronym of the newly created National Institute of Agrarian Reform. 
The INRA law was passed in 1996 under the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada with the aim of resolving the unfinished business of titling lands which had 
begun with the 1953 agrarian reform. While the legal and institutional mechanisms of 
the agrarian reform had provided tens of thousands of individual title deeds to peasant 
smallholders, mainly from former hacienda lands which had been occupied by peasant 
militias, the legal status of huge areas of land was uncertain: many families had never 
resolved their situation and indigenous groups in the Eastern lowlands felt their 
territories under threat from highland and valley colonists and large-scale agrobusiness. 
While the INRA law was an attempt to complete the process of the agrarian reform and 
theoretically followed one of its central tenets (that land should perform a ‘social 
function’ to be granted title), it used the word saneamiento rather than ‘restitution’ to 
describe this process: a term which refers to regularising the status of agricultural land 
within a formal register for a diverse set of constituencies, including not only peasant 
smallholders and indigenous groups but medium and large-scale commercial 
landowners. 
The figure of the TCO had been created with indigenous groups in mind and the 
impetus for it came partly from lowland indigenous organisations such as CIDOB 
(Postero, 2006). It was also undoubtedly influenced, as were other laws regarding land 
reform in the Americas, by ILO convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples 
(Colque, Tinta and Sanjines, 2016) which expressed the notion of demarcating 
territories as habitats for indigenous and minority ethnic groups, linked to the goals of 
biodiversity conservation (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2013; Davis et. al., 1998). Following 
this concept, TCOs were defined as spaces that form the habitat of indigenous and 
originario people in which they practice traditional cultural and subsistence economic 
activities which assure their survival (INRA, 2002). In addition to the requirements for 
the saneamiento of individual lands, such as public notification, the measurement of the 
land and assessment of its ‘social function’, the saneamiento of a TCO has to include a 
certification of the ‘ethnic character’ of the indigenous people and how their particular 
needs and way of life relates to the land they inhabit (Ibid.). This meant that the territory 
was not only recognised as collective property but also as the basis for the economic 
and cultural reproduction of a people and as a way of guaranteeing cultural rights and 
the ‘ways of life’ of the group.  
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For this reason, although the INRA law can be understood as part of a ‘neoliberal 
multicultural’ agenda of granting cultural rights to ease the implementation of economic 
restructuring (Hale, 2002, 2004), it was given a more radical interpretation by certain 
indigenous groups and regarded as the potential future basis for an independent or 
autonomous territory. Among certain highland indigenous organisations, it was seen as 
the first step towards the ‘reconstitution of the ayllu’ (described briefly in Chapter 3). 
This movement was driven by national-level organisations such as CONAMAQ who 
were pursuing a project of cultural revindication and of reconstructing from the bottom 
up the traditional pre-conquest polities, to the point of eventually recreating the 14 
Aymara kingdoms of the Gran Qollasuyo. Their project includes a specific view of 
history in which there is a continuity of struggle and resistance from the time of the 
Spanish invasion until now and in which the common denominator is the fight between 
the originarios and the q’ara runas, alongside a vision of Andean culture as supremely 
virtuous in its practices of reciprocity, justice and governance. 
In Bolívar province the saneamiento of the TCO and the reconstitution of their 
traditions and political authorities were linked processes5.  The opportunity to gain 
recognition of their territory in this way was understood as a continuation of the long 
history of fighting to defend their territory, autonomy and usos y costumbres from 
outsiders via legal means. At the same time, they were, with help from organisations 
such as CONAMAQ and NGOs such as PROSANA, engaged in re-establishing their 
ancestral customs and the higher authorities of the ayllu through workshops and public 
meetings. Tata Sabino explained to me that while they had been ‘woken up’ by this 
process, the structure of the territory and authorities had always existed in Bolívar 
province. He, Gregorio and Dominga were reminiscing about titling the TCO in the 
kitchen of Gregorio’s home when he made clear to me, ‘aqui siempre nos organizamos 
aransaya-urinsaya, de arriba a abajo, asi es. Jilanku siempre había, organizamos según 
usos y costumbres’ (here we have always organised ourselves from above to below, 
aransaya-urinsaya. There was always a jilanku and we organised things according to 
the usos y costumbres). He then stated that by the 1990s there had been a process of 
fragmentation of the larger ayllu structures and higher authorities. Nevertheless, in 1998 
                                               
5 I gained an understanding of this from speaking with various actors involved in the process such as 
former ayllu authorities Juan Apaza and Sabino Veizaga, the former technical and legal adviser to 
COAMAC, Toribia Lero Quispe, and the anthropologist Nelson Antequera, alongside documents 
provided to me by Mallku Gregorio detailing the reconstitution and titling of the TCO. 
148 
 
 
the decision was made by various local authorities. including jilankus and union 
dirigentes such as the former dirigente provincial, Justiniano Cunurana, to re-instate the 
position of leader of the ayllu at the level of the entire province, subsequently installing 
Tata Marcos Mamani as Kuraj Mallku. 
We analysed little by little and in '98 we also began to recover the autoridades 
originarias...we wanted to value and improve the traditional authorities because they 
have to be above me, shall we say, like an even higher cargo...we must always walk 
together...unfortunately from that point they have almost been unable to agree or 
coordinate. There is always a disagreement...perhaps [because] the sindicato is, let’s say, 
not of this place.' (S) 
- Don Justiniano Cunurana, former Dirigente Provincial 
From this point on the traditional authorities in Bolívar were very much involved in the 
formation of CONAMAQ and in the regional ayllu organisation of COAMAC, being 
instrumental in the organisation of the first council of ayllus of Cochabamba in 2003. At 
the same time, they continued organising workshops and consultative meetings 
throughout the province concerning the TCO, in which it was highlighted that it 
expressed the desire of many people to defend their land and territory. Juan Apaza 
explained to me that they believed the TCO would allow them to defend their lands and 
resources, particularly the communal lands and shared resources from incursion by 
private landlords and mining companies, ‘Con saneamiento simple soy dueño nomás de 
mi parcelita pero con TCO somos dueños de todo, de los rios, los arboles las piedras, 
de todo el ayllu.’ (With individual titling I own just my own tiny plot of land but with 
the TCO we are the owners of everything, the rivers, the trees, the rocks, the entire 
ayllu).  
In 2003, after preparing the documents which demonstrated the requirements of 
‘ancestrality’ and ‘territoriality’ as an indigenous group, they began the difficult 
bureaucratic procedure of marking the borders of the TCO and the limits between 
departments and non-TCO areas in coordination with figures from the INRA institute. 
Here the TCO process proved to be a source of conflict between and within 
comunidades. Alongside the problem of determining the limits of the territory, not all 
the comunidades in the province wanted their lands to be included in the TCO, such as 
the area known as Comuna. This area had formerly been hacienda land and many 
individuals did not consider themselves part of the ayllu. The problem, according to 
Gregorio, was that they were ‘medio q’aras’ or half outsiders, due to having existed 
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outside of the ayllu for a significant period. Additionally, not all individuals within 
comunidades were in agreement with the process. Gregorio had been a young man when 
there was a confrontation in his home comunidad of Palca between those, like Gregorio, 
who were in favour of the TCO and others who wished to keep their individual land 
titles. Despite these problems, the TCO was eventually formalised in two separate titles 
in 2008 and 2009 and was celebrated as a substantial achievement with an official 
ceremony in the town of Bolívar. 
Given the above history, the TCO can be attributed at least three meanings. Firstly, it 
represents the recognition of their land as an indigenous people, according to the notion 
of indigeneity implicit within international human rights law, in which indigenous 
groups live within bounded territories or habitats and have a special relationship with 
the land involving traditional cultural and economic subsistence activities. This is of 
course inconsistent with the contemporary and historical reality of Bolívar province and 
other highland communities where individuals engage in both market exchange and 
non-market subsistence economic activities and do not live within a well-defined and 
bounded territory but rather practice various forms of seasonal migration and double 
residence. Secondly, for organisations such as CONAMAQ, the TCO is given a more 
radical interpretation: as the basis for autonomy and the reconstruction of their ancestral 
customs and polities. Finally, among the local traditional leaders I came to know, many 
of whom were influenced by the project of ‘reconstituting the ayllu’, it became part of 
their history and the narrative of what it means to belong to their community. The 
project of the TCO was viewed as the continuation of defending their territory, 
autonomy and customs via legal means, going back to the efforts of the soqta 
achichilas. It was regarded as a vindication of their struggle, a legitimation of the 
traditional authorities and as a way of defending not just their territory but the usos y 
costumbres related to the cultivation, access to and management of land. Moreover, the 
project they became involved with made their role clear as being those who ‘velan por 
los usos y costumbres’ (who defend the usos y costumbres), something which was stated 
repeatedly in public meetings of the province, as opposed to the peasant union which 
serves as a mediator with outside institutions. The TCO itself became another revered 
document, like the map of the land purchase or the ancestral book of their history, 
awilachachay, kept in a leather sack in the sede sindical of Vilaycayma. Many of these 
documents were displayed together by Juan Apaza when he discussed the history of 
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Kirkiawi with me, stating that with the TCO they could prevent outsiders from 
destroying the ayllu by taking control of the land and preserve the usos y costumbres. 
The TCO is therefore regarded as a way of defending the integrity of their vision of 
their community and its customs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Picture of Kuraj Tatas examining the documents of the TCO 
Consequently, while the dispute over the TCO is a political issue about power in the 
sense that it confers legitimacy and potentially greater control to the traditional 
authorities in the event of creating an AIOC, it is also about different understandings of 
what it means to belong to their community. It represents what was described in the 
opening of this thesis as an ethical-political discourse: the attempt to define their shared 
values and collective identity. Before analysing the details of these differences one 
instance of how the dispute over the TCO and the legal status of individuals’ lands 
emerged during the time of my fieldwork will be described, alongside the views of 
different figures involved within it.  
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II. The dispute over the TCO 
 i. The plurinational state, land and conflict 
In November 2015 a técnico or legal functionary from the constitutional capital in Sucre 
appeared in the ampliado general in the town of Bolívar. The meeting was attended by 
at least a hundred representatives of the different social organisations of the province, 
seated on plastic chairs or the floor, while the local government and senior peasant 
union figures sat at one end facing the rest of the room behind large wooden tables. I 
was sat opposite Don Severino, who had travelled from Cochabamba to attend the 
meeting. Reports were presented, minutes were followed and coca leaves were 
distributed in vast quantities to all present. By the time the técnico from Sucre spoke the 
meeting had been running for some hours and the coca was necessary to hold off fatigue 
and maintain concentration in the freezing hall. 
The técnico was the assistant of the lawyer Juan Sanchez, who had been present at the 
meeting held in Vilaycayma some months earlier concerning the Tribunal 
Agroambiental or Agro-environmental Tribunal. This would implement a new branch of 
law pertaining to environmental and agricultural matters and create regional judges to 
help adjudicate over local issues; as such it represents the decentralisation of judicial 
power as part of the ‘process of change’ and the direct presence of the state in 
previously isolated communities. He expounded in Spanish that in the department of 
Cochabamba there would be 8 judges distributed across the different provinces to 
receive claims from groups or individuals with land that has been titled either 
individually or collectively and to adjudicate over cases relating to the environment, 
subsoil resources and the disputed use and ownership of agricultural land. He then 
explained that in Bolivian law the right of usucaption does not apply in rural areas and 
that the judges could determine the rightful owner of agricultural land in the case of its 
unlawful occupation. Moreover, more individuals would return to Bolívar the following 
year to organise workshops about the new law and explain how to seek the help of the 
judges over these matters. He would speak with Mayor Francisco and this would be 
carried out at some point in 2016. 
Olker Nina, the union dirigente provincial, greeted the técnico with the Spanish title of 
doctor, an honorific used in Latin America, usually to address politicians or individuals 
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working in the legal professions. Afterwards he stated the following to all present in the 
meeting: 
So brothers let there be some questions because it is a very important topic...these 
doctors know how we can solve problems...because as we know here our lands are in 
tiny parcels...so with these parcels there are seizures of land and sometimes we pass 
over each other’s limits, with this there are, shall we say, problems…we know that 
within the TCO it is not possible to have individual land titles...the doctor knows that 
asking for the report from INRA...perhaps a revocation of the TCO may be called for 
and we can enter with individual title...we don’t have great extensions of land in this 
municipality…each of us has divided into little parts at the most a hectare...so I would 
like to ask if we could title these little parcels for each person.’ (Q) 
The técnico responded that it may indeed be possible to change the nature of land 
ownership but first it would be necessary to look at all the relevant documents. In any 
case, he added, they would have to coordinate with INRA first and only after they 
organised workshops next year. Jesus Aguayo, part of the technical team from the 
municipal government and an originario from Pampajasi, asked about the problem of 
securing loans from institutions such as the BDP or Productive Development Bank: an 
agency created under the MAS government in 2007 to provide loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, including farmers. Jesus claimed that due to the collective 
titling of the TCO it was difficult to secure large loans because they could not use their 
lands as collateral, despite the fact that many in the comunidades wanted to improve 
their production for commercial sale. The técnico responded that he knew of a similar 
case in Cliza in which it was established that the family living on an area of land were 
the true owners through interviewing witnesses such as neighbours to authenticate that 
they had always lived on and used the land. In this way they were able to establish legal 
title. He then stated that one must have a title because without it ‘no son los dueños de 
nada’ (‘they are the owners of nothing’). Following this, Olker spoke enthusiastically 
about the presence of the técnico in the meeting and possibilities this offered them, 
including that of creating individual land titles: 
‘These judges they take actions and analyse the information and coordinate with INRA. 
In some places they have individual titles, right? Each family, for example, in all the 
upper valley of Cochabamba, each family has one. But we haven’t arrived at this point 
yet, and the individuals from the tribunal are assigned for this purpose as well...And the 
judges, for example, if you cross over into my land while sowing crops they say they 
can solve this sort of thing...A little while ago we spoke about the question of limits: so 
that they too can pronounce with the law and convoke and analyse…But before técnicos 
did not come to visit us like this. This is the first time that a doctor has appeared in this 
hall, at least in our great meeting [the ampliado general], and in this way perhaps more 
will come, which would be a wonderful thing for us. Also, the use of subsoil resources, 
they are responsible for dealing with these issues and we could ask them about that. 
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Brothers, look it’s the first time that one of them has appeared here among us!...what is 
taking place with the lands over in the East of the country…and also how things are 
being fulfilled or not and how they are advancing. There are many of our comrades 
[runa masinchik] from the altiplano in these hot lands [the eastern tropics], isn’t that 
right? So, we will analyse this topic and how things are progressing. Perhaps there will 
be lands and what is more we could adjudicate in this area, or if there exists the 
possibility of sowing rice or whatever we want because here, brothers, we suffer a great 
deal, and for all of this there now exists this state and through its técnicos, its 
departments it is now reaching each and every community, each and every village, 
reaching the local government and the municipalities and this was something that we 
never saw before.’ (Q) 
Olker’s emphasis on the presence of the state and its administrative functionaries as a 
great blessing and in contrast to the past when this was never seen is interesting to note. 
For him and other figures within the union and for the local MAS politicians this is part 
of the process of change in which the new state has emerged to support previously 
marginalised social groups, a view which places more importance on the increased 
power of government and its penetration into previously unreached areas than on local 
autonomy. He also used the opportunity to discuss the possibility of individually titling 
the agricultural lands in the ayonoqas ‘divided into little parts’ and suggested that in the 
upper valley of Cochabamba they were better able to solve problems due to individual 
titling. In addition, he mentioned the ongoing land reform voted through in the 2009 
constitutional referendum, that formally defined the limits on private land ownership 
and which was hoped by many within highland peasant organisations would provide the 
possibility of lands in the eastern tropical lowlands, a site of migration where it is easier 
to cultivate than in the poor soils of the highlands. Following Olker’s speech, it was 
suggested by Jesus that they finally resolve the issue of the legal status of the lands in 
the province once and for all. As was explained earlier, the saneamiento of the TCO had 
not been carried out in all the province and support for it had never been universal, 
either at the level of the entire territory or within individual comunidades. The 
documents establishing the TCO, including all the survey work carried out in 
collaboration with INRA, were in the possession of the traditional authorities. Some of 
these documents were in the home of Juan Apaza in Oruro and others in the sede 
sindical of Vilaycayma, where they were kept alongside the various ancestral 
documents. He claimed that the traditional authorities had no right to hold onto these 
documents as they belonged to everyone and they needed to be taken to the municipal 
government buildings to be examined. He then proposed that a meeting be held at some 
point the following year to consider the issue. 
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A number of the traditional authorities were visibly upset with Jesus’ attitude and 
Gregorio called for calm. A man from Palca comunidad who identified himself as Don 
Jose explained that it was incorrect of Olker to claim that this was the first time such 
técnicos had visited them because this had been the case some ten or fifteen years ago 
when the traditional authorities had worked with INRA to establish the TCO and that 
only a matter of months ago they had organised the tantachawi in Vilaycayma where 
representatives from the Tribunal Agroambiental had also been present. It was fine to do 
as Jesus suggested and dig up the documents, ‘Nuqapis hermanos niyman, waliq 
kanman ya nomás presentana como nin Jesus, ajinata chaymantataq urqhukusunman, 
no?’ if only so they could value their land and ancestors, ‘juk chhika valorasqa 
kananpaq kay jallp’anchik achachilachik’. Another speaker commented that it caused 
him great pain, ‘sunquy nanawan’, to know the sacrifice that had been made by 
generations of authorities to defend their land and territory when this was not 
appreciated by the peasant union figures. 
The atmosphere in the room began to turn more hostile as tensions rose. Numerous 
figures spoke, mainly from the peasant union, and in the ensuing discourse the issue of 
resolving the problem of the status of the land and the supposed problem of the multiple 
overlapping authorities became mixed up. The issue of la parte orgánica was mentioned 
and it was stated that the traditional authorities were operating outside of their role and 
in opposition to the other social organisations. For example, a union representative, Don 
Julian, stated the following: 
This document of the TCO should be left with the municipal government or if not with 
the provincial office [of the peasant union]...We’ll look at everything and where things 
fall and whether these six old people, the Mamanis, Fernandez, Apazas, will keep 
holding on forever. To me those documents signed in the little sack no longer matter: 
what matters now is the TCO and these have to be in the provincial office and be 
examined...We are no longer going to serve as a ladder for these Mamanis and Jacintos. 
So brothers, I want to say this as a suggestion and that it end in this: let’s name new 
mallkus and kuraj tatas so they don’t go in a different direction which is what is making 
us protest: that either [the traditional authorities] stay put or disappear.’ (Q) 
Don Julian makes reference to the ‘six old people’ or soqta achichilas: the ancestral 
heads of the families who were said to have purchased the land of the ayllu for seven 
bushels or mule-loads of gold and silver and speaks of the ancestral documents as ‘those 
signed in the little sack [which no longer matter]’. The role of Kuraj Mallku is partly 
hereditary, as only individuals with certain surnames said to descend from the soqta 
achichilas can occupy it. By suggesting that they were ‘serving as a ladder’ he was 
155 
 
 
employing an expression commonly used in Bolivia to refer to the use of the ‘bases’ by 
social leaders for their personal benefit or to gain power, which is associated with the 
political clientelism of the recent past. Gregorio needed to tell them like a man, 
‘qharijina’, when he could deliver the documents and resolve the problem. This speech 
caused more consternation and the objection that as a form of organisation pre-existent 
to the colony the traditional authorities were recognised by the 2009 plurinational 
constitution. The peasant union authorities and the local MAS politicians were trying to 
make them disappear and this was something they had no right to do. In response Olker 
Nina stated the following: 
‘Well brothers, they have spoken about the constitution. Clearly in the constitution it 
recognises pre-existing persons but if we get rid of the peasant union or get rid of the 
traditional authorities, mallku and all that, well that depends on us, on the organisation. 
But the constitution does not oblige us to maintain either the autoridades originarios or 
the unions, that is our [collective] decision and it depends on us alone.’ (Q) 
Following this intervention, Gregorio stated calmly that his gestion or term as Kuraj 
Mallku would be concluding soon and that his replacement and other ‘organic’ matters 
would be discussed at a tantachawi in Vilaycayma in early January, coinciding with the 
change of authorities at the local level. He stated that people should be familiar with 
Don Julian’s way of expressing himself and that he should not be taken seriously. He 
then maintained that there was no problem with presenting the documents and holding a 
meeting to discuss the legal status of the land and that they had nothing to hide. The 
atmosphere became somewhat calmer and friendlier. However, Dominga, Gregorio’s 
wife and the sister of the POKUY candidate for Mayor in the previous local elections, 
gave the last word. According to the principle of chachawarmi it is the married couple 
and not the individual who assume the cargo and it is in this capacity that she spoke 
directly and vehemently, about the bad feeling in the room and how pointlessly they 
fought with each other. You almost seem inhuman, she stated, ‘mana yawarniyuq 
runasina parlankichik kaypiqa’ (literally: ‘you speak here as if you were people without 
blood’). What angered her the most seemed to be the implication that in assuming the 
cargo they were trying to take advantage of others or to profit when this was 
disinterested public service which implied sacrifice, ‘nitaq nuqaykup gustuykuchu 
yaykuyku, chayraykuchus tata dios astawancha phinachinkichik qamkunaqa’ (we did 
not even assume this cargo because we wanted to and that means you are angering tata 
dios even more). They received no salary and any money they gained they would only 
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leave for the community and they went out just the same way as they came into the 
cargo, ‘nuqaykuqa lluqsipusqayku maypichus yaykuyku’. 
 ii. Land, the TCO and double residence 
Some months after the meeting of the ampliado general discussed above I spoke with 
the provincial union leader, Olker Nina, about the issue of land and individual titling. 
We sat in the courtyard of his house on the edge of the town of Bolívar while his wife 
was butchering a pig in preparation for New Years’ eve. He gave many reasons for 
supporting the revocation of the TCO, including the claim that it would provide a 
solution for the violence occurring in some comunidades over the limits of plots of 
ayonoqa land, as was the case in the comunidad of Piruani. The individual plots of 
arable land are very small as they are divided into non-contiguous parcels which shrink 
further over time due to the custom of multigeniture. Olker had commented on this in 
the meeting in Vilaycayma described in the opening chapter of the thesis when he stated 
‘chaypi achka en las comunidades, parcelitas tiyan, dividisqa dividisqa chaywan 
problemas tiyan’ (there is much of this in the comunidades, there are little parcels which 
become divided over time and with this there are problems’). Moreover, he explained, 
for individuals in the city it is not only difficult to use the land productively but without 
title deeds its ownership remains insecure: 
‘Here unfortunately no one is owner of the land with the titling of the TCO. So, whoever 
abandons the land for five years, does not fulfil social obligations or payments to the 
comunidad, communal work or anything then the comunidad is who decides who should 
no longer belong: this person for this, that or other motive. And the law says too that the 
land is for he who works it...but with individual titling you are owner: you can sell, 
obtain credit from the bank with your title for your economic development and all that.’ 
(S) 
Olker’s claim that ‘no one is the owner of the land’ because of the TCO reveals a 
distinct understanding of ownership on the basis of the individual or family unit rather 
than the community taken as a whole. It also demonstrates a particular problem for 
individuals with their main residence in the city or the tropics: namely that their lands in 
their home comunidades are not necessarily secure while they are living in another area. 
Should someone fail to meet the necessary social obligations they may lose their lands. 
Moreover, as was explained above, while use of the land for productive purposes, 
engagement in agricultural labour, communal work and the responsibilities of civic 
politics are generally counted as requirements for the enjoyment of ayonoqa land, what 
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precisely defines continued membership of the comunidad and access to land remains 
essentially unclear. The MAS councillor and former union dirigente Vincente Condori 
claimed that a small number of traditional authorities under the influence of 
CONAMAQ had gone through with the titling of the TCO and in doing so had annulled 
previously valid individual land titles, without properly consulting the affected parties. 
He pointed out that in his case an implication of the TCO was that only he could inherit 
the ayonoqa land in his home comunidad and not his four brothers who were resident in 
Oruro and Cochabamba and therefore did not meet the requirements set by the usos y 
costumbres. The attitude of both Olker and Vincente was matter of fact: there exist 
problems related to the scarcity of land and migration to the city which need solutions 
and they were responding to them. Neither claimed to be strongly against the TCO, but 
rather were open to its revocation if people so wished, as they claimed many individuals 
disliked the fact that it offered no recourse against trespass and security in the case of 
their residence elsewhere. 
When I spoke with Mallku Gregorio about the meeting and the comments of union 
figures, he claimed that people were being misled by the peasant union, whose real 
motive was to ‘hacer desaparecer el ayllu’: not only to get rid of the system of land 
tenancy but also the whole way of life connected to it and the traditional authorities 
themselves. He claimed this was obvious from the way they spoke in the ampliado 
general and other meetings. Some of the figures in the municipal government were 
ignorant as to how the usos y costumbres worked and the system of land tenancy 
because they had left for the city to attend school at a young age. In other cases, they 
were being deliberately misleading. He pointed out that many of the documents 
showing individual titling correspond to the urigen, areas of family land that were 
granted according to the 1881 census. Gregorio argued that this was simply the way of 
legally securing the lands during the time of the former Bolivian republic when there 
were no legal mechanisms available to recognise collective ancestral land; yet this has 
nothing to do with the internal norms regarding land ownership and rights. Gregorio 
maintained that the land had always been managed collectively according to the usos y 
costumbres and by bringing up the existence of these documents the union and local 
MAS politicians were deceiving people about their own history.  
Moreover, he contested that individuals who supported individual titling had been 
influenced by the fact they spent time in the cities and as migrant workers in the valleys. 
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He explained that in the valley regions of Cochabamba, such as Cliza, land has been 
individually owned since it was redistributed from the haciendas in the 1953 agrarian 
reform. As a result of high levels of transnational migration to Argentina and Spain, a 
substantial portion of the inhabitants of the valleys rent their agricultural lands, in many 
cases to people from the nearby highlands, while they spend extended periods of time 
working abroad. Having witnessed this, it is only logical that people from Bolívar 
province may wish to do the same. If they are in the city and the lands are not being 
used, then they believe they should be able to rent them to obtain income. However, as 
their family ayonoqa lands are granted to them in the form of a usufruct right, this 
option is not legally available. Gregorio’s attitude towards the Quechua-speaking 
peasantry of the Cochabamba valleys was that they are not originarios but instead ‘nada 
más que los descendientes de los peones de hacienda’ (nothing more than the 
descendants of the hacienda farmhands’) having lost their own land and culture. It was 
clear that for him they were not an example to follow. 
While I do not have copious data to support Gregorio’s claim, one of my informants in 
the city, Don Fermin, confirmed that some urban residents tend to be more strongly in 
favour of revoking the TCO in exchange for simple individual titling. I had met Don 
Fermin through the Baptist Union church in Yuraq Rumi where my wife and I gave 
weekly English classes to local children and teenagers. I had spoken with him about this 
topic one Sunday afternoon in January 2016 in the period after the rains had fallen and 
the normally dry landscape of peri-urban Cochabamba had become relatively green and 
pleasant. Despite living in the city, Don Fermin still travelled with his wife to 
Vilaycayma to sow and harvest crops and to visit relatives, especially their elderly 
parents and aunts and uncles. Don Fermin had been jilanku a number of times while still 
living mostly in the city, travelling back to attend meetings in the countryside and to 
adjudicate over problems related to the land. He explained that some individuals 
complained that they should not have to carry out social obligations to keep their land 
and that only gaining individual title deeds provided them with security and allowed for 
the economic development of their families. Moreover, he had heard some people talk 
about the idea of redrawing the boundaries of family plots of land, so the scattered 
parcels can be placed together in one or several larger plots, in the process replacing the 
muyu system with something closer to the division of land in the valleys. The muyu 
system of land rotation and the subdivision of plots at different altitudes means that the 
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actual plots of land cultivated at any one time are tiny, sometimes of only a few hundred 
square metres, thereby limiting crop yields to subsistence levels. It had been argued that 
changing this would better allow for the implementation of systems of small-scale 
irrigation or microriego and the commercialisation of production. Don Fermin was 
sceptical about this, however, as it would mean some families having privileged access 
to water resources. He was also clear that he had no problem with assuming the 
necessary social obligations to retain access to land and that he would do so until he 
died, although he confessed that his children no longer knew how to perform 
agricultural work and were therefore ‘of the city’. 
What these comments suggest is that the predominance of rural-urban double residence 
is a factor exerting significant influence over the debate between the ayllu and sindicato 
authorities regarding the future legal status of their lands and the way it should be 
administered. Among residents in the city, the worry they may lose their family lands is 
a major motivating factor in wishing to secure individual legal title. Moreover, I would 
suggest that the experience of living in the city changes how individuals regard the 
lands in their home comunidades in two ways. Firstly, the legal frameworks which 
define how urban residents may gain inclusion in the city and be recognised as citizens 
generate a sense of precarity which can only be overcome through the acquisition of 
official title deeds to the plots of urban land they inhabit. This influences individuals to 
view rural lands in their home comunidades in the same way and to see individual 
titling as key to security and proper ownership. Secondly, the fact of earning a living 
primarily in the money economy of the city may lead to the re-evaluation of how 
agricultural land should be used in favour of maximising production for commercial 
sale. 
Concerning the first point it is important to understand that, unlike in the countryside, to 
be regarded as fully part of the city it is necessary for persons to go through bureaucratic 
processes which allow for their juridical legibility as citizens. The legalisation of land 
bought as lotes, firstly as a collective titling and OTB and then as individual plots with 
title deeds, is the main form this takes. The OTB, as the basic urban mechanism of 
association and recognition, is organised on the basis of the individual ownership of 
urban land, which becomes the key condition of belonging to the OTB as a community. 
This means that in the city the individual or family and their property are the essential 
unit of community and development. The long and arduous bureaucratic process 
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described in chapter 2 causes people to live in a state of constant uncertainty as to their 
formal inclusion in the urban space. Yet those who have gained title deeds for their lotes 
have been able to apply for commercial loans which they have then invested in buying 
vehicles to use as taxis or minibuses, as they gradually improve their social position; as 
was the case with Don Fermin who had purchased a 1995 Toyota transit van with the 
intention of using it to sell agricultural supplies to people around the Andean region of 
the department of Cochabamba. The idea in Bolívar province of using land as collateral 
for loans, as was discussed in the meeting of the ampliado general outlined above, 
clearly mirrors the way urban lotes have recently become a resource against which 
families borrow to start small businesses or to purchase large value items. 
Regarding the second point, it is worth recalling that, as was briefly detailed in chapter 
2, the exigencies of the money economy of the city lead to a change in thinking about 
the need to maximise productivity or profit. Residents in the city often describe their 
lands in the countryside as a form of insurance against economic uncertainty. If they are 
no longer able to find work or their small businesses fail, they always have the option of 
returning to their family lands. Meanwhile, through returning periodically to sow and 
harvest in their home communities they can supplement the income they gain from 
working in informal commerce or as day labourers, providing food for their families or 
in some cases produce to sell or exchange. Yet seen from this perspective, the need to 
hedge against the possible loss of crops to frosts and hails by subdividing plots of lands 
at different levels of altitude is no longer so urgent. Being resident in the city means that 
the agricultural production from their lands is a complement to their incomes and not 
their primary means of subsistence. While improving crop yields would allow them the 
possibility of a cash crop income to supplement what they earn in the city, the 
traditional management of lands in the communities of Bolívar province makes it 
difficult to use technology to increase yields or to carry out commercial farming. This 
explains why some individuals have proposed reorganising the tiny scattered plots of 
land, progressively fractioned over time by inheritance, in more concentrated patterns 
and suggested that individual titling would be the most efficient way of doing so. Most 
importantly, people are encouraged to view the lands of their home comunidades as a 
resource through which income can be generated rather than as a territory they inhabit 
and exist in a living relationship with. This latter meaning of land as territory, as the 
place people inhabit and the totality of social relationships organised around it, is crucial 
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to the perspective of prominent ayllu figures and their notion of what it means to be 
originario. This will be explored in the final section of this chapter. 
III. ‘We’re not campesinos but the pueblo originario’: Land, the usos y costumbres 
and originario identity 
In their public discourse and in interviews various ayllu figures emphasise a primordial 
connection with their land and ancestral territory as one of the key aspects of what it 
means to be originario. They would often repeat the story of how the land was 
purchased with seven mule-loads of gold and silver by the soqta achichilas. These 
ancestros apoderados, their ancestors who represented them legally, had marched to 
Lima Peru in order to make their case to the relevant authorities and had bought the 
right to hold the lands of the ayllu. Both the documents which record these historic 
events and the ancestors themselves are venerated every year in misa mast’ay. In the 
sede sindical of Vilaycayma the ancestral documents are spread over a table and ritual 
libations are made to them. When telling the story of the land purchase, individuals 
would emphasise the fact that the q’ara runas had never entered their territory and that 
they had always existed as an ayllu. Alongside the story of their historic land purchase 
there exists another legend of the origin of Kirkiawi which speaks of a time before, 
when the land was inhabited by different people and of an ancient lost city from which 
the present territory derives its name. I heard this story from various figures, including 
Tata Apolonio Guitierrez, the Kuraj Tata of Eximo jap’iy during the time of my 
fieldwork. Tata Apolonio told me the following in the courtyard of his house in the town 
of Bolívar: 
‘Bolívar, where we are now it is said that before it was Kirkiawi. The lost city that was 
left below by the earthquake. According to what is said, in Kirkiawi there was a great 
celebration and an old man arrived and this old man was in rags, filthy, and they wanted 
to throw him out. There was a woman and she offered him charity. ‘Hoy qam ripunki 
kunan kaymanta’ (leave here now this day) he had told her and that she should not look 
behind…and the old man stayed behind while the woman left towards Sacaca. A voice 
had said ‘anda ripunki, qam salvasqa kanki’ (go now and you will be saved) and this 
voice was Tata Dios. And the woman, because of her curiosity, had looked behind. In 
that moment the city was boiling, it had become liquid...and it is said the woman was 
carrying her child. And there in that very spot she turned to stone...and this stone is still 
there on the road towards Sacaca.’ (S) 
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By the side of the road towards the town of Sacaca, just across the nearby border of the 
department with Northern Potosí, there is an unusual stone pillar standing in the middle 
of the strange deserted landscape which resembles a figure with its arms outstretched. 
According to the legend (which is strikingly similar to the biblical story of Sodom and 
Gomorrah) the original inhabitants were wiped out entirely because they had angered 
Tata Dios for refusing to show hospitality and charity to the old man. In this sense it 
resembles other myths among Andean highland peoples which speak of a time before 
the arrival of the Christian god and of previous inhabitants who were killed or fled 
(Harris, 2006; Canessa, 2008). According to the story, the present occupants are not the 
original inhabitants of the land but instead came from other places to settle in what was 
once the ancient city of Kirkiawi. This contrasts with the story of the soqta achichilas in 
as much as it does not emphasise a primordial connection to the land they occupy and 
suggests the impermanence of their habitation of it. Curiously, when I spoke with the 
anthropologist Miranda Sheild Johannson who had lived for an entire year in the remote 
comunidad of P’iya Q’ayma in Bolívar province, she was not familiar with the story of 
the land purchase, while she had heard the legend of Kirkiawi’s demise from numerous 
sources. The extent to which this story is an invented tradition is unclear, although it is 
mentioned in the documents of a (2014) case study carried out by the NGO Fundación 
Tierra, in which Tata Sabino Veizaga, Mallku Gregorio and his wife Dominga were 
interviewed. What it does suggest is the extent to which histories are interpreted in the 
present. In other words, the myths and stories which form the collective narrative of 
their community are symbolic artefacts open to interpretation and multiply contested by 
different groups and actors. Whether a timeless connection with the land can be 
demonstrated through them is a matter of reading and emphasis. As David Kertzer 
(1988), following Victor Turner’s (1967) analysis of symbols has pointed out, the 
multivocality and ambiguity of symbolic cultural elements, including myths and stories, 
is what gives them political power and allows them to become the basis of both group 
solidarity and political discourse. As shall be explored more fully in chapter 7, while 
some peasant union figures are aware of the story of the land purchase and the historical 
documents of the ayllu, they place greater importance within their view of history on the 
1952 revolution and the need to fulfil its promises. Meanwhile, the traditional 
authorities involved in the process of titling the TCO and the reconstitution of the ayllu 
emphasise how their identity is connected to the land and the complex of customs and 
practices through which it is managed. 
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Therefore, for these figures land is central to what it means to be originario due to its 
connection with their ancestral past and to the usos y costumbres. Figures from the 
sindicato and from the MAS alcaldía seemed to alternate between stating that they 
support the usos y costumbres and are themselves assuming responsibility for them and 
claiming them to be incompatible with new technology, progress and the passage of 
time. For example, Mayor Francisco and Vincente Condori both stated that the values of 
ayni and mink’a were present in the way they administered the municipality. In contrast, 
Olker Nina maintained that the usos y costumbres were gradually disappearing: 
‘The usos y costumbres with the passing of time and with technology will be lost...All 
that of the mink'a is very uncommon, not like it was before when I was a child. I saw all 
of these, choqus, choqus they're called. Many people, all of us would come together to 
dig up potatoes and they butchered a llama, a sheep just like that...but now it's with 
money, it isn't like that anymore, you know? Even the very clothing, as we're linked 
with technology it is possible that the children will no longer adopt the usos y 
costumbres despite the fact they know them. Only the old people are practising them. 
The usos y costumbres are becoming a story. They don't observe them out in many 
places.’ (S) 
For Olker there is no great emphasis placed on traditional customs, particularly the non-
market forms of exchange and reciprocity linked to agrarian production. In stark 
contrast, the ayllu leaders place enormous value on them and legitimise themselves in 
terms of their unique connection with these practices. They are at pains to point out that 
it is their role to look after and administer the usos y costumbres and that unlike the 
sindicato they do not use money. They regulate access to the land, resolve disputes 
surrounding it and represent the ways of their ancestors. References to this role, its age-
old nature and the fact that money was not involved were made countless time by 
Gregorio and others in public speeches. 
The lack of attachment by the peasant union and municipal government figures to 
certain traditional customs is also expressed in their attitude of pragmatism. For the 
sindicato, changing the nature of land tenancy and creating individual titling is a logical 
solution to the problems faced by individuals as a result of social change. Nevertheless, 
this attitude emerges from a difference in the role of the peasant union compared with 
that of the traditional authorities. While the peasant union in Bolivia should not be 
understood as a body for agricultural workers similar to a trade union but rather as a 
civil society organisation which acts as a form of local government, compared to the 
traditional authorities in Bolívar it is closer in function and ideology to a labour union. 
They represent the needs and interests of their members, in this case individual families 
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who wish to improve their economic conditions and gain resources from the state. This 
in turn implies a vision of the individual family as the unit of development and the basis 
of community. Land is therefore a resource which belongs to the individual family who 
may dispose of it so as, in the words of Olker and Vincente, ‘to improve their economic 
development’. It is worth emphasising the similarity between the peasant union and the 
peri-urban OTB in this respect. The OTB largely focuses on ensuring that its members 
may gain legal title of their lote. In peri-urban neighbourhoods where this process has 
been completed and infrastructure is in place the OTB tends to become less important 
and meets only once or twice a year, as was the case in the miner’s neighbourhood I 
stayed in during my first few months in Cochabamba. Being individual private owners 
of the lotes upon which they live is the basis of membership of the community and of 
long-term physical and economic security in the city. The OTB represents its constituent 
members in both securing the legal title of their lote and in mediating with government 
and outside agencies for projects and material improvements. This role and the implicit 
understanding of community membership is closer to that of peasant union leaders. 
The views of Sabino Veizaga, former Kuraj Mallku, COAMAC regional secretary and 
founder of the ayllu’s ‘political instrument’, POKUY, concerning the meaning of land 
and territory were strikingly different. When I interviewed him over several hours in his 
home in Oruro in February 2016, he spoke about how colonial administrative divisions 
impose an alien logic on originario people. For example, the canton, the most basic 
colonial division, ‘es como cortar los raizes de un arbol’ (it is like cutting the roots of a 
tree): referring to how it fails to acknowledge the way territory and communities are 
spatially organised in the Andes and cuts across the native divisions of jap’iy, pirañu 
and ayllu (and beyond that the marka and suyu). Changing the organisation of the land, 
dividing it into parts or selling it is like dissecting a living thing of which they form a 
part. When I asked Sabino about the tendency for individuals to prefer the idea of 
individual land titling in Bolívar province over the traditional communitarian system of 
tenancy he provided the following response: 
This way of thinking they have too. They want to own like in the city...it’s urban...like a 
lote you have to pay your tax, well everything you own you have to pay for. That’s 
more or less how the people in the countryside have come to think. But it isn’t like that. 
Everything is free. We share according to the usos y costumbres. We do rotation as well: 
we cultivate the earth and make it rest. If it’s individual from just their entitlement they 
have to pasture their sheep, from just their entitlement they have to fetch their firewood. 
Simple land titling is really a bit of trouble...They keep thinking of selling and going 
somewhere else. So as nothing more than a campesino, a settler we want to be now. But 
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for that reason as well I really regret this ‘we’re campesinos’: that pretty name that 
those of us from the countryside have taken hold of. We’re not campesinos but rather 
the pueblo originario. We are what was formerly tawintinsuyu, the ayllu, marka. That’s 
what we really are...Now I regret that the sindicato is making a simple land titling. Now 
just as a campesino. We’re no longer the owners of anything. This seems to be what the 
people understand...if they understood properly the ayllu that was bought with seven 
mule-loads of gold and silver, well, then we could be originarios. From there we can be 
not just tenants but owners...If we can understand properly what we are, from where we 
come...I always say that if we are the ayllu, marka, suyu, if we are the pueblo originario 
then we are owners of all that we live where we dwell. But if we want to be a simple 
titling, as nothing more than a sindicato, well, than we’re nothing but tenants or 
workers. You have to earn nothing more than your daily wage for yourself, not as an 
owner...’ (S) 
In the above passage Sabino outlines the process of what could be described in Marxian 
terms as proleterianisation or depeasantisation (Brass, 2011): the transformation of rural 
peoples with a partially autonomous communitarian economy, what is described by 
Olivia Harris and others in the Bolivian context as ‘the ethnic economy’ (Harris, 2000; 
Cusicanqui, 1990), into individuals wholly integrated into the market and dependent 
upon wage labour or some form of petty capitalist enterprise to meet their needs. This is 
his perception of what is happening as a result of migration from Bolívar to the cities 
and the tropical lowlands and he claims that it is partly for this reason the people have 
lost the sense of what it means to be originario and are at risk of losing their identity. 
He also contrasts being originario with being campesino. While this term has become 
widely adopted in the countryside it owes its existence to the 1952 revolution and the 
formation of the peasant unions and has been argued to be part of the attempt to 
reimagine highland indigenous peoples as mestizo peasant small-holders, integrated into 
the wider national society and economy (Platt, 1986; Cusicanqui, 1990, 2010). Sabino 
takes campesino to mean a de-indigenised subject who no longer chooses to live 
according to the usos y costumbres and does not recognise or understand his heritage. 
This primordial connection with their territory is what links a person to their 
neighbours, their community, to their ayllu and to the past. 
Sabino’s comments about how being originario means being the ‘true owners of the 
land’ directly contrast with remarks from Olker and other union figures that 
‘desafortunadamente aquí en Bolívar, gracias al TCO nadie es dueño de la tierra’ 
(unfortunately, thanks to the TCO, nobody in Bolívar province is the owner of the land). 
For Olker, ownership means that an individual possesses land as a legally saleable 
commodity, while for Sabino truly owning the land means maintaining their collective 
ancestral territory and the traditions and norms that are linked to its organisation. I was 
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with Mallku Gregorio at the home of his friend Javier in Pampajasi in January 2016 and 
while we were drinking singani spirit and sprite, chewing coca and playing music I 
asked him about the scenes in the ampliado general. He was about to come to the end of 
his term as Kuraj Mallku and he said that at times he regretted assuming the 
responsibility. The cargo had been a financial sacrifice because he had stopped working 
full-time as a tractor driver, but what had been worse was the personal cost of the 
acrimonious rift between authorities. What saddened him was that in listening to the 
union and local MAS politicians talk about the TCO, people were forgetting who they 
were. If they were to properly understand, they would realise that they are the ayllu: 
‘We are the pueblo originario, the ayllu Kirkiawi. The rocks, the rivers, the sources of 
water, all of this is the ayllu and you can’t divide it up and sell it. The TCO is what 
guarantees that our children will be the legitimate heirs to the land and not tenants.’ (S) 
Here is expressed the notion of land as territory, meaning the totality of a system of 
relationships, rather than as a commodity or factor of production: as a political, 
organisational and symbolic form perceived as possessing historical continuity with 
their way of life prior to the Spanish colony. As was explained earlier, the term ayllu 
may refer simply to the territory where people live alongside their customs and ways of 
life. This sense of their land as a territory and the desire to defend it have always been a 
part of the experience and aspirations of people in Bolívar and other highland 
communities. However, the INRA reform in the 1990s, along with new institutional 
expressions of highland indigenous identity such as CONAMAQ, combined to re-
vitalise and organise the traditional authorities and provide them the role of expressing 
this common aspiration. The influence of this process, along with their role in 
administering the usos y costumbres, explains to a large extent why they value this 
understanding of the land and the fight to preserve it. It is for this reason that the TCO 
has acquired a symbolic value for various figures I spoke with. It is another ancestral 
document like those kept in the sede sindical of Vilaycayma which represent the 
struggle by the ancestros apoderados to maintain the integrity and autonomy of their 
territory and preserve the usos y costumbres. As will be detailed further in chapter 7, the 
LPP process exercised a similar function for the peasant union: providing it with an 
institutional role as a mediator for development funds; as an outward-facing 
representative which looks after the needs and interests of its constituent members, in 
turn influencing the perspective of those involved in its local organisation. 
Consequently, alongside the local MAS government they express the aspiration to 
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improve the material conditions of their lives and those of their children and to gain 
inclusion and power within the wider state and society. 
For individuals like Juan Apaza, Mallku Gregorio and Tata Sabino, who have all 
exercised high cargos and were involved in the titling of the TCO and the reconstitution 
of the ayllu, to be originario means to be connected to the land as territory. This 
connection with the land as a complex of social relationships and practices, especially 
the forms of exchange and reciprocity involved in agrarian productive activity means 
that breaking up the territory is like tearing a living thing of which they are a part. For 
them, the TCO guarantees its integrity, while revoking it in favour of individual title 
will make them nothing more than tenants or settlers and not the heirs to the historic 
ayllu. Meanwhile, the peasant union are more concerned with what they view as 
practical solutions to problems resulting from social change and out-migration. Yet this 
pragmatism is channelled through the lens of a different view of belonging to their 
community: one which emphasises the individual and their family, the material 
improvement of their lives and their inclusion within the state.  
Conclusion 
In Bolívar province land is traditionally managed according to a system in which access 
to it is a form of usufruct right. This organisation of land is part of traditional practices 
which facilitate agricultural production and the supply of resources in a partially non-
market economy. These practices, often referred to as usos y costumbres, also mediate 
social relationships and the relationship between individuals and the land. Much of their 
administration in the comunidades of Bolívar is still in the hands of the jilankus, the 
traditional authorities at the local level. Access to land is determined by the continued 
participation of individuals in the life of the community and through engaging in 
agricultural work. The collective titling of the TCO is believed to have legally enshrined 
this practice and helped legitimate and define the role of the traditional authorities, in 
part as the guardians of the usos y costumbres. Despite being an element of neoliberal 
multicultural reforms of the 1990s, it took on a distinct meaning for new indigenous 
organisations such as CONAMAQ as part of the project of ‘reconstituting the ayllu’. 
For those involved in the titling of the TCO in Bolívar, the recovery of their ancestral 
practices and the titling of the land were the same process, one which shaped their view 
of what it means to belong to their community. 
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As the previous chapter made clear, much of their organisational concepts and form of 
the local authorities are shared and they are generally regarded along with the municipal 
government as a single hybrid system. Because they were involved in different projects 
furnished by the reforms of the 1990s, they were able for a time, in the words of some 
leaders, ‘to walk together’. Ironically, it has been interaction with the new plurinational 
Bolivian state that has provided the grounds for conflict, in this case over the issue of 
land and the TCO. In the last chapter it was shown how the possibility of becoming an 
AIOC under the new constitution supplied the basis for a dispute over the meaning of 
leadership and governance. This chapter has described how the presence of a minor 
legal functionary in a public meeting and the possibility of access to legal representation 
as part of the national programme of reform provoked a discussion over the status of 
their land and the future of the TCO. Some of the issues mentioned, such as the 
interpretation of the constitution in privileging indigenous or ‘pre-existent’ peoples and 
the problem of solving violence over land will be explored in the following chapter.  
The question of how land should be owned and managed most clearly expresses the 
differences between the different authorities as to what it means to belong to their 
community, expressed frequently through use of the term originario. Here the term 
originario stands for the ethical-political subject: the 'collective 'we' that defines group 
identity as a contested object of discourse. For the peasant union, individual land titling 
is a practical solution to various problems, not least that of double residence; it seems 
arguably the case that this is a factor influencing the debate as individuals living in the 
cities may change their attitude towards the lands of their home comunidad for the 
reasons speculated above. However, this attitude of pragmatism belies a view of being 
originario premised on the individual family as the basis of the community, a view 
influenced by their role in materially improving peoples’ lives and seeking their 
recognition and inclusion within the state. Meanwhile, traditional leaders have 
expressed the notion of land as territory: as part of a social system possessing historical 
continuity with their way of life prior to the Spanish colony. For them, being originario 
means to be part of this complex of social relationships and practices, connecting them 
to their history and ancestors. While these disagreements reveal two different 
understandings of what it means to belong to their community, this is due to how they 
embody different dimensions of the common aspirations of highland peoples, a theme 
which will be expanded on in chapters 7 and 8. However, for now this thesis will return 
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to the issue of violence in the comunidad of Piruani and how this highlights contested 
understandings of justice and the constitution. 
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Chapter 6. The Case of Piruani: Justice, Legal Pluralism and Indigenous Identity 
 Introduction 
As was explained in the previous chapter, replacing the communal form of the TCO 
with individual titling had been heralded by figures within the peasant union and the 
MAS alcaldía as a solution to violent conflict between families over land. During the 
time of my fieldwork in Bolívar province the major ongoing example of violence 
between families was what was commonly referred to as ‘the case of Piruani’. The 
‘case’ had become an object of contention between the two sides and it was frequently 
brought up in public meetings in relation to the land question and other issues. Piruani is 
a comunidad in which a bitter series of quarrels over the ownership of land had resulted 
in physical fights, with some individuals having to be hospitalized for stab wounds. The 
dispute had been taken to the courts in Oruro and the ayllu and peasant union authorities 
had separately attempted to resolve the matter. Consequently, a conflict between 
families over land had converted itself into a dispute between the local authorities of the 
province, who argued over the precise events of the case, the morality and constitutional 
legality of each other’s actions and the root causes of the problem. 
The ‘case of Piruani’, therefore, is a legal case tried by the ordinary civil courts and by 
two different forms of local authority within an indigenous community. Yet it is 
tempting to view at it as a ‘case’ in the sense generally used by the Manchester school 
of anthropologists of the 1950s, whereby a particular social situation or series of events 
can be used to illustrate the larger context and structures in which it takes place 
(Gluckman, 1961; Mitchell, 1983). Nevertheless, figures such as Gluckman and 
Mitchell were interested in the interaction between the state and indigenous custom and 
law primarily in the context of the colonised societies of Africa, in which the colonial 
authorities operated alongside native systems of governance and conflict resolution. 
This case takes place in a self-acknowledged ‘post-colonial’ and ‘post-neoliberal’ state, 
complete with its own ‘Ministry for Decolonisation’. According to the 2009 constitution 
the Bolivian state formally recognises the existence of legal pluralism: indigenous 
communities are allowed to exercise their own ‘customary law’ within the jurisdiction 
of the justicia indígena, which is constitutionally recognised as having equal legal 
hierarchy with the ordinary civil and criminal courts or justicia ordinaria. In other 
words, indigenous practices concerning the adjudication of transgressions and their 
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punishment are not only legally permitted, they are treated as separate and equal forms 
of legal authority within the plurinational state. 
The fact that the issue of justice should divide an indigenous community in the midst of 
this new postcolonial era may seem initially rather puzzling. This chapter will examine 
how the case of Piruani serves to illustrate not only the different understandings of 
territorial organisation and justice held by the authorities of the province but the internal 
contradictions within both the 2009 constitution and the overall project of political 
reform carried out by the MAS government. It will argue that there exists a tension 
within the Bolivian constitution between different conceptions of legal pluralism, 
resulting from the fact that the document is a compromise between the visions of 
different parts of the pacto de unidad and other social constituencies (Schavelzon, 
2012). The ayllu authorities, the sindicato and the MAS alcaldía in Bolívar province are 
themselves the local bases of some of the same social organisations who debated the 
wording of the constitution during the constituent assembly process in the years 2007-
2009. Rather than settling their disagreements, the ambiguous nature of many the 
constitution’s elements leaves a wide space for disagreement over its interpretation. Two 
of the principal areas of ambiguity within the constitution concern the meaning of legal 
pluralism and the definition of indigeneity. The case of Piruani brings into sharp focus 
how the different authorities conceive of indigenous justice, political and legal reform 
and their identity as originarios.  
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first will provide a brief history of legal 
pluralism within Latin America and Bolivia and the broader social and legal changes 
leading up to the present and will serve to illustrate the wider context in which the case 
takes place. It will then examine the accounts of the case of Piruani offered by the 
different authorities of the province before examining in detail the substantive 
disagreements between them resulting from it and what this says about the current 
period in Bolivia and ‘the process of change’.  
I. A brief history of Legal Pluralism in Latin America, Bolivia and Kirkiawi 
If legal pluralism is to be understood as the existence of multiple legal systems within 
one society (Pospisil, 1967) and their formal recognition by the state as separate legal 
orders then Bolivia and other countries in Latin America can be said to have exhibited a 
weak form of it during the colonial and post-colonial periods. This form of legal 
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pluralism consisted of the recognition by the state of forms of pre-existing indigenous 
customary law among groups defined as ‘Indians’ (Griffiths, 1986). With the 
colonisation of the Americas, the Spanish and indigenous populations were divided into 
separate legal categories, referred to as the Indian and Spanish ‘Republics’ (Wade, 
1997). This classification of the population facilitated the pattern of colonialism 
exhibited in the early years of the Spanish Americas in which Indian communities 
provided corvée labour and state revenue through a head tax known as la tasa (Platt, 
1982). In Bolívar the head tax was collected in some form well into the twentieth 
century and was one of the principal responsibilities of the Kuraj Tatas. 
In Bolivia this situation continued for some time during the post-colonial era, partly due 
to reliance on the Indian head tax for state revenue (Platt,1982; Klein, 2003). As was 
explored in Chapter 3, throughout the Americas there existed a continuity of colonial 
institutions and economic structures in the transition to independence, along with 
associated ethnic social divisions. At the same time, the newly independent states in the 
Americas had to reconcile their identity as modern nations with the reality of diverse 
populations of indigenous, mixed-race and Afro-american ethnic groups (Wade, 2001). 
In countries like Bolivia, where the majority of the population were of highland 
indigenous descent, the ‘Indian Question’ began to emerge within the discourse of 
educated urban society towards the second half of the twentieth century (Gotkowitz, 
2008). Bolivia and other emergent states attempted to conceive of themselves as 
possessing a unitary national identity, while remaining societies in which the indigenous 
majority were constituted as a separate and inferior human group that could not be 
integrated into the dominant culture. 
Since the 19th Century the various attempts to resolve the Indian Question have 
followed different constitutional models that broadly corresponded to different modes of 
economic organisation which reflected changes in the global political economy (Knight, 
2014). Towards the end of the 19th Century, as American states developed their 
economies towards the export of commodities on the global market, they adopted 
classical liberal political models and began to view the continued existence of Indian 
ways of life as a barrier to the economic and cultural development of the nation, 
favouring a centralised state and a laissez-faire economy. In Kirkiawi and throughout 
Bolivia this period was characterised by conflict between the ayllu communities and the 
state, as the 1874 disentailment act sought to transfer huge quantities of collective 
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indigenous land into the hands of private landowners, provoking mass struggles to 
prevent this from happening (Platt, 1982; Izko, 1992). Towards the middle of the 
twentieth century Latin American states began to adopt import-substitution models of 
development under ‘populist’ governments, who moved to an ‘assimilationist 
constitutional model’ (Knight, 2014) in dealing with their indigenous populations. In 
Bolivia, the 1952 revolution and subsequent agrarian reform established a constitutional 
model in which highland indigenous peoples gained social and economic rights while 
being forced to adopt a new identity as peasants or workers as part of the ideology of 
mestizaje. Highland peoples were encouraged to form peasant unions as civil society 
organisations aimed at integrating rural populations into the nation under the new 
identity of campesino. As with the liberal constitutional model, the state was conceived 
of as the centralised source of normative authority, with a monopoly over legal 
processes. Nevertheless, while in Kirkiawi the peasant union would have established a 
presence by the 1960s the traditional authorities, such as the jilankus, would have 
continued to be responsible for adjudicating various matters of justice in compliance 
with the usos y costumbres. As is the case with Kirkiawi, it is arguable that a form of de 
facto legal pluralism has existed throughout Bolivia’s history as a result of the uneven 
distribution of the state within its territory, with parallel systems of law and governance 
filling the gaps in its discontinuous presence (Barrantes-Reynolds, 2016).  
During the 1980s, following the post-1978 ‘wave of democratisation’ in Latin America 
and as countries began to undergo widespread neoliberal economic reforms, 
multiculturalism emerged as a new constitutional model. This happened at the same 
time as a multiculturalist discourse of human rights appeared as part of debates 
concerning the treatment of minority groups in European countries. According to the 
definition of multiculturalism given by the philosopher Will Kymlicka (1995) minority 
groups may be granted autonomy and distinct rights in order to preserve their cultural 
identity and allow individuals the chance to flourish as members of such groups. 
Minorities are therefore granted rights and tolerated by the state to the extent to which 
these rights do not interfere with universal human rights and the liberal good. Ethno-
cultural groups are legally recognised for their possession of specific cultural traits and 
culture becomes a right because it is what allows persons to have the resources to make 
choices about the good life. 
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The liberal notion of multiculturalism, understood as a way of incorporating national 
minorities within liberal nation states, became applied to the treatment of indigenous 
minorities. This shift in international law was crystallised in the 1989 convention 169 of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which was subsequently ratified by nearly 
every government in Latin America. While this new framework, which moved away 
from the previous model of ‘integration and assimilation’, treated indigenous groups in 
a similar fashion to minority ethnic groups there are two differences in how groups are 
classified as ‘indigenous’. Firstly, to be indigenous is understood to mean having a 
special relationship with a land or territory, which in turn confers rights over its 
occupation and use, leading to the need for groups who wish to be recognised as 
indigenous to prove ‘ancestrality’ via documents or to show how the land they occupy is 
essential to their culturally specific way of life. Secondly, indigenous identity is 
conceived of in highly essentialist terms, according to which ‘authentic’ indigenous 
peoples exhibit pre-colonial traits in their culture and social institutions and conform to 
an idealised Rousseauian picture of the ‘ecological noble savage’ (Kuper, 2003). This 
leads to the phenomenon of individuals ‘performing’ this ‘hyperreal’ version of 
indigeneity towards governments, NGOs and international institutions in order to gain 
recognition (Ramos, 1994).  
As was mentioned in chapter 3, various authors (Postero, 2011; Albro, 2005b) have 
described the period of multicultural reform in Bolivia as ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’, 
since its purpose was largely to ease the implementation of neoliberal economic 
policies. While limited recognition and legal rights were granted to subaltern groups this 
came at the expense of the state co-opting indigenist discourse and parts of the 
indigenous movement, furthering governmental decentralisation and the dismantling of 
social rights. While the liberal multiculturalist model seeks to accommodate national 
minorities, when applied in the context of a country like Bolivia this ignores the 
historical reality of colonialism: that individuals who may be categorised as indigenous 
are not simply national minorities but colonised peoples who continue to live under 
social relations resulting from a colonial system of racialised inequality. Moreover, 
ethnic identity in Bolivia is considerably more complex, fluid and ambiguous than the 
essentialist Rousseauian notions implicit within multiculturalist reforms. Even among 
ethnic political movements such as Katarismo, the language of class is used alongside 
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that of indigeneity: the two understood as complementary and indivisible elements of 
the lived reality of being Indian (Reinaga, 1970; Tiwanaku Manifesto, 1973). 
As was explained earlier, the main manifestation of these reforms in Bolívar province 
came in the form of the INRA and LPP laws, which helped to legitimise both the ayllu 
and sindicato and provide them with separate but apparently complementary roles as 
social organisations, reinforcing the notion that they form a hybrid governmental 
structure in the province. While aimed at pursuing the World Bank’s goal of ‘good 
governance’, the reforms provided new ways for the gente humilde from the 
comunidades of the province to make demands of the state and mobilise politically. The 
local elections of 2004, which saw the ‘indigenous takeover’ of the local government by 
representatives of MAS and POKUY, were a prequel to the later election of Morales as 
president in 2005.  
The current self-acknowledged post-neoliberal and post-colonial period in Bolivia takes 
place in the wider context of what has been described as the ‘new constitutionalist era’ 
in Latin America (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2012), as a number of countries in the region have 
passed new constitutions (in particular, several states belonging to the ‘pink-tide’ of 
democratically elected left-wing populist governments, notably Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela). These governments exhibit much of the radical discourse and symbols of 
the revolutionary Latin American left while remaining committed to democratic process 
and the rule of law. They mix radical structural demands for social transformation with 
the language of human rights and liberal ideas of citizenship. This results in the attempt 
to bring about a transformative political project through constitutional and legal reform 
and redefining of citizenship in order to provide recognition and confer rights on 
oppressed groups. Consequently, it can be posited that these regimes are constructing 
‘post-neoliberal subjects’: individuals who conform to the notions of citizenship and 
personhood defined by their new constitutions and political projects (Goodale and 
Postero, 2013). Nancy Postero (2016) has argued that in Bolivia the MAS government 
is engaged in a form of liberal state-building that privileges an indigenous subject. 
Nevertheless, this indigenous subject is ambiguously defined and remains open to 
interpretation. This has to do with how the 2009 constitution emerged as a compromise 
between the various social movements that made up the pacto de unidad. 
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The Bolivian constitution acknowledges the equal judicial hierarchy of the justicia 
ordinaria and justicia indígena and establishes that the authorities of pueblos indígenas 
originarios campesinos shall exercise the role of judicial authorities over all legal 
matters internal to their communities in agreement with their own norms and principles, 
provided the plaintiff and accused in each case are members of said community. 
However, the constitution also states that a law of judicial demarcation between the 
different jurisdictions will determine their respective limits and mode of coordination. 
The fact that the constitution first posits an apparently strong form of indigenous 
judicial autonomy before then establishing the legal basis for its limitation and 
separation from the state courts reflects a tension between two different visions of legal 
pluralism implicit within it. In broad terms these visions can be described as 
multiculturalism and plurinationalism (Barrantes-Reynolds, 2016). The first is the same 
approach taken in the multiculturalist constitutional model of the neoliberal period, in 
which limited autonomy is granted to minority groups on the basis of their right to 
culture, while the second views the Bolivian constitution as part of a project of 
decolonisation, allowing for the possibility of an alternative to the liberal state model 
while taking seriously the notion that indigenous groups are peoples with the right to 
self-determination.  
As mentioned previously, this tension reflects the distinct needs and visions of the 
different social organisations who negotiated during the constituent assembly process. 
The cocaleros and peasant unions represented by the CSTUCB were less concerned 
with issues related to indigenous rights and legal decolonisation (Postero, 2016; 
Schavelzon, 2014), instead favouring economic development, state control of the 
economy and natural resources and the creation of positive social rights. The majority of 
the MAS and peasant union organisations therefore favored a strengthening and 
centralisation of the state over the autonomy of indigenous communities and a strong 
program of legal pluralism. The peasant unions saw the legitimacy of indigenous 
judicial autonomy as deriving from the state, while the lowland and highland indigenous 
organisations saw indigenous rights as preceding the state by virtue of their right to self-
determination as peoples (Schavelzon, 2012). As a result of the compromise nature of 
the drafting of the constitution there exists a degree of ambiguity as to which of these 
two visions it inclines towards. At some points the constitution justifies legal pluralism 
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in terms of the right of self-determination of colonised peoples and at others it is said to 
be derived from the judicial function of the state (Barrantes-Reynolds, 2016). 
Moreover, the unwieldy phrase pueblos indígenas originarios campesinos or indigenous 
native peasant peoples, which defines the scope of indigenous legal jurisdiction, also 
reflects a somewhat awkward compromise. The Bolivian constitution unequivocally 
privileges being indigenous, granting special rights and the free determination of native 
peoples in its second article, without offering a coherent definition of indigeneity. The 
term pueblos indígenas originarios campesinos came about as union and cocalero 
leaders wanted their social organisations to be recognised as indigenous in order to be 
eligible for corresponding rights and benefits (Schavelzon, 2012). As discussed earlier, 
these groups had deployed a limited and strategic notion of indigenous identity during 
the period prior to Morales’ election as president (Grisaffi, 2010). What can be 
described as ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ (Schavelzon 2014) has become the basis of the 
populist ethnic nationalism of Morales and the MAS, joining multiple ethnic groups and 
social sectors together into a single subaltern subject as part of an ethnic discourse with 
broad similarities to the project of mestizaje of the social assimilationist period 
(Canessa, 2012, 2014).   
Therefore, in addition to containing a tension between an understanding of legal 
pluralism as a form of cultural recognition or decolonisation, the constitution also 
vacillates between a strict and inclusive definition of indigeneity. Nevertheless, 
particularly in the period since 2011, the MAS has increasingly promoted the inclusive 
notion of indigeneity in which the indigenous subject stands in for gente humilde or 
humble folk, the oppressed or los de abajo. At the same time, its official discourse has 
progressively represented plurinationalism, indigenous autonomy and legal pluralism as 
equality of rights before the law and equated decolonisation with equitable economic 
development (Schavelzon, 2014; Postero 2016). The unresolved conflict between the 
different elements of the pacto de unidad concerning these issues and others came to a 
head in the protests surrounding the proposed highway through the TIPNIS national 
park. They remain present, however, in the local politics and everyday experiences of 
numerous communities throughout Bolivia, including those of Bolívar province. 
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II. Accounts of the case of Piruani 
Piruani is a small comunidad of approximately thirty families. Within the emic 
conceptualisation of the province’s geography it is considered part of the higher and 
more arid zona puna, although it is in fact located at approximately 3800 metres of 
altitude and has suitable land for growing tubers, barley and other crops. Like many 
other communities in Bolívar, Piruani manages the land collectively and the issue of 
ownership of respective family parcels is determined communally with the help of the 
jilanku and with only the stone boundaries or qanipus marking the division between one 
area and another. According to the territorial division of the ayllu it is part of 
Warawarani jap’iy and it also corresponds to a sub-central of the peasant union. 
However, due to high levels of migration and double residence, both the jilanku and 
peasant union dirigente are not ordinarily resident within the community and only 
attend the monthly meetings and cultural events or travel from their homes in 
Cochabamba and Oruro when requested for extraordinary meetings. While Piruani is 
one of many communities that have been affected by migration in this way the lack of 
an ongoing presence of community leaders has exacerbated the conflict surrounding the 
case. The affected parties directly sought the assistance of higher-level leaders of the 
ayllu and sindicato as well as the ordinary civil courts instead of following the normal 
‘organic’ channels of consulting their local leaders in the first instance. I received 
various accounts of how the case of Piruani had developed from different sources but 
was not present in the community at the time the events took place and have not 
interviewed the affected parties in the dispute. I cannot pretend to know the truth of the 
case but simply present the different accounts offered by various members of the ayllu, 
sindicato and alcaldía and the public discourse concerning the case in local political 
meetings. 
One of the individuals who provided me with an account of how events unfolded was 
Francisco Larico. Francisco was a Quechua-speaking indigenous rights activist and 
paralegal, studying for his law degree in Cochabamba, who had grown up in the 
countryside in Oruro. He was married to Dominga’s sister Victoria, who had been the 
POKUY candidate for Mayor of Bolívar province in the 2015 local elections. I had met 
him through Gregorio at a conference on indigenous justice in La Paz organised by 
various Quechua and Aymara leaders and activists and he had later agreed to meet for an 
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interview in Cochabamba. We met on a sunny afternoon in a cafe in El Prado, a long 
tree-lined Boulevard filled with up-scale bars and restaurants just north of the city 
centre. Francisco, a young man in his early thirties, was critical of Evo and the MAS but 
was still enthusiastic about the possibility of indigenous peoples gaining autonomy over 
matters of justice. He had helped Mallku Gregorio make a presentation to the 
constitutional court in Sucre concerning the case of Piruani and how its eventual 
resolution represented a sound example of customary law.  
According to Francisco, everything began when one of the families from the comunidad 
had appropriated lands belonging to neighboring families. The problem with the case, 
he claimed, began with the failure to respect the proper channels in dealing with a 
dispute of this nature. Instead of approaching the ayllu authorities to resolve the matter, 
the families whose lands had been encroached upon spoke directly with the central 
provincial, the division of the peasant union at the level of the province. At this point, 
the union leaders should have involved Gregorio as the maximum representative of the 
traditional authorities and head of the ayllu. Yet instead of doing so, the peasant union 
leaders passed the matter up to the central departamental, the leadership of the peasant 
union at the level of the whole of Cochabamba department. The departmental level of 
the union, the FSUTCC, thereupon issued a resolution declaring the ‘real victims’ (the 
families whose lands had been appropriated) guilty of aggression against the very 
family who had encroached upon their lands and issued them a fine of 20 thousand 
bolivianos (approximately 2000 pounds sterling). At the same time as the peasant union 
were carrying out their judgment on the case, the ‘ringleader’ of the family who had 
encroached upon the land attempted to prosecute the other families for presumed acts of 
violence in a separate legal case. This took place within the ambit of the justicia 
ordinaria, in the courts of Oruro. Eventually the case was thrown out by the judge, but 
the ‘ringleader’ was able to obtain legal documents showing that the case had been 
taken to court and with these he returned to Piruani and attempted to use them to 
intimidate the other families into not pursuing the matter further.  
Gregorio, the Kuraj Mallku at the time of my fieldwork, only became involved in the 
case some fifteen weeks after the families whose lands had been encroached upon had 
taken it to the central provincial. According to Francisco, Gregorio and his Kuraj Tatas 
took some time to analyse the case before raising an objection with the resolution issued 
by the central departamental:  
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‘They object to this resolution, indicating that it is unconstitutional. First because it 
didn’t go through the correct procedures, second because it infringes upon the 
constitutional rights, of self-government and the principles of the usos y costumbres.’ 
(S)  
According to Francisco, Gregorio and other ayllu authorities, the actions of the central 
departamental contradict the 2009 Bolivian constitution. Indigenous communities have 
the right to resolve disputes internally according to their ‘customary law’. Therefore, in 
making a decision without involving the leaders of an indigenous community their 
constitutional rights are violated. In Bolívar the term usos y costumbres is used to mean 
something similar to the human rights term ‘customary law’ although it has a far 
broader meaning, encompassing local forms of governance, customs and traditions 
internal to the ayllu as well as historically, referring to the right to internal autonomy 
under the de facto weak legal pluralism of the colonial and post-colonial state. 
According to the understanding of the usos y costumbres favoured by Gregorio and 
other traditional leaders, the nature of the judgement carried out by the central 
departmental goes directly against their principles. For Gregorio, the peasant union is 
‘infected with the mentality of the justicia ordinaria’. When I pressed him as to what 
this meant he claimed that this was in part to do with the use of money. The sindicato, 
like the civil courts resolves disputes through placing fines. He claimed that Olker, the 
provincial union leader, had demanded two thousand bolivianos from all the parties 
involved as a ‘guarantee’ in order to resolve it, an action he considered antithetical to 
the usos y costumbres. 
When Gregorio finally judged the case, he went to Piruani and carried out a ceremony 
in which the different factions symbolically resolved their differences through the 
exchange of cattle. The solution had been witnessed by all the members of the 
community and the ayllu and union leaders. Later, Gregorio had presented the details of 
the case to a meeting of the constitutional court in Sucre. Francisco describes it in the 
following way: 
‘When they arrived there, they saw all this scene, right? They didn’t solve anything. 
Later, at the last moment, there is the solution. The people say, sanction already with 
everything. And he asks, right? He recognises his mistakes, that he’s infringed on rights. 
I’ll pay two llamas, he says. He pays two llamas. They butcher them right there and eat 
them...What is more this gentleman cannot exercise any cargo as an authority for five 
years.’ (S) 
For Gregorio, the form in which the dispute had been resolved had been in agreement 
with the usos y costumbres and was qualitatively different in character to that offered by 
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either the ordinary courts or by the peasant union. Instead of punishing the respective 
parties for on the on one hand illegitimately appropriating land or on the other for 
inflicting violence in retaliation, he had carried out a symbolic reparation between the 
warring families which involved the transfer of cattle. Following this, they had 
slaughtered a sheep and made kanka de oveja and papa wathiya, traditional delicacies of 
salted sheep meat and potatoes baked in the earth, sitting down together as a community 
to feast. Gregorio was at pains to point out that the resolution to the conflict had been 
carried out without money, unlike the solutions offered by the sindicato, which involve 
fines and offer the opportunity for corrupt union leaders to profit. Even worse, he 
claimed, is the justicia ordinaria that is inherently corrupt and would judge a ruling on 
behalf of whichever party is able to offer a larger bribe. 
When I spoke with the provincial union leader and equivalent to the Kuraj Mallku in the 
hierarchy of Bolívar, Olker Nina, about the case, his account was rather different. We 
sat on low wooden benches in the courtyard of his house and, while his wife prepared us 
some tea in the kitchen, he laid out his view of the matter. In the first place, the 
judgement by the departmental level of the CSTUCB had sided with the individual who 
Gregorio claimed to be the genuine offender. Olker viewed this judgement to be correct 
and he pointed out that it had been made in the light of violence suffered by the family 
of the individual. He maintained that the violence exhibited in Piruani was worrying and 
symptomatic of problems throughout the province. In the first place, the custom of 
multigeniture had led to the successive fractioning of family lands and the 
intensification of competition between multiple families over an increasingly scarce 
resource. This was the case despite the fact that many communities appeared 
abandoned, as the majority of originario residents with land spent most of their time in 
the cities or tropical lowlands and returned periodically to cultivate it or left this 
responsibility to a relative or neighbour. Being absent from the community meant that it 
was difficult to be aware of incursions upon one’s land or of its precise boundaries. 
Moreover, the jilankus and union leaders responsible for adjudicating these matters 
were often themselves mainly resident elsewhere and only returned for monthly 
community meetings. He claimed Piruani to be an exemplary case of all these factors 
and indicative of the problems faced by the province in a time of change. 
Moreover, Olker stated that he did not believe that Gregorio had resolved the conflict in 
any way. He describes the situation in the following terms: 
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‘What is it to give a solution? If they are in a problem to do with a territory…we said 
because before we went with the mayor, everyone. We said that we’re going to inspect 
the land and according to that we’ll give a simple [individual] titling to everyone 
involved in the conflict, in equal parts. But I’ve heard that this one, Gregorio, hasn’t 
done it that way. He’s just placed sanctions and not given a solution.’ (S)  
For Olker, the only way to resolve the conflict and to stop the violence occurring 
between families was to establish clear boundaries between the respective lands through 
providing individual title deeds. While the land remained communally managed, he 
maintained, the violence would continue. He seemed to view Gregorio’s claim to have 
provided a resolution as somewhat irresponsible as it did nothing to bring about an end 
to the conflict or unambiguously define the boundaries between plots of land. For him, 
the exchange of cattle and the ceremony carried out by Gregorio was merely a 
‘sanction’ for the violence carried out and not a definitive judgment. This sentiment was 
echoed by a number of local MAS politicians in the alcaldía, including the Mayor 
Francisco Delgado and the councillor Vincente Condori. 
Because the different local authorities had not only offered alternative solutions but had 
effectively sided with different parties, the conflict in Piruani had spilled over from a 
conflict between families to a conflict between the peasant union and MAS municipal 
government on one side and the traditional authorities on the other. The case served to 
amplify disagreement and intensify feeling over points of contention that had already 
existed between the authorities and the case became emblematic of them. When the 
matter came up in public meetings it was clear that both sides believed the other to be 
going beyond the limits of their role, both using the expression la parte orgánica to 
refer to the idealised structure of the different social organisations and the division of 
labour between them. For the ayllu leaders, it is not legitimate for the union to resolve 
questions of justice relating to the usos y costumbres, as their role is to act as the 
external political representatives of the community and to solicit funds for development. 
The union leaders argue that in reality they are dealing with many of the problems 
which result from conflicts over land and that this is a responsibility they routinely 
assume at the level of the comunidad and beyond. They also objected to the fact that 
Gregorio and a number of Kuraj Tatas and jilankus had been going to meetings in the 
constitutional capital in Sucre as part of a consultation process regarding the 
implementation of the new tribunal agroambiental and that Gregorio had taken his 
putative resolution of the case of Piruani to a meeting of the constitutional court, 
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designed to showcase examples of indigenous legal practices and customary law. These 
meetings were attended by numerous representatives of highland and lowland 
indigenous communities and were meant to be forums in which the nature of indigenous 
justice could be explained, illustrated and debated. Given the hybrid nature of 
government in Bolívar province in which there exists both ayllu and sindicato leaders in 
each comunidad and at every subsequent level of social organisation, the sindicato 
viewed the fact that Gregorio and others had attended these meetings without them as 
illegitimate: they were presenting themselves as the ‘true originarios’ when they had no 
right to do so. In response, various ayllu leaders claimed they had every right to do so 
given the fact they were uniquely responsible for maintaining the usos y costumbres and 
that they had existed as a form of authority prior to the colonisation of the Americas. At 
this point it becomes clear that the dispute over the case of Piruani and the legitimacy of 
the actions of both forms of authority in adjudicating it turns not only on what is 
understood by justice, but on the meaning of being indigenous or originario and how 
the use of this term within the Bolivian constitution is interpreted. 
 III. Justice and originario identity 
Part of the substantive difference between the ayllu and sindicato leaders concerning the 
resolution of the case pertains to the way land should be owned and managed, with the 
case of Piruani frequently cited as an example to justify individual titling. A number of 
the traditional authorities I spoke with claimed that in saying this, the sindicato were 
deliberately misleading people about the way land is managed according to the muyu 
system. The point was made repeatedly that the real motivation of the sindicato and 
local MAS politicians in advocating individual titling was as a way of revoking the 
TCO in order to ‘desaparecer al ayllu’: to vanish the ayllu as a form of territorial 
organisation and thereby also eliminate the traditional authorities as a rival source of 
power. The union and alcaldía figures were either deliberately misrepresenting the way 
the land and conflicts resulting from it were traditionally managed or, in the case of 
some of the MAS alcaldía, were genuinely ignorant of these matters as a result of 
having left their communities at an early age to receive education in the city. They were, 
it was claimed ‘ignorantes en su propia casa’ (‘ignorant in their own home’). This 
charge was leveled especially towards the Mayor of the province, Francisco Delgado, 
who Gregorio described as profoundly ignorant about the usos y costumbres and ‘anti-
indigenous’. 
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It is a phenomenon that has been observed by scholars of Bolivian Andean communities 
(Albó, 1977) that conflict over land between families, communities and entire ayllus is 
an endemic and seemingly unavoidable feature of traditional land tenancy systems in 
the highlands. Without precise boundaries it is inevitable that individuals will encroach 
upon each other’s plots and the jilankus or other authorities will not always be able to 
determine who is the victim and the offender. Nevertheless, the cyclical rotation of the 
land in ayonoqas means that these feuds are often resolved automatically as the land is 
never cultivated consecutively for more than a few years. Once a particular ayonoqa is 
left fallow a new one has to be ‘opened’ in an official ceremony in preparation for its 
cultivation ahead of the rainy season, which includes el reparto or parceling out of the 
new land among families by the jilanku. With the opening of the new ayonoqa the slate 
is effectively wiped clean and feuds will normally come to an end. Curiously, the same 
word used to describe the leveling of earth to prepare it for cultivation which follows 
the reparto of lands with the opening of new ayonoqas is often used in Quechua to 
mean ‘forgive’: the verb pampachay meaning literally ‘to flatten out’ or ‘to level out’ is 
used alongside the hispanicism perdonay. The term implies a notion of justice and 
conflict resolution focused on the restoration of balance within a community rather than 
identifying the guilty party and the aggressor. This does not mean that there does not 
exist a concept of blame or guilt, which was described to me with the Spanish culpa or 
the Quechua juch’a. I was given a number of examples of justice carried out in the past 
in which the jilanku would give a beating to all of the parties involved with his chicote 
rope whip, so they could experience shame and all learn their blame and the mistakes 
they had made before resolving the differences between them. 
Part of Gregorio’s solution to the case of Piruani, which he believed distinguished it 
from that of the peasant union, was that it had not involved money. The resolution 
between the different parties had been achieved with non-monetary reparations and 
without precisely quantifying damages. In part, this reflects how the ayllu authorities 
legitimise themselves in terms of their connection to the traditional agrarian subsistence 
economy with its non-monetary forms of exchange. He claimed that it represented an 
important difference in principle between the two forms of authority. According to 
Gregorio, the most important thing for an originario living in the highlands is his sense 
of dignity, resulting from his standing in the community and the public image he 
projects. Paying a fine allows the offender to absolve himself of the debt he owes to the 
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victim in the manner of a monetary transaction, with no loss of face. On the other hand, 
the exchange of cattle and the sort of ceremonial reparation he had carried out made the 
offender publicly admit his guilt and beg forgiveness in front of the whole community. 
This, he maintained, represented a more lasting solution, as the aggressor had to swear to 
not repeat his mistakes in the presence of all his neighbours. 
Gregorio maintained that making a declaration of intent in front of the community to be 
the most effective method of preventing further transgressions. He stated that public 
declarations or juramentos had been a common way of dealing with individuals who had 
committed serious crimes in the past. During the meeting narrated in the opening chapter 
of this thesis, the septuagenarian Vilaycaymense, Don Enrique Tola, had made an 
intervention in which he accused the present leaders of the comunidad of being mistaken 
about how justice should be carried out. They had lost their customs and instead settled 
things with money. He described how when he was a young man it had been normal to 
make someone swear a juramento: 
‘If you don’t do this then you will be dead right here…you would make the oath, we 
would place a little salt and crossed blades. And this is what you would shout. Shouting 
this, in making the oath you would swear, lord in my heart, that this and that…’ (Q) 
The person making the oath would walk over the crossed blades while they shouted that 
they should die if they didn’t keep their word. If they didn’t, then Tata Dios would 
strike them down. In this way the community could be sure that the offender would not 
repeat their crime and would comply with the sanctions they were obliged to make in 
order to repair the damages they had caused their neighbors and to the social contract of 
the community. Former Mallku and COAMAC leader Sabino Veizaga had seized on this 
as an example of the sort of ancestral practices they had to recover in order to get past 
the problems that were taking place in communities like Piruani. 
Tata Sabino had given one of the more considered interventions during that meeting. 
Unlike some of the angrier speeches made by ayllu and union figures, his was calm and 
measured but clearly articulated a particular vision of justicia indígena. Tata Sabino is a 
quietly dignified and intelligent man and he explained in a polite and somewhat mild-
mannered fashion how he believed the meeting to be very important given the fact that 
Kirkiawi, as an ‘ancestral territory’, had traditionally administered its own forms of 
justice with no recognition or oversight by the state. With the new plurinational 
constitution this sort of space provided the possibility to go forward ‘ñawpaqman 
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rinananchispaq’ towards a greater understanding between the state and their community 
Yet at the same time, he reflected, it was making them a little sad that some of the 
judicial competencies of the traditional authorities were being taken away from them ‘un 
chicito llakichiwanchis chiqa qichuwanchis, jerarqias de la justicia ordinaria’. Here 
Sabino was referring to the judicial demarcation law or Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional 
that attempts to establish clear boundaries between the competencies of indigenous and 
ordinary jurisdictions. While he recognised the existence of problems in comunidades 
such as Piruani, ‘wakin comunidadesmanta achkata pantashanku, problemas tiyan’ 
(‘among some communities they are making a lot of mistakes, there are problems’), they 
had to assume the responsibility themselves for resolving these issues. They needed to 
follow the usos y costumbres and recover their ancestral knowledge and practices. In the 
past, he claimed, time was not wasted on lawyers and written documents but rather 
problems were resolved by the traditional authorities in the manner described by Don 
Enrique, using juramentos or through summary punishments. This, he stated 
emphatically as the conclusion to his speech, was the key to overcoming the problems 
they were witnessing, ‘Entonces chay astawan nuqanchis mejorananchis tiyan, 
hermanos…kayta astawan practicananchis tiyan!’ (‘So, that is what we have to improve 
on, brothers...it is more of this that we need to practice!’). 
The notion of recovering practices and creating an alternative to the liberal state and its 
system of laws, based on the collective experience and ‘ancestral knowledge’ of their 
community, is very much part of the understanding of legal pluralism as a project of 
decolonisation shared by CONAMAQ and various prominent ayllu leaders within 
Bolívar province. In contrast, the Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional, which defines the 
limits between the justicia ordinaria of the civil and criminal courts and the justicia 
indígena, goes very much against any serious idea of plurinationalism or legal 
decolonisation. It reinforces the subordination of the justicia indígena to the state, while 
limiting the competency of indigenous jurisdictions to those areas which are 
‘traditionally dealt with’ by indigenous authorities, excluding them from judging major 
criminal offenses and interfering with any of the key functions of the centralised state. 
While the sindicato leadership and local MAS politicians did not raise objections to it, 
many of the traditional authorities believe the Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional to be anti-
constitutional, as it places limits on the ability of indigenous communities to manage 
their own justice. They do so because they interpret the constitution to be in favour of a 
187 
 
 
plurinationalist version of legal pluralism as part of a decolonial endavour of refounding 
the Bolivian nation. 
The Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional also restates the right of peasant unions to be 
involved in matters of justicia indígena as recognised social organisations within 
‘indigenous native peasant’ communities. Much of the ayllu leadership reject this 
entirely and believe the inclusion of unions as a recognised indigenous organisation to 
be a mistake. They point to the wording of articles 2 and 30 of the constitution that state 
that indigenous communities and by extension their authorities are those which existed 
prior to the Spanish colonial invasion. This supports the view that the traditional 
authorities are the true originarios, predating the colonisation of the Americas and 
therefore uniquely responsible for defending and reconstituting the practices and 
principles of the usos y costumbres, unlike the peasant union which is a European 
institution imposed as part of the post-1952 assimilationist project of the MNR 
government. When Gregorio made this point in a meeting of the ampliado general in 
the town of Bolívar, he was met with the familiar reply that ‘all of us are originarios’ 
and the assertion that union leaders routinely dealt with such matters in the 
comunidades. 
The debate over the constitutionality of the peasant union acting as judicial authorities 
within the jurisdiction of the justicia indígena illustrates the consequence of two points 
of ambiguity within the constitution. The first of these is the previously outlined matter 
of what it means to be indigenous, or in the case of Bolívar province originario, while 
the second concerns who is deemed responsible for exercising indigenous customary 
law within a community such as Bolívar. The law treats indigenous communities as 
homogeneous entities: there is no distinction made between the different authorities and 
institutions that may exist in parallel and the constitution provides no guidance on this 
issue. Concurrently, the constitution vacillates between strict and inclusive notions of 
indigenous identity. At times it comes close to the ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ increasingly 
favoured by the MAS while also containing elements of the view implicit in 
international human rights law and even that of the Katarista political movement. 
Meanwhile, within highland communities like Bolívar individuals employ the language 
of class and ethnic identity in an almost interchangeable fashion. Despite their 
differences, both the traditional and union authorities conceive of themselves in class 
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and ethnic terms. One evening, while chewing coca and smoking cigarettes with 
Gregorio, the conversation turned to what it meant for him to be indigenous or 
originario and he replied ‘we are an oppressed people within the bourgeois state and 
have been for centuries’ (‘Somos un pueblo oprimido dentro del estado burgués. Así ha 
sido por siglos’). As the Katarista phrase puts, it class and race for highland peoples are 
‘the two eyes with which to see the world’ and ‘the two legs with which to walk on it' 
(Albó, 2009): they are complementary analytic categories that are not reducible to each 
other but together express the lived experience of being Indian and offer the path to 
overcoming their position of oppression. 
The difference in how the traditional and union authorities conceive of originario 
identity is therefore not as clear as their current political opposition to each other would 
suggest. As was established in Chapter 4, being from the same communities and 
working alongside each other the different forms of authority do function to an extent as 
a hybrid governmental structure in the province. However, the case of Piruani provides 
an example of where the respective authorities make their differences clear, since a 
significant part of the dispute turns on the definition of indigeneity contained in the 
Bolivian constitution. From the public discourse of the meetings in the province it was 
clear at the time of my fieldwork that the union leaders broadly followed the discourse 
of inclusive indigeneity of the national MAS government. This was also echoed when I 
conducted interviews with local MAS politicians such as the Mayor Francisco Delgado 
or the councillor Vincente Condori or union leaders such as Olker Nina or Severina 
Wayatola as well as in countless conversations with Severino Condori. They justified 
the constitutional legitimacy of the union as a judicial authority within the jurisdiction 
of the justicia indígena on the basis of an inclusive view of the indigenous subject, 
which includes echoes of class and the assimilationist notion of mestizaje. Meanwhile, 
the traditional authorities interpret the constitution to follow a strict definition of 
indigenous identity which is closer to how they articulate what it means to be 
originario. This is similar to the definition of indigeneity that Andrew Canessa (2014) 
describes as that of a minority group that needs protection from the state, namely one in 
which being indigenous refers to qualities of territoriality, ancestrality and a continuity 
of pre-colonial practices and social institutions.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how ‘the case of Piruani’ illustrates the different understandings 
of justice, territorial organisation and indigenous or originario identity among the 
respective forms of local authority in Bolívar. A land dispute between families in an 
isolated rural hamlet converted itself into a discussion between the provincial 
government and peasant union and the traditional ayllu authorities over how to resolve 
conflicts and to interpret the legal pluralism guaranteed by the 2009 constitution. The 
fact that intra-community conflict has intensified in a new ‘post-colonial’ era, following 
the implementation of a ‘plurinational’ constitution that claims to refound the Bolivian 
state for the benefit of the previously ignored indigenous population reveals the ongoing 
tensions and contradictions within the project of social and political reform or el 
proceso de cambio being carried out by the MAS government. 
The constitution itself is a compromise document which reflects the distinct needs and 
visions of the various elements of the pacto de unidad involved in the constituent 
assembly process. As a result, the final document contains various tensions and 
ambiguities. In respect of legal pluralism, it vacillates between a strict and inclusive 
definition of indigeneity and between viewing indigenous justice as a right of cultural 
recognition granted by the liberal state or derived from the right to self-determination of 
formerly colonised peoples. This equivocation stems from separate understandings of el 
proceso de cambio: of building a more inclusive centralised state with equitable 
economic development and social rights or as a more radical project of decolonisation. 
This is similar to the characterisation made by Arturo Escobar (2010) concerning the 
choice faced by new leftist states in Latin America between ‘alternative modernisations’ 
and ‘decolonial projects’. 
In the case of Piruani the different authorities of the province dispute the constitutional 
legitimacy of each other’s actions based on rival conceptions of what it means to be 
originario. In broad terms it can be said that the union and local MAS politicians view 
being originario in a manner closer to the ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ that has 
progressively become part of the official discourse of the national government. 
Meanwhile, the traditional authorities employ something closer to a strict definition of 
indigeneity, which includes notions of ancestrality, territoriality and the continuity of 
pre-colonial practices. Individuals involved in this dispute were obliged to articulate 
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these differences because the 2009 constitution makes explicit reference to indigenous 
or originario peoples while defining these terms ambiguously. This process of 
contesting the meanings of shared elements of their culture and of making claims to 
authenticity, particularly regarding their collective identity, has been described in this 
thesis as an ethical-political discourse. The debates described in this chapter illustrate 
how the national project of reform of the MAS government has helped to produce an 
ethical discourse within a local community and how notions of indigeneity that circulate 
within wider networks of political, indigenous rights and environmental organisations 
have been articulated in ways that engage with more specific local understandings of 
identity, history and values. The following chapter will explore how local debates over 
development relate to distinct views of their common identity as originarios, expressed 
in different accounts of historic struggle. 
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Chapter 7. Living Well: The Meanings of Development 
 Introduction 
In early October 2015 I attended the World People’s conference on climate change in 
the town of Tiquipaya just outside of Cochabamba. The purpose of the event was 
ostensibly to draft a document representing the views of the peoples of the global south 
to be presented at the G20 climate summit held in Paris later that year. I took part in a 
workshop concerning el vivir bien: a concept included in the Bolivian constitution as 
one of the fundamental ethical principles of the state that serves to guide national 
economic development. During the workshop, the Bolivian foreign minister, David 
Choquehuanca, invited us to ‘cosmo-ver’ and ‘cosmo-ser’: Spanish portmanteau words 
that refer to the process of coming to terms with the unique worldview of highland 
indigenous peoples that transcends the limitations of material consumption and western 
notions of progress. The following week I attended the ampliado general of Bolívar 
province and heard the women’s union leader, Severina Wayatola, speak about the 
importance of voting in the affirmative in the impending referendum on amending the 
constitution to allow for Evo Morales’ re-election. Thanks to ‘Tata Evo’ and ‘the process 
of change’, she stated emphatically, we have football pitches, sports halls and 
electrification. Only Tata Evo could deliver more development for their municipality.  
In Bolívar province development policy has become a focus of debate among local 
leaders. Meanwhile, the national MAS government claims to have made a decisive 
break with neoliberalism and capitalist development and to have found an alternative in 
concepts such as el vivir bien (Morales, 2007). Yet the direction of national policy has 
divided elements of the Pacto de Unidad, as well as the national MAS movement. In 
recent years there has been a shift in both the nature of government discourse and 
substantive policy regarding economic development (Postero, 2014; Schavelzon, 2014). 
The effect of this in Bolívar province has been to reinforce the alliance between the 
sindicato, local MAS politicians and the national government, while undermining the 
traditional authorities and exacerbating tensions.  
The very idea of development is new in Bolívar and owes its existence to the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1990s that fundamentally altered local power relations. A further result of 
this process was the creation of a site of struggle between the various forms of local 
authority. This is both a site of political struggle over control of the municipal 
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government and its resources and of ideological struggle to orient and define the process 
of change taking place. I argue that this ideological struggle represents what is described 
in chapter 1 as an ‘ethical discourse’: the attempt to articulate what is authentic to a 
sociocultural group in terms of its collective narrative, identity and ends. As it is during 
the self-proclaimed post-neoliberal period that relations between the different 
authorities have deteriorated, terms such as el vivir bien and other elements of national 
discourse form part of this debate. The present chapter aims to show how these concepts 
are being articulated and contested at the local level and the relationship between this 
parochial dispute and the debates and developments taking place nationally. It will be 
argued that tensions between the different local authorities regarding development that 
have existed since the neoliberal period have worsened because of the actions of the 
national MAS government to centralise power and to pursue a development policy 
based largely on delivering projects funded by the expansion of extractive industry. 
Moreover, despite the fact that terms of national discourse gain different meanings when 
appropriated by local actors, what unites the division between elements of national-level 
social organisations and the MAS with the discussions taking place in Bolívar province 
is that they share broadly similar understandings of what it means to be indigenous or 
originario. In addition, the debate between the different local authorities concerning 
development and the nature of el vivir bien relates especially to how they conceive of 
their common narrative. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide an analysis of 
current public discourse surrounding development in Bolivia and particularly the notion 
of el vivir bien and its intellectual genealogy. This will be followed by a history of 
development in Bolívar, describing how the implementation of the Popular Participation 
Law or LPP initially united the different forms of local authority, while also providing 
an arena for conflict between them. The second section will detail the status of 
development policy within Bolívar province at the time of my fieldwork and the 
discussions surrounding it. The final section will provide an analysis of the substantive 
differences between the different authorities regarding the matter and will explore how 
these are shaped by different historical narratives of struggle. 
 
 
193 
 
 
I. Development and El Vivir Bien  
 i. Development policy and living well in the New Bolivia 
The terms el vivir bien or el buen vivir form part of international discussion on 
development as well as national ideological debate in Bolivia. The notion of el vivir 
bien represents perhaps the strongest possibility available to the MAS government to 
put forward an intellectually coherent programme that is simultaneously post-neoliberal, 
anti-capitalist and de-colonial, combining the disparate ideological threads that make up 
its political discourse. Throughout Latin America these terms have been enthusiastically 
adopted by social movements, left-wing intellectuals and populist governments 
(Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2017). It has been advocated as a possible platform for 
constructing an alternative to capitalist development, based on common features of the 
ethical views of indigenous peoples and peasants regarding communal existence and the 
relationship between humans and nature, in contrast to those of the Europeanised elites 
who have traditionally dominated them (Albó, 2009; Gudynas, 2011). However, in 
Bolivia it has a particular intellectual genealogy and is rooted in the cultural and 
political movement of indigenous revindication which emerged nationally towards the 
end of the 1960s. 
As was described in detail in chapter 3, this movement was termed Katarismo and was a 
diverse cultural and political tendency composed of peasants, students and urban 
intellectuals of mainly Aymara descent which took as their emblem the figure of Túpak 
Katari. What was central to Katarismo as an ideological movement was the view of 
colonial society having been imposed oppressively over a civilisation that was 
originally free and which embodied a distinct social and ethical order (Cusicanqui, 
2010a). During the period of fragmentation and dissolution which took place within the 
Katarista movement and the massive irruption of NGOs into Bolivia in the 1980s and 
1990s a new discourse materialised surrounding development. The works of a number 
of Aymara intellectuals such as Simon Yampara (2001, 2010), Felix Patzi Paco (2004) 
and the MAS politician David Choquehuanca (2010) exhibit continuities with the earlier 
intellectual and cultural aspects of Katarismo, while distancing themselves from its 
Marxian theoretical orientation, moving away from a focus on the state and towards the 
practice of development as the site of struggle between social and ethical orders. 
Meaning approximately ‘the good life’ or ‘to live well’, the term el vivir bien is itself a 
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translation of the Aymara suma qamaña. It claims to refer to a notion of the common 
good or of well-being within the cosmovisión or worldview of highland indigenous 
peoples. This is a holistic sense of well-being embodied in the communitarian practices 
of the ayllu, in which there does not exist a separation within the totality of social 
relationships between people and the land they inhabit, thereby running counter to some 
of the core assumptions of western modernity and expressing a possible response to the 
substantive criticisms of post-development. For this reason, scholars such as Arturo 
Escobar have enthusiastically posited the concept as a potential platform to construct 
alternatives to the ‘civilizational crisis’ of capitalist modernity (Escobar, 2010, 2011; 
Gudynas, 2011). 
During the early years of the MAS national government the term el vivir bien became 
part of its official discourse and found its way into the 2009 constitution. The term el 
vivir bien appears in article 8 of the constitution as a ‘fundamental ethical principle of 
the state’ as well as in the fourth section which deals with the state’s economic 
objectives. Here it refers to achieving el vivir bien in the context of reducing poverty 
and social exclusion and states that to achieve this goal it will be necessary to fairly 
distribute the proceeds of economic growth and promote equal access to resources 
within a framework that respects individual and collective rights. It does not mention 
the notion of the people and their environment being fundamentally bound together or 
of an alternative to the notion of linear progress in economic planning. Therefore, even 
within the constitution it is codified essentially as a conventional notion of 
development, couched in left/social democratic terms. This reflects the relative 
weakness of Aymara intellectuals and representatives of CONAMAQ within the 
constituent assembly, as opposed to conventional leftists and union figures who were 
more concerned with ensuring state control of resources, positive social rights and 
increased investment in rural development and infrastructure (Schavelzon, 2012; 
Postero, 2014). 
In the current period, the MAS party is internally divided between old-fashioned leftists, 
union representatives and those who take seriously the idea of an alternative indigenous 
worldview as the basis for decolonising and refounding the Bolivian nation. Broadly 
speaking, leftist intellectuals such as the Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and union 
representatives, particularly those of the ‘inter-cultural colonists’ of the tropics, 
converge around the idea of utilising extractive industry to pursue an increase in GDP 
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growth to allow for higher family incomes and to fund social programmes (Postero, 
2016). Intellectuals who put forward the idea of el vivir bien in the sense described 
above have become marginalised and are sometimes depreciatively referred to as 
pachamamánicos, portrayed as romantics with nothing of substance to offer in debates 
about national development (Stefanoni, 2010). In the years since Morales’ original 
election there has been a marked change in both the tone of official discourse 
surrounding development and actual policy. Writing in 2010, Arturo Escobar eulogised 
about the possibility of Bolivia leading the world into a post-developmentalist moment 
(2010). However, it is arguably the case that rather than exemplifying a new post-
neoliberal or post-capitalist reality Bolivia is practising a new form of 
developmentalism based on extractive industry and commercialised agriculture 
(Postero, 2016). Some have argued that the MAS has adopted ‘neostructuralism’, a sort-
of Latin American ‘third way’ (Giddens, 1998) which mirrors many of the economic 
aspects of neoliberalism while seeking to share somewhat more equitably the benefits of 
growth and fostering social institutions to allow for the inclusion and participation of 
the population (Leiva, 2008; Webber, 2011). Those critical of neostructuralism claim 
that it does not offer a genuine alternative to neoliberalism and maintains an unequal 
relationship with foreign capital and reliance on extractive industry (Webber, 2011; 
Leiva, 2008). 
The (2014) government document Agenda Patriotica 2025 outlines Bolivia’s present 
long-term development goals. It describes the importance of eradicating poverty 
through the provision of basic infrastructure and ensuring that all Bolivians have access 
to health care, education and sports facilities. This will be achieved through a 
‘diversified economy’ that will focus heavily on resource extraction and commercial 
agriculture as well as the building of hydroelectric projects which will convert Bolivia 
into a net exporter of electricity. While the term vivir bien is used throughout the 
document, it is precisely this deployment of it, in relation to oil exploration and 
hydroelectric construction, that is regarded by some as a meaningless trivialisation of 
the concept (Cusicanqui, 2015). What Eduardo Gudynas (2015) labels ‘progressive 
extractivism’ has effectively become the national discourse of the government, within 
which notions such as el vivir bien and decolonisation are equated with equitable use of 
the profits of extractive industry and relatively conventional notions of development, 
progress and modernity. This progressive extractivism fits with the discourse of 
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‘ecumenical indigeneity’ discussed in chapters 3 and 5: the populist ethnic nationalism 
of Morales and the MAS which unites distinct ethnic groups and social sectors together 
into a single subaltern subject. Extractive wealth facilitates the policy of delivering 
projects through national development programmes that bear the President’s name and 
allows for public performances which celebrate the positive change brought through 
Evo’s presidency for the benefit of the formerly marginalised and impoverished 
Bolivian people. Costly high-technology mega-projects such as the nuclear power plant 
currently being constructed in El Alto or the telecommunications satellite named after 
Túpak Katari have become symbols of Bolivia’s new modernity as it finally emerges 
from centuries of poverty and dependence. In a public address, Morales stated that with 
the Túpak Katari satellite they would go beyond Bolivia to ‘decolonise space’ (Celis and 
Arce, 2014). 
The breakdown in the Pacto de Unidad that took place over the proposed highway 
through the TIPNIS national park reflects the dissatisfaction of the highland and 
lowland indigenous organisations, CONAMAQ and CIDOB, over this direction of 
policy. The 2015 World People’s climate conference in Tiquipaya I attended represented 
one space where this ideological division was publicly manifested. The final document 
that emerged from the conference emphasised the importance of ‘transitioning towards 
a civilisational model of el vivir bien’ (CMPCC, 2015) and the speeches of the opening 
and closing ceremonies (which featured the highlight of presidents Evo Morales, 
Nicolas Maduro and Rafael Correa dancing together in highland indigenous costume) 
referred extensively to ‘the rights of the mother earth’. Concurrently, a number of 
figures from the CONAMAQ orgánica came to publicly protest and attend the 
alternative conference, Mesa 18. Among those present were Mallku Gregorio and the 
indigenous rights lawyer Edwin Prada, who acted as the official legal advisor to Ayllu 
Kirkiawi. The chief grievances raised at this event concerned the state mining law and 
mining practices that do not properly afford indigenous communities their right to prior 
consultation, while allowing transnational companies to eschew their environmental 
responsibilities through sub-contracting to miners’ co-operatives; extensive de-
forestation of the eastern lowlands linked to commercial agriculture and a general 
increase in extractive industry and the penetration of foreign capital. Those present felt 
that the MAS government did not take their environmental commitments seriously in 
any way. While they had appropriated many of the terms of the indigenous movement, 
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what was taking place in Tiquipaya was political theatre principally directed towards the 
outside world, including their socialist allies in Venezuela and Ecuador and international 
organisations such as the United Nations. In reality, they claimed, the MAS cared 
nothing for the rights of indigenous people and the principles of el vivir bien. 
 ii. A history of development in Bolívar Province 
As was mentioned previously, Bolivia has adopted different models of economic 
organisation throughout its history which have affected the relationship between 
indigenous communities and the state (Knight, 2014) and this has formed part of the 
local history of the residents of Bolívar province. Since the national revolution and the 
corporatist period, communities within the territory of Kirkiawi would have had access 
to education through the construction of village schools and would occasionally have 
been able to secure projects for water or the improvement of roads. Nevertheless, the 
notion of development, understood broadly as the possibility of systematically planning 
the material transformation of their communities, only became widely accepted within 
the province during the neoliberal period, following the implementation of the Popular 
Participation Law or LPP.  
As was described earlier, the LPP brought about the ‘municipalisation’ of government 
funds, meaning that local governments would receive a small fraction of the national 
state budget to grant to local community organisations for investment in basic 
infrastructure and other public works. While the LPP was part of a series of neoliberal 
economic reforms designed to decentralise government and transfer responsibility for 
the provision of basic services away from the state, a key element of it was the creation 
of instances of ‘citizen participation’ in the processes of planning and auditing of local 
development. The structure of the reform was such that this participation was limited to 
administering the fairly meagre resources allocated to a local municipal government, in 
this way helping to ensure Bolivia complied with the World Bank development goal of 
‘good governance’ (World Bank, 1992). However, in Bolívar province, as in much of 
the rest of Bolivia (Postero, 2007), this limited inclusion and recognition had profound 
effects that went beyond the modest ambitions of the initial reform. It provided the 
people of the comunidades of Bolívar with a way of resisting the clientelist form of 
political relations that had existed since the time of the national revolution and helped 
legitimate and revitalise the local authorities. It provided them with a common cause to 
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unite against the neoliberal government and a site of political struggle and ideological 
contention6. 
While the purpose of the LPP was ostensibly the inclusion of local people in decision 
making, it was introduced in a remarkably sudden and top-down fashion. The local 
government, based in the small town of Bolívar, suddenly became responsible for 
administering funds from the LPP, identifying needs and organising a development plan 
in consultation with the approximately 60 comunidades of the province. Until this point 
the local government would have effectively encompassed the former canton capital of 
Bolívar, while the position of mayor was ad honorem, dependent for funding entirely on 
taxes and fines, collected mainly in the town from the local producers of chicha. The 
elaboration of the first Municipal Development Plan (PDM) was therefore 
subcontracted to an NGO, PROSANA, who completed the process in less than three 
months (Antequera, 2013). To do so, they enlisted the help of rural schoolteachers, 
whose mission was to create a ‘communal file’ in which each comunidad would identify 
their needs, create a map and census and list their demands. In reality, the local 
schoolteachers became adept at filling out the paperwork and the actions of the NGO 
became limited to distributing and recollecting these documents, which in most 
instances prioritised the construction or extension of local schools (Ibid.). 
At the same time, it was necessary to create the legally constituted community 
organisations who would negotiate for funds and projects with the municipal 
government. The LPP encouraged the legal recognition of small community 
organisations as Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs). However, rather than 
creating OTBs, the local comunidades were legally recognised as peasant unions, as this 
had been an existing form of social organisation since the time of the agrarian reform. 
According to the Bolivian anthropologist Nelson Antequera (2013) it was the 
involvement of local schoolteachers and mestizo townsfolk as privileged intermediaries 
between the state and the comunidades in the initial implementation of the law that led 
to the recognition of the sindicato campesino, rather than the traditional authorities, as 
the interlocutor with the local government. This is because teachers and llaqta runas, 
despite often being of rural origin themselves, tend to identify with a national white-
                                               
6 My understanding of this process comes in part from conversing with the Bolivian anthropologist 
Nelson Antequera who has written on the topic and carried out fieldwork in Bolívar in the early 2000s 
and with individuals who were involved in it, particularly Justiniano Cunurana, Severino Condori and 
Vincente Condori. 
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mestizo culture and viewed the sindicato as civilised and modern. While the sindicato 
campesino had existed in the province in some form since the agrarian reform and it 
was normal for comunidades to have dirigentes alongside jilankus, it was relatively 
disorganised and lacked a strong institutional purpose. Moreover, it was associated with 
the clientelist politics of the corporatist-assimilationist period, during which time union 
leaders would often ‘sell’ the votes of their communities at the time of national elections 
to the established parties, such as the ADN or MNR, in the hope of gaining food 
subsidies or money. In contrast, the LPP served to legitimise the peasant union by 
providing it with a role as mediator for municipal funds. 
The top-down nature of the LPP’s implementation meant that it was treated with distrust 
both locally and by national-level peasant union organisations. Don Enrique from 
Vilaycayma informed me that there existed the widespread suspicion that the process 
was a pretext for the q’ara runas to tax or appropriate their lands. However, as the first 
modest projects began to enter with the small amount of money provided through the 
LPP, they were greeted with great excitement. With the entrance of funds for small-scale 
projects the idea of carrying out improvements to infrastructure, building public works 
and employing technology to improve agricultural production became commonplace. 
Vincente Condori and the former provincial union leader, Justiniano Cunurana, both 
explained to me that prior to this, the idea of constructing projects with the ongoing 
investment of resources from the municipal government, permitting them to decide as a 
comunidad or at the level of the province what they should prioritise, did not exist. To 
continue to manage the process it became necessary to properly organise the sindicato, 
as Don Justiniano explained to me: 
‘In ‘97 they chose me as union leader of Bolívar province and I accepted this and 
afterwards began to organise. And the truth is they were not organised well but 
rather...the political parties would come and offer to the unions and they would 
manipulate them...there was no coordination...from there we began to organise, to first 
of all create a general meeting...after that we made workshops in order to be well-
trained and to understand the new laws...Here in Bolívar province, in all of Bolivia in 
the countryside we were very discriminated against, very marginalised. With the 
Popular Participation Law being created we knew how we had to handle things. On that 
basis I organised...more than anything else in order to better manage the resources...’ (S) 
According to Justiniano this led to a change in the relationship between the peasant 
union and the political parties as they were no longer beholden to them in the same way:  
‘Before when there were presidential elections, of course they controlled us, they used 
the peasant unions...they looked for a leader and like that they entered...in that way they 
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handled us...they brought coca...sometimes money...they offered me political posts, 
money, but I didn’t want it...with the LPP things changed...before the whole thing was 
totally controlled by political parties…’ (S) 
In Bolívar the ADN and MNR were the two parties who had dominated local politics 
prior to the late 1990s. While the MNR was ostensibly a left-populist or socialist party 
and the ADN a fascist party, they were described to me by Tata Sabino, Gregorio and 
Justinano as essentially different sides of the same thing, representing the control over 
the comunidades by white and mestizo outsiders. However, Justinano explained how 
this changed as the sindicato became organised throughout the entire province with 
regular meetings and coordination between the different levels of central, sub-central 
and comunidad. At around the same time that Justinano was elected to the alcaldía of 
Bolívar the traditional authorities were engaged in the process (described in greater 
detail in chapter 5) of titling their land under the INRA law, which in turn helped 
revitalise and legitimate the ayllu authorities. During Justiniano’s term as provincial 
union leader the notion that the traditional and union authorities form a hybrid structure 
in which the different levels of authority each have their complement became 
widespread. ‘We became aware,’ Justinano told me ‘that we must always walk together,’ 
(tenemos que siempre caminar juntos) although he later concluded that they had 
unfortunately been unable to coordinate or come to an agreement in the subsequent 
years. 
Eventually it became evident that in order to fully manage the resources available 
through the LPP, it was necessary to take control of the local government directly. As 
local politics in Bolívar had been traditionally dominated by the established parties, 
positions of power were always occupied by party outsiders from the cities or local 
mestizo townsfolk. Justinano was the first indigenous councillor elected in the 1999 
elections as a candidate of the Communist Party (PC), adopting its personería jurídica 
or juridical personhood as a political party to run. In the 2004 elections the sindicato 
and ayllu authorities disagreed over the process of selecting candidates, this time under 
the personería jurídica of the MAS party. The traditional authorities had the legal 
recourse of using the personería obtained through the recently approved TCO and so 
stood for election separately under the title of POKUY (flourishing in Quechua). 
However, the two sides agreed on a common slogan of ‘vote MAS or POKUY but not 
for the q’aras’. The result was to wipe out the traditional parties and establish an 
‘indigenous takeover’ of the local government, with MAS and POKUY agreeing a ‘pact’ 
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to work together for the good of the entire province. This pact was helped by the fact 
that in this period the sindicato and the autoridades originarias, as well as the national-
level organisations they belong to, the CSTUCB and CONAMAQ, were united against 
the deeply unpopular neoliberal government.  
The modest aims and initiatives of the LPP had transformed the way people saw their 
relationship with the state, providing a means to overthrow the clientelist political 
relationships established by the 1952 revolution. Meanwhile, it embedded the notion of 
development within the discourse of local social organisations and created a site of 
political and ideological contention between them. While the LPP helped instil the 
notion of the peasant union and ayllu authorities as complementary, it also brought them 
into conflict over control of the municipal government and the orientation of its 
policies, the sources of funding for development projects and the form they would take. 
While it introduced the concept of development, understood broadly as the possibility of 
systematically planning the material transformation of their communities, in doing so it 
also introduced a space for ethical discourse over what this process means and how it 
relates to their common goals, history and identity.  
II. Development and El Vivir Bien in Bolívar Province 
 i. The local politics of development 
While Bolívar remains one of the poorest areas of the department of Cochabamba it has 
changed substantially in the twenty years since the LPP was implemented. In the early 
1990s not even the provincial capital was connected to the national electric grid, there 
was not a single phone line in the province and public works were virtually non-
existent. Despite the fact that the funds mobilised through the LPP were largely 
inadequate to meet the needs and demands of all the inhabitants of the province, the 
changes to their lives have been tangible. In the years since the indigenous takeover of 
2004, the municipal government of Bolívar has produced three municipal development 
plans or PDMs. In each of the three PDMs from 2002-2016 el vivir bien is described as 
one of the guiding principles behind municipal development strategy, based on a 
‘cosmo-centric vision that shall overcome the ethnocentric contents of development’ 
(PDM Bolívar Province, 2011). In addition to the PDM, the local government produces 
a POA or annual operative plan and the representatives of the local social organisations 
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participate in the steering of policy in both the monthly ampliado general and the bi-
monthly municipal development committee or CDM. 
At the same time, the budget of the municipal government has increased tremendously 
in the years since the 2005 election of the national MAS government and the number of 
technical staff has grown prodigiously. From 1994 to 1999 the money available for 
investment through the LPP had increased from approximately ten thousand to several 
hundred thousand US dollars (Arratia, 2002) and this has grown to over a million US 
dollars in the current period (PDM Bolívar Province, 2011). Once the municipal funds 
are added to the potential funding sources from government ministries, NGOs and 
national development programs the total budget theoretically available is several times 
this figure (Ibid.). These changes are reflected in the architecture of the town of Bolívar. 
The Bolivian anthropologist, Nelson Antequera, told me how in the late 1990s the figure 
of the Mayor would have attended people in a small adobe building that consisted of a 
waiting room that housed both the electricity generator of the town and the Mayor’s 
office: a dimly lit space with wooden chairs, a mechanical typewriter for official 
correspondence and a desk, behind which hung the national coat of arms and pictures of 
Simon Bolívar and Antonio Jose de Sucre, together establishing the presence of the 
Bolivian state. At the time I carried out fieldwork, the offices of the Mayor, councillors 
and some technical advisors were housed in the municipal administrative centre: a two-
storey building complete with meeting rooms and a tiny public library which included a 
payphone and two computers. Nevertheless, the administrative centre was no longer 
adequate to house the growing number of staff and the municipal government had 
begun the construction of new offices which were completed by the end of 2015. The 
finished casa municipal is an enormous conspicuously modern four-storey office 
building finished in gleaming white concrete, that dwarfs the one and two-storey adobe 
brick houses of the central square of the town. The new building vigorously establishes 
the presence of the Bolivian state and the power of the local government, functioning as 
the focal point for public assemblies carried out by the MAS controlled alcaldía and 
visiting politicians. 
The source of this increase in funding in the ‘post-neoliberal’ period has been the 
nationalisation by the MAS government of hydrocarbon resources, coupled with 
historically high oil and gas prices. While the amount of money available for rural 
development projects has increased substantially, this money enters through various 
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sources, including the per capita municipal funds established by the LPP, grants from 
government ministries and the fondo indígena: a development fund established for the 
benefit of indigenous communities. More controversial is Bolivia Cambia: Evo Cumple 
(Bolivia changes: Evo delivers): a programme of direct grants from the central 
government for large public works. Thanks to Bolivia Cambia: Evo Cumple, the town of 
Bolívar has a sports centre and a football stadium, a synthetic football pitch and the 
aforementioned casa municipal. The works themselves are accompanied by giant 
billboards showing a smiling picture of the president and details of the precise cost of 
the project, indicating the amount of money Evo has ‘delivered’ to the community. The 
construction of synthetic football pitches and other large-scale public works have 
featured among the signature acts of the Morales presidency. Normally, when a large 
public work is constructed through Evo Cumple, the president appears in person to 
officially deliver it to the community, while the major social organisations organise an 
assembly in front of the president and local provincial and departmental political 
leaders. 
It is precisely during this ‘post-neoliberal’ period that the issue of development had 
become a major point of contention between the different authorities in the province. 
When I spoke with several current and former ayllu leaders, they maintained that the 
local and national MAS government and the sindicato did not understand the concept of 
el vivir bien and were in essence the same as the government of Sanchez de Lozada, 
carrying out ‘neoliberalism with an indigenous face’, or more informally that they were 
‘la misma cholita con otra pollera’ (the same young woman with a different skirt). At 
the same time, members of the alcaldía and peasant union were critical of the 
autoridades originarias for being resistant to change and not acknowledging the 
tangible material improvements brought about through the government of Evo Morales 
and el proceso de cambio. 
Some of the publicly stated concerns of the autoridades originarias in Bolívar province 
echo those made by national level indigenous leaders and in forums such as the Mesa 18 
alternative climate summit. As mentioned earlier, the major deterioration of local 
relations between the union and traditional authorities dates to the national-level split of 
the pacto de unidad over the proposed highway through the TIPNIS national park, 
partly because of the close relationship of the traditional leaders with the CONAMAQ 
and COAMAC highland indigenous organisations. Ayllu leaders had publicly stated 
204 
 
 
their discontent with the lack of consultation of indigenous communities over roads and 
mining projects in the meetings of the ampliado general and during one meeting of the 
autoridades originarias Mallku Gregorio had shown us a film about the environmental 
dangers of extractive industry and invited a speaker from Northern Potosí to explain 
how their right to prior consultation was not being properly granted. 
Nevertheless, many of the arguments that took place in public meetings and the 
grievances I heard privately expressed concerned the mismanagement of funds and 
misuse of resources, accusations of corruption and clientelism and the inappropriate and 
unsound nature of many of the large and costly projects. The accusation that the current 
government is really 'neoliberal' and ‘la misma cholita con otra pollera’ refers not so 
much to its extractivist or anti-environmental policies but to the perception of the re-
emergence of political clientelism and prebendalism. Mallku Gregorio described to me 
how during the years following the 1952 revolution, political parties, whether ostensibly 
from the right or left, kept rural people excluded from power and controlled them 
through the sindicatos. While they fought between each other, he claimed, ‘all of them 
ate from the same plate’ (‘todos comían del mismo plato’) as they were simply ‘doing 
pasanaku’7: exchanging positions of office while keeping things the same. White and 
mestizo politicians maintained power over the countryside and treated state revenue as 
their own, rewarding political cronies and providing crumbs to rural communities who 
would support them electorally upon the request of the union leaders. The accusation 
levelled at the sindcato and local MAS government is that this situation has repeated 
itself in a new form. This is related to the fact that they criticise the national MAS 
government for retaining functionaries and government ministers who are q’aras: part 
of the white elite who have always held power, such as the Presidential Minister Juan 
Ramón Quintana, who formed part of previous neoliberal governments. They claim the 
national MAS government, like the governments before it, attempts to use the unions to 
stay in power and does so by rewarding cronies with jobs and money and using projects 
as a way of buying votes. This is not a reading that is exclusive to ayllu figures: 
Justinano Cunurana, now retired from political life and living in Cochabamba, 
confessed to me that, while the sindicato had freed itself from being subject to political 
parties in the years following the implementation of the LPP, things have returned to the 
                                               
7 The Quechua suffix ‘naku’ indicates a reciprocal action. ‘Pasanaku’ is to pass around between 
individuals. 
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ways of the past. Before, he told me, ‘the parties moved the unions. We changed that, 
but now the MAS moves the unions.’ Sindicato figures are accused of being 
buscapegas: self-interested individuals who see their cargo not as a position of public 
service but as a ‘ladder’ to a cushy political or administrative role. Moreover, the 
apparently inflated figures of various projects are attributed to embezzlement on the part 
of municipal government politicians and staff, an accusation made not just by ayllu 
leaders but by some of the townsfolk of Bolívar and individuals I spoke with in 
Vilaycayma. 
I am unable to corroborate the extent to which the accusations of corruption, 
embezzlement, clientelism and cronyism are true. However, there are a number of 
points worth making about how local development and political power have co-evolved 
during the ‘post-neoliberal’ period. Firstly, as described in the previous section, from the 
start of the process of implementing the LPP the sindicato was favoured as the natural 
interlocutor for development money, a role it readily assumed and in which it was 
legally instituted. In part, this was due to the role of the mestizo townsfolk, rural 
teachers and traditional politicians in the process, but also because of the union’s more 
outward-facing role as a civil society organisation which provides a link between rural 
communities and the state. With the 2004 indigenous takeover of the municipal 
government and the failure to agree a single electoral slate for both the union and 
traditional authorities, a mutually supportive relationship was established between the 
sindicato and the MAS. In the municipal government the Mayor is not directly elected 
but appointed by the five-person consejería municipal, whose task is to audit the 
projects enacted by the executive. The local MAS party, largely composed of sindicato 
figures, has consistently won a narrow majority of the council seats in every election 
since 2004, meaning they control the municipal funds and development policy and 
direct these towards projects initiated by the unions. 
At the same time, the change in both the overall quantity and sources of funding coming 
into the province only serves to reinforce this mutually supportive relationship, as more 
money has become available through per capita municipal funds and even more via 
direct grants such as Bolivia Cambia: Evo Cumple. Huge projects, such as the casa 
municipal or the local football stadium are attributed to Tata Evo and the MAS and 
show the power of the national and local MAS party and the sindicato to ‘deliver 
development’. During the time of my fieldwork, figures in the local government and 
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sindicato were declaring their intention to build a three-storey provincial headquarters 
for the peasant union in the town of Bolívar alongside the casa municipal. Mallku 
Gregorio described this as nothing more than a display of power, designed to ‘disappear 
the ayllu’. Although the ayllu authorities have never been as involved in acquiring and 
administrating projects, the fact that large numbers of NGOs have left the country or in 
some cases been expelled, described by President Morales as ‘pawns of foreign 
interests’ (Postero, 2016), alongside the freezing of money from the fondo indígena, has 
denuded them of potential funding sources. At the time of my fieldwork the fondo 
indígena had been suspended while an investigation took place into numerous 
allegations of corruption by senior figures within both the CSTUCB and CONAMAQ. 
Despite this, the traditional authorities complained that the case of the fondo indígena 
was ‘politicised’, as the freezing of funds affected ayllu organisations more than the 
unions, while the corruption allegations were allegedly being used to target high-level 
CONAMAQ figures critical of the government, such as its former president, Felix 
Becerra. 
 ii. The local meanings of development 
In January 2016 I attended the official celebrations of the anniversary of the province in 
the town of Bolívar. People had arrived from as far away as Argentina to attend a party 
in the main square of the town and the following morning Evo Morales was due to 
arrive in his Presidential helicopter to officially deliver the casa municipal. The event 
took place shortly before the national referendum on changing the constitution to allow 
for Morales’ third term. Individuals from every comunidad in the province poured into 
the square with placards indicating that they represented a particular comunidad or sub-
central. Some of them held placards with specific demands addressed to ‘Tata Evo’, 
such as a clean water programme, a new sede sindical, electrification or irrigation. After 
several hours of waiting it was announced that due to bad weather in El Chapare the 
President would not arrive and the event took place without him. The Mayor of Bolívar, 
provincial and departmental union leaders and various politicians from the departmental 
congress stood on a platform in front of the newly built casa municipal, dressed in 
highland indigenous clothing of sheep hide sombreros and homespun jackets and in 
fluent Quecheñol extolled the progress that had been made in the province thanks to the 
nationalisation of hydrocarbons and the development programmes of the national 
government. The new casa municipal, stated Mayor Francisco Delgado, did not belong 
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to the municipal government but to all of them. Before, he emphasised, no one 
represented the gente humilde, the people of the comunidades, but thanks to the last ten 
years of investment they had increased access to electrical power, clean water and 
health care. 
How should the performative nature of this event be interpreted? For the ayllu figures I 
spoke with, it exemplified the MAS government’s building of financially costly white 
elephants as a way of publicly demonstrating their power and instituting a new form of 
caudillismo in which the peasant unions organise support for the MAS and President 
Morales. Nevertheless, it is clear from talking with the local MAS politicians and 
figures within the union that for them it represents more than a cynical exercise of 
power. Displaying the diacritical markers of originario identity while delivering the 
project exhibits the progress made in Bolivia towards inclusion and recognition of the 
gente humilde. Projects such as the synthetic football pitch and the casa municipal, with 
their conspicuous size and modern appearance, perform at a local level (as the Túpak 
Katari communications satellite and other public works do nationally) the emergence of 
the nation’s ‘indigenous majority’ from centuries of poverty, exclusion and dependence. 
This was emphasised to me in conversations with various members of the MAS 
alcaldía, including Mayor Francisco and Vincente Condori and by union figures who 
were proud of the level of development they had brought to the province and who felt 
this would only improve in the future. 
For example, Severina Wayatola, the women’s union leader at the departmental level 
spoke with me in the offices of the FSUTCC in Cochabamba. Severina had begun a 
long trajectory in peasant unionism in the late 1990s as secretaria de actas or minutes 
secretary in her comunidad of Challviri in Bolívar. Severina is mentioned at the start of 
this chapter for her intervention in the ampliado general, praising the fact that only 
‘Tata Evo’ could ‘bring development’ to the province. I spoke with her at some length 
about the history of local politics in Bolívar and current developments. She told me the 
following about the indigenous takeover and the changes that have occurred locally 
thanks to ‘the process of change’:  
'Some comrades were saying, 'and why don't you all stand as campesinos?' They [the 
local government representatives] are all still in the city. They are not going to govern 
well...After this we began to see change...Before there weren't many resources and 
afterwards with [Mayor] Francisco there has been change. There are projects, 
agricultural production, education, health as well. All of this is thanks to the process of 
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change at the national level. The nationalisation of hydrocarbons...this has been 
distributed and that's why there are results in Bolívar...We are aware that the campesino 
originario doesn't have money to live well...he just lives from the same potatoes and 
ch'uño that he produces...now it says el vivir bien in the constitution because everyone 
has to have good employment or if not businesses. That's what it says. That everyone 
lives equally.' (S) 
Her reading of the constitution and el vivir bien is clearly at odds with that of local 
traditional authorities such as Mallku Gregorio but not completely inconsistent with the 
notions expressed by the Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and his brother Raul, with 
whom I had the chance to speak, while working at the Casa del ALBA in Cochabamba. 
Raul explained to me that the distribution of hydrocarbon resources is what would allow 
individuals in the countryside and urban periphery to create economic development, 
including cooperative businesses, based on their own ‘communitarian models’, without 
providing any definition of what this communitarianism consisted of. Severina informed 
me that the commercialisation of crops and investment in inputs and transportation for 
cooperative peasant businesses would allow them to be the equals of people in the 
cities. Moreover, she displayed an optimism about the possibility of bringing more 
projects and material improvements to the province, an optimism that was shared by 
others. One evening in Vilaycayma I was staying at the house of Don Severino and we 
were fetching water from the well to make tea. The night was cold and clear and as we 
gazed out at the nearby hills and the adobe houses of the comunidad Severino asked me 
if a village the same size as Vilaycayma in my country would have its own airport. I 
explained to him that this would be an absurdly costly investment even in the UK for a 
village of several hundred people but that it is possible it could have a small train 
station. Severino considered this for a moment and replied that, although they were still 
very undeveloped in Bolivia, with the process of change he hoped one day to bring 
these sorts of services to his home comunidad. 
Mayor Francisco would often claim that changes brought about through development 
and technology have changed the province such that it is impossible to ‘go back to the 
past’, stating that this was what Mallku Gregorio and other ayllu figures wanted. More 
generally, it was suggested that the ayllu leadership were opposed to the progress 
brought through el proceso de cambio. Moreover, while they were critical of local and 
national mega-projects, they did not offer concrete proposals or deliver their own 
alternatives. On a couple of occasions during meetings I attended of the ampliado 
general and Comité de Desarollo Municipal (CDM), Mallku Gregorio was, following 
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the union leaders, asked to report on the projects he had managed in the previous month 
and was unable to do so, precisely because the traditional authorities at the time did not 
have access to funds or the same relationship with the municipal government as the 
sindicato. This seemed like a deliberate attempt to publicly undermine Gregorio, but it 
served to underline the accusation against him of empty criticism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Picture of the new Casa Municipal 
When I asked Mallku Gregorio about these comments, he claimed the problem he and 
his Kuraj Tatas objected to was not the use of technology or with projects to improve 
people’s lives but simply with the way they were being delivered without proper 
consideration of people’s needs or the traditions of their communities. The projects were 
not just a misuse of resources but showed a complete misunderstanding of the concept 
of el vivir bien, which means to live in equilibrium with one’s neighbours and with the 
land. Gregorio added that the peasant union authorities were following an idea of 
development that was wasteful while simply reinforcing their power and that of the 
national government. He showed me a PowerPoint presentation he had made with help 
from his friend Piter Fuentes, an indigenous rights lawyer resident in Oruro, and Toribia 
Lero Quispe from the NGO Fundación Tierra. This featured schematic drawings 
showing the development they wanted to pursue that allowed for improvements in their 
lives but took into account their relationships with other people and the environment. 
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He maintained that for the MAS and the union to live well means nothing more than to 
‘have a full belly’, when what it really meant was to live in accordance with ‘who they 
really are’, referring to the past of their ancestors. Moreover, the reason they were 
unable to carry out projects that reflected their views was because the peasant union and 
municipal government controlled and monopolised sources of funding. 
One example of a relatively modest development project administered under Gregorio’s 
term as Mallku was the Proyecto de Papas Nativas or ‘native potatoes project’, that had 
been financed with money secured from the fondo indígena. The project was carried out 
in the comunidad of Vilaycayma and aimed to diversify the production of species of 
potatoes native to the altiplano and to use a method of companion planting of different 
species of native tuber to increase yields and minimise the loss of crops to gorgojo 
worms. This was an alternative to the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides which 
were generally opposed by the leaders of all the local social organisations because they 
are believed to sterilise the land. I attended the control social or official audit of the 
project in September 2015. A técnico from Cochabamba had arrived and sat next to 
Mallku Gregorio and some of the Kuraj Tatas in the sede sindical of Vilaycayma, while 
a number of the mainly elderly residents sat on benches or on the floor, the women 
dressed in their black embroidered almillas. Don Pancho, the larger-than-life hospital 
orderly and one of the supervisors of the project, had traveled from Cochabamba to be 
present. The técnico made inquiries as to where the money had been spent and a total 
was written on a flipchart in the corner of the room. During the public audit Mallku 
Gregorio was at pains to point out that the resources for the project, which included the 
seeds and hoes, were bought collectively and then managed and distributed by a 
committee rather than in the form of direct cash grants to families, as is sometimes the 
case. The project was designed to increase production for commercial sale while not 
prejudicing their food security and sovereignty and would recreate traditional practices. 
Individuals described how they had benefited from workshops where they discussed 
with individuals from the AGRUCO agrarian research institute the use of companion 
planting methods that had been used in the past but were becoming lost and had drawn 
on their own memories and ‘ancestral knowledge’. They had then purchased varieties of 
potato seeds and materials to initiate the project. 
Traditional authorities I spoke with during a recess in the meeting claimed the Proyecto 
de Papas Nativas to be an example of a project in line with their values as originarios, 
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both in the form of its administration and in its aim to re-introduce the way their 
ancestors had cultivated. Not only did it incorporate local understandings and values, its 
goal was to rediscover knowledge and practices that were in the process of being lost. 
Don Pancho participated enthusiastically in the audit and afterwards explained to me 
that while they had been able to produce more, this method meant they did not have to 
spend money in the future on agricultural inputs such as artificial fertilisers and 
pesticides. Don Enrique stated that as they were changing their ways and being 
influenced by urban living this explained both why their land was becoming less 
productive and that people were also suffering health problems which were uncommon 
in the past. As people were consuming processed food from outside and drinking things 
like Coca-Cola it meant they were becoming contaminated and no longer lived as long 
as they did in the time of his father. These sorts of projects meant they could repair the 
damage that was being done. These remarks were also echoed by Tata Sabino when I 
spoke with him in Oruro: 
‘Well before we sowed the earth very naturally. Now chemical fertilisers have appeared 
and it seems we are mistreating the land. The land has its hormones just like people and 
we are mistreating it, right? Now they are using inorganic fertilisers...they’ve learnt it, I 
don’t know where, over there in the Chapare. Before potatoes were not harvested until 
[the fiesta of] San Juan [June 23rd], because the longer it is in the earth, the sweeter it is. 
When we dug up those potatoes and made wathiya [earth baked potatoes], wow, it was 
delicious. But now worms appear and they become infested easily. And before the 
ch’uño lasted, it kept for years. But it doesn’t last the same way...In this way little by 
little we are contaminating everything. Before it is said that people would live longer 
than 80 but now we’re lucky to live 70 years. Perhaps from now on a good age to live 
will be no more than 50. Before we used only clay or earthen pots. Now everything is 
aluminium or plastic, so we are even contaminating ourselves...the weather is destroying 
itself and become tired. We are not looking after things properly as Bolivians. We are 
not dealing properly with plastic, nylon, with the waste that we generate. For this reason, 
many animals no longer exist. The toads here before in the countryside in these times of 
rain, so many would be crossing your path...things are no longer the same.’ (S) 
Tata Sabino’s reference to the weather becoming tired was of relevance to the fact that 
the year I was in Bolívar the seasonal rainfall had been delayed, a phenomenon that 
people commented had become increasingly frequent in recent years. The relatively 
fragile climate of the altiplano was clearly experiencing changes and the problems in 
Bolívar had meant that the municipal government had to provide emergency food 
supplies for individuals in a number of comunidades. In Sabino’s speech the notion of 
the past and the time of their ancestors as representing a superior ethical and social 
order is mixed with ideas of moral and physical pollution, as both modern practices and 
substances are regarded as contaminating; a representation that was repeated to me by 
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several individuals from Vilaycayma and by Mallku Gregorio. The way the land is 
treated, the way food is obtained, prepared and eaten all form part of the complex of 
social practices which maintain balance between people and the land. It is the past of the 
historic ayllu, understood to represent a more harmonious state of social relations 
between the land and the people, which informs the choices to be made in development 
programs. This contrasts markedly with the way in which sindicato leaders and the 
MAS alcaldía look to the future brought by el proceso de cambio, a term they interpret 
to mean a relatively conventional notion of development rather than decolonisation or 
cultural revindication. As will be described in the final section of this chapter, the 
contrast in how figures view history and their place within it underlies the differences 
expressed over the meaning of development.  
III. Development as an Ethical Discourse and Narratives of Struggle 
‘El vivir bien means that we must have everything within our grasp. It means we must 
have everything so as to live well. We must have, let’s say, if we have a programme of 
agricultural development, we have to be able to produce well, to have a good capital. To 
have the resources to live well through the programs that president Evo carries out.’ (S) 
         - Olker Nina, Provincial union leader of Bolívar 
‘El vivir bien, doesn’t mean to eat well but to live as we did before.’ (S) 
    - Sabino Veizaga, ex-Kuraj Mallku and founder of POKUY 
While development has become the site of a political struggle between the different 
forms of authority in the province over the resources of the municipal government and 
the orientation of its policies, their discourse reflects distinct ideas about their identity 
and the goals of their community. These differences have to do with the historical 
trajectory of the two sets of authorities, not least during the period of the last twenty 
years. In the 1990s the sindicato became the recognised community-level organisation 
for the LPP and the traditional authorities initiated the process of collectively titling the 
land as a TCO. Yet these two projects represent different aspirations: one to become part 
of the Bolivian nation and to gain representation through the state and the other to 
defend their land, autonomy and identity. Both emerge from the marginalised condition 
in which people in areas of the Bolivian highlands such as Bolívar have found 
themselves: denied power or participation within the colonial and post-colonial state 
while finding their autonomy and very existence threatened. However, one set of 
authorities responds to this condition through a project that tacitly embraces a version of 
progress, while the other is a project of revindication linked to historic struggles. This is 
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expressed in different evocations of history, in distinct readings of the collective 
historical narrative of their community and interpretations of the category of originario. 
When I spoke with former Mallku, Juan Apaza, about the political situation in Bolívar 
he told me it was absurd to accuse them of being politicians when they were only 
continuing the struggle that had been fought for centuries, ‘Bolívar tiene apenas treinta 
años como provincia pero los autoridades originarias estamos luchando desde hace 
quienientos años!’ (Bolívar is barely thirty years old as a province but the traditional 
authorities we have been fighting for five hundred years!). As was explained in chapter 
2, when a Kuraj Tata assumes the cargo he is referred to in meetings according to the 
mountain summit of his jap’iy, not by his given name. In a sense he is no longer himself 
but simply embodies the cargo. This ritualised use of language, along with clothing 
such as the poncho, which should not be taken off in public by the individual who has 
assumed the cargo, represent what is sacred and eternal: the permanence of the ayllu 
over time as a form of social and territorial organisation and as a system of authorities. 
The same may be said of the other symbols of authority, such as the tata santísimo or 
baston de mando. This is not only passed down through the generations and carried by 
the Kuraj Tata but is treated with reverence when placed in a ritual pyramid at the start 
of meetings and offered coca leaves and alcohol, as are the ancestral documents of the 
ayllu which are venerated in the ceremony of misa mast’ay. The past is ritually evoked 
and the traditional authority is not only identified with it but becomes part of it in the 
moment of ritual. It is for this reason that the notion that they are ‘politicians’ is treated 
with derision. The term ‘politician’ is identified with the clientelism of the recent past 
and is seen as fundamentally alien to the traditional authorities who are a natural and 
neutral part of the social order. 
In contemporary discourse the past is identified with the struggle of their ancestors and 
especially the past authorities to defend the ayllu as territory and as a symbolic referent 
against which the present may be judged. It is for this reason that only individuals with 
certain surnames, descended from the ancestros apoderados, may ascend to the highest 
cargos. It was repeated to me by numerous individuals, including Mallku Gregorio, 
Juan Apaza, Don Enrique and the former leader Don Celestino among others, that their 
struggle for centuries as an ayllu had always been led by the autoridades originarias 
against the q’ara runas or patrones. One evening, Gregorio explained to me the 
meaning of the clothing worn by the authorities. Each part means something, he told 
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me, from the chicote rope whip that meant the power to punish infringements of the 
usos y costumbres to the chalina scarf which was like the mountain peaks of the apus. 
When he spoke about the authorities of the past his eyes lit up with romantic 
enthusiasm. Although these ways were becoming lost, they were fighting to recover 
them, like his ancestors who had fought to preserve the ayllu. This was why he had 
accepted the cargo of Kuraj Mallku and would keep defending the usos y costumbres, 
even though there were many in the province ‘who were still asleep’ (‘que siguen 
dormidos’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Picture of Gregorio and Dominga offering coca to the tata santísimo 
This view of the past as a perfect social and ethical order and of the traditional 
authorities involved in a fight between the originarios and the q’ara runas is likely 
owed in part to the processes of the 1990s, such as the project of titling the TCO, their 
involvement with CONAMAQ and the broader undertaking of reconstituting the ayllu. 
It is not possible to determine the extent to which certain symbolic cultural elements 
referred to by the traditional authorities, including their clothing and rituals, are 
invented traditions. What seems more likely is that they have been reinterpreted in the 
light of the wider social and political changes of the last twenty years. There are clear 
similarities in their perspective with elements of Katarismo, and by extension the way 
certain ideas from it were recreated as a discourse about development by Aymara 
intellectuals. Nevertheless, it is a fact that individuals in Bolívar, as in many other parts 
of the Bolivian highlands, fought by legal and other means to preserve their lands and 
autonomy, an experience which involved an evolving struggle and negotiation with the 
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colonial and post-colonial state and the landlord class. In this regard, the discourse of 
the traditional authorities, along with their practices and symbols, which together evoke 
an idealised past and ancestral struggle, are an expression of the historical experience of 
their community and its common aspirations. This is no less true, however, of the 
peasant union. 
One of my informants, Severino Condori, as well as being union dirigente in 
Vilaycayma during my fieldwork had been involved in the political project that 
eventually became the MAS as well as serving one term as a national congressman 
between 2002 and 2005. He had been involved from the 1990s in the project of seeking 
political representation for the people of the comunidades in the municipal government 
and had been the first person from Vilaycayma to finish high school and attend 
university in Oruro. This was a source of great pride for him but had also been deeply 
traumatic because of the discrimination he faced from teachers and the sons of miners 
and the urban middle class. At the time I met him he had been living in the 
neighbourhood of Villa Pagador in Cochabamba for the last fifteen years, while 
regularly visiting his home community and acting as a local dirigente. When I asked 
him why he became involved as a union leader and continued participating in the 
politics of his home community he gave the following response: 
‘The principle that, let’s say, to incline myself to it is because of the people who have 
always been, that we’ve always been marginalised, right? We’ve been 
marginalised...from the city. That hurt me then because I couldn’t fight for the people for 
equality, to have at least, to run our own municipality…because before it was they who 
ran it. This has, the experience of the community, of the city has motivated me to 
involve myself in politics...that motivated me to carry on fighting in order to carry on, 
let’s say, helping the organisations and to not abandon my community.’ (S) 
Severino’s views exhibit greater similarity with class solidarity and he makes a strong 
distinction between the landlord class or patrones and ‘those from the city’ and the 
originarios from the countryside such as himself, who are united because of their 
economic and political exclusion by the dominant classes. For him, the purpose of 
political organisation is to end the many indignities suffered by the gente humilde and 
what he describes as ‘political serfdom’ (‘ponguaje politico’), a feat that was made 
possible but not achieved through the 1952 revolution: 
‘There was revolution. The originarios in ‘52 raised arms and threw out the patrones 
because there was revolution with the originarios against the patrones. So, they rose up 
with arms, with rifles. It lasted a year, two years that revolution and the originarios won, 
right?...and there wasn’t a leader from the originarios to assume the presidency. We 
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handed it over like a well-cooked dish, like a well-prepared dish to Victor Paz 
Estenssoro who was the son of a patrón. He was an oligarch, from the bourgeoisie...So 
at that time the sindicatos were born here. Where there had been hacienda land, land of 
the patrones. In that way, the federations became organised at the departmental level.’ 
(S) 
For Severino the national revolution failed to free the originarios because they lacked 
the technical expertise and organisational ability to take control of the government 
following the revolution. For him, the political project that at the local level led to the 
‘indigenous takeover’ of the Provincial government in 2004 and the election at the 
national level of an ‘indigenous president’ a year later represent a completion of the 
process started in 1952. For the ayllu figures I spoke with, the takeover of the 
municipality and the election of Evo Morales were seen as important steps towards the 
end of internal colonialism but not the ultimate goal of their struggle. This in large 
measure accounts for the ideological content of the split in the pacto de unidad at the 
level of the province, as both sides had previously been able to unite to end the 
clientelist politics that were prevalent in Bolívar province following the 1952 
revolution, but within different long-term narratives of struggle. Once they had achieved 
this common goal the differences between them had space to surface. 
For the sindicato, the revolution of 1952 and the agrarian reform were the defining 
moment in Bolivia which allowed the possibility for the nation’s rural majority to gain 
control of the state. This feat was not achieved at the time, they claim, because the 
peasantry had not developed the organisational strength to represent themselves and 
were therefore betrayed by the white ruling class who took control of the revolution in 
its interests. The ayllu tends to see the national revolution as less important in the much 
longer history of struggle for autonomy dating back to the Spanish colony. For this 
reason, they believe in the need to more radically transform the neo-colonial structures 
of the state and ‘rediscover who they are’. Each organisation therefore legitimises itself 
through reference to different readings of history. The sindicato plants its legitimacy in 
the national revolution and agrarian reform, while the traditional authorities do so 
through an idealised past. The traditional authorities emphasise the economic ethos of 
the ayllu, based on traditional forms of reciprocal exchange and communal work such as 
ayni, mink’a and choqu, which is partly why they place a great deal of importance on 
money not being involved as a form of reparation in the administration of justice. 
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Meanwhile, the sindicato emphasises the improvements delivered through the projects 
of Tata Evo and the ability of families to improve their material base and productivity. 
The sindicato leaders and local MAS politicians therefore enthusiastically embrace 
large projects as emblems of the emergence of their community from a state of political, 
economic and cultural marginalisation. Their evocation of history, with its emphasis on 
the 1952 revolution, results in a collective narrative that looks forward to the full 
realisation of the promises of social rights, equality and the inclusion of rural peoples 
within the national state and economy, that comfortably fits with the idea of linear 
progress and conventional notions of development. While placing great importance on 
their identity as originarios during the official openings of public works, the local 
sindicato and MAS figures do not emphasise their relationship to the past and to the 
land as a form of life and community. Rather, they evoke the terrible poverty and 
marginalisation that they, the gente humilde, have suffered until the current period of 
political and social transformation. This is why they view both large-scale projects and 
the limited but tangible material improvements in people’s lives as a result of increased 
government investment as a sign of their emergence from poverty and of their 
attainment of dignity. For the ayllu leaders, the defining moment in history is the 
colonisation, the long history of struggle following it and what they were as a people 
before it. Therefore, the fact that the traditional authorities view these developments 
more cynically is not simply because they do not benefit from them politically but 
because they do not attach the same symbolic importance to large public works and 
wish to use technology and investment in a way that is compatible with the usos y 
costumbres. 
As was discussed in chapter 5, the traditional authorities are concerned not merely with 
defending the tenancy of their land but defending the land as territory, meaning the 
totality of a system of relationships, rather than as a commodity or factor of production 
and as an entity they perceive as possessing historical continuity with their way of life 
prior to the Spanish colony. This is in contrast to many of the sindicato leaders and the 
MAS alcaldía, who support individual titling precisely because it means the land can be 
treated as a commodity. It is for this reason too that their view of development centres 
around the improvement in material well-being of individuals or families and that they 
conceive of what it means to be originario in terms that we would identify as being 
closer to class, i.e., economic condition, occupational category and social position. In 
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contrast, ayllu figures believe in orienting municipal policy and development projects in 
a way that is compatible with re-establishing the social and ethical order of their 
ancestors, as was the case with the modest native potatoes project in Vilaycayma. 
 Conclusion 
The issue of development is one that emerged repeatedly in public debates between the 
traditional authorities, the peasant union and MAS representatives of the municipal 
government during my fieldwork. Nonetheless, the very concept of development, 
understood to mean the possibility of planning the systematic material transformation of 
their community, is itself new to Bolívar province. It was only in the 1990s, following 
the implementation of the LPP that local social organisations became involved in using 
the resources of the municipal government and national agencies to fund infrastructure 
and development projects. The LPP was a reform intended to decentralise government 
and achieve the World Bank objective of ‘good governance’ and was arguably designed 
to provide a limited form of representation without challenging the status quo. Yet in 
Bolívar province it provided the gente humilde of the comunidades with a means of 
organising themselves against the prevailing forms of clientelism that had kept them 
excluded from political power. This process helped legitimise both the sindicato and 
ayllu authorities and united them in opposition to the white-mestizo political hegemony, 
leading to control of the local government by people from the comunidades. At the 
same time, it provided a site of political and ideological contention over the control of 
resources for development and the right to define the meaning of this process for their 
community. It was during the post-neoliberal period that the tensions between the 
different local authorities put into place by these changes erupted into open conflict. 
This is partly to do with the worsening of relations due to the national breakdown of the 
Pacto de Unidad, but also because of the way national development policy has created a 
mutually supportive relationship at the local level between the sindicato, local MAS 
politicians and the national government. This has been described as a return to the 
clientelism of the past, with the key difference that the chief political actors are no 
longer outsiders and mestizo townsfolk but individuals from the comunidades who 
publicly profess their identity as originarios.  
This thesis has argued that the rift between the ayllu and sindicato represents not only a 
struggle for power but an ethical discourse in a sense similar to that used by the 
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philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1991). In the case of ‘ethical-political’ discourse (Ibid.) 
this is concerned with the collective identity and narrative of a community. While this 
has been expressed in a dispute over development and the authentic meaning of el vivir 
bien, it ultimately relates to the different evocations of their history and collective 
struggle. As Alasdair Macintyre has observed, the fact that ‘man is a storytelling animal’ 
(1981, p.216) means that the question of what one is to do can only we answered in 
terms of the stories one finds oneself part of. Human action directed towards a range of 
possible alternatives is only intelligible insofar as there exists a narrative understanding 
which links the present to both the past and the future (Ibid.). This is also true at the 
social level, as the stories we tell will inevitably shape the common goals or ends of the 
communities we belong to. The question of who we are and where we are going must be 
explained in terms of where we are coming from. When development, broadly 
understood as the possibility of planning the material transformation of their 
community, emerged as a concept through the LPP, this presented the different local 
authorities with a choice over what ends to pursue and the meaning of the process. It 
therefore became an ineluctable site of struggle, not only over power, but more 
fundamentally, over the question of who they really are.  
Meanwhile, similar ideological differences are present in national divisions over 
development policy and the meaning of el vivir bien; the national government favours 
‘progressive extractivism’ linked to an inclusive notion of indigeneity while other 
elements of the MAS and Pacto de Unidad search for an alternative to conventional 
notions of development in the communitarian forms of the ayllu and the ethical order of 
the past. While the sindicato looks forward to the full realisation of political and social 
rights and material well-being promised by the 1952 revolution, many of the ayllu 
leaders hope to recreate the social and ethical order of their ancestors. While the union 
leaders and local politicians, echoing the ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ of the national MAS 
party (Schavelzon, 2014), speak of being originario in terms more redolent of class, 
various traditional authorities emphasise the primordial connection to their land as 
territory. For this reason, union leaders and local MAS politicians express a notion of 
development and use the term el vivir bien in a similar fashion to the national 
government. The traditional authorities attempt to challenge this at the same time that 
their power and legitimacy is undermined by the mutually supportive relationship 
between the peasant union and the MAS.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion: The New Bolivia and the Politics of Identity 
When Evo Morales came to power in 2006, he was greeted with enthusiasm both locally 
and internationally and identified as part of the more radical end of the ‘pink tide’ 
democratically elected leftist governments which had emerged to challenge the 
prevailing neoliberal hegemony. Academics, such as the anthropologist and 
development scholar, Arturo Escobar, had viewed the appearance of new left 
governments brought to power by popular social movements as allowing for the 
potential construction of alternatives to capitalism and western modernity (Acosta, 
2017; Gudynas, 2011; Escobar, 2010). Escobar, writing in 2010, identified the 
similarities between the governments of Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia and suggested 
the region was at a ‘crossroads’ in terms of the possible futures that would emerge 
(Escobar, 2010). Yet in the following eight years the pink tide seems to have retreated, 
as parties of the right have taken power in Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil and the 
‘Bolívarian revolution’ in Venezuela has descended into chaos and tragedy. 
Moreover, a number of commentators have questioned the extent to which the pink tide 
genuinely represented a decisive turn away from neoliberalism (Kohl and Farthing, 
2014; Merino, 2011; Postero, 2013; Fernandes, 2013). One area of contradiction 
between rhetoric and reality concerns the fact that there has been limited structural 
change, particularly to the economy, where extractivism, path dependency and foreign 
ownership have not been seriously challenged (Leiva, 2008; Webber, 2011). 
Governments such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, while mirroring much of the 
symbolism of the older Latin American left, remain committed to a project of reform 
centred primarily around constitutional and legal-institutional changes. As Nancy 
Postero (2016) has observed, a common feature of these governments is a radical 
discourse that speaks of change or revolution, of the transformation of their societies 
through bringing an end to historic inequalities which are the sequelae of the colonial 
and post-colonial state. Yet this is attempted through an enterprise that is essentially 
about the construction of a new state and a more inclusive form of citizenship, which 
may include notions of positive social rights and incorporate ideas or language from 
popular social movements (Ibid.). Accounting for the multiple complex reasons which 
may explain the development of this new left reformism at the level of the region is 
beyond the purview of this thesis, which has limited itself to exploring the 
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consequences of reforms on a local political conflict within a small community and the 
points of contention and transformations provoked by it. However, they likely include 
the re-emergence of left-wing and popular social forces into the political domain 
following the return to democracy of countries throughout the region, which in the 
process underwent a transformation from the more Marxist ‘old left’, becoming 
influenced particularly by human rights discourse and developing a greater respect for 
liberal democracy and the state as a vehicle for change. 
In the case of Bolivia, the new state established in the 2009 constitution, privileges an 
‘indigenous’ popular subject, constructed so as to include diverse social constituencies, 
and creates forms of participation and interaction with government agencies and the 
law. This has seen the increased penetration of the state into communities which had 
previously maintained a more indirect relationship with it. This presence is witnessed 
not only through interaction with local government, national agencies and legal reforms 
but in the physical construction of buildings and infrastructure projects, such as the 
gleaming four-storey casa municipal in the town of Bolívar. The increased power and 
importance of the state and the promotion of a model of mass citizenship privileges 
some groups and communities while excluding others (Canessa, 2012, 2014; Postero, 
2016). In the case of Bolívar province certain elements within an indigenous community 
have benefited over others from the state-building project of the national government 
and support it politically and ideologically, while various aspects of the new state and 
instances of interaction with it have contributed to internal conflict. 
The historical interaction between the colonial and post-colonial state and the 
inhabitants of the area which today comprises Bolívar province has helped form a sense 
of identity linked to a specific territory and shaped the institutions through which this 
territory governs itself and represents itself to wider society. As was explained in 
chapter 3, the relationship between communities like Bolívar and the state has gone 
through distinct stages which have helped define the strategies available to persons for 
negotiating autonomy and improvements in their lives and their internal forms of 
governance. The history of the last twenty years in particular explains both why Bolívar 
today is distinguished by a hybrid form of local government with three sets of 
overlapping authority and how the current ‘post-neoliberal’ period has contributed to the 
intensification of conflict between them. 
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Prior to the early 1990s, both the peasant union and traditional authorities were 
fragmented and lacking in organisational strength. The reforms of this period 
represented a fundamental reorganisation of the relationship between rural peoples and 
the state, comparable to the Toledo reforms or the agrarian reform following the 
national revolution. While the effect of these has varied from place to place, in Bolívar 
they served to revitalise and legitimate the traditional and union authorities by providing 
them with distinct but complementary projects: on the one hand of seeking 
representation from the state and material improvements in their lives through the 
Popular Participation Law or LPP and on the other of defending their historic territory, 
autonomy and usos y costumbres by titling their collective lands as a TCO through the 
INRA law. The implementation of the LPP and its effects were outlined in detail in 
chapter 7 and the INRA law in chapter 5. In both cases, these reforms, as part of what 
has been described as ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ (Hale, 2002; Postero, 2006), had 
relatively modest aims and were arguably intended to grant limited cultural rights while 
decentralising government and allowing for the limited participation of local people in 
administering municipal budgets. However, they developed into more radical and 
transformative undertakings, leading to the electoral project of seizing control of the 
municipal government in the indigenous takeover of 2004 and the more general 
revindication of their cultural identity as originarios.  
The more radical understandings which became attached to these processes developed 
principally for two reasons. Firstly, those involved became linked to wider ideological 
currents and discourses, in part through their increased interaction with larger parent 
organisations or organizaciones matrices: in the case of the peasant union, the CSTUCB 
and the evolving project which became the MAS and in the case of the ayllu authorities 
with CONAMAQ. Secondly, involvement in these struggles acted as a formative and 
consciousness-raising experience which helped shape the perspectives held by 
prominent figures within the different sets of authority today. While the peasant union 
has always functioned as a civil society organisation to represent rural communities, in 
Bolívar in the early 1990s it was associated with the clientelist politics of the post-1952 
corporatist period and lacked a distinct role, given the presence of traditional authorities 
such as jilanku. Furthermore, the traditional authorities, while involved in administering 
various social practices centred around the land and agricultural work, had become 
fragmented and the higher levels of the ayllu were hardly recognised. The processes of 
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the 1990s and early 2000s not only strengthened both sets of organisations but provided 
an evolving understanding of their roles. In the words of Tata Sabino Veizaga, this 
served to ‘wake him up to who he really was’ and for Don Severino Condori it 
represented the fulfillment of the goals of unionism, through not only gaining control of 
their local government and resources but achieving dignity for originarios from the 
comunidades like himself. 
At the time of my fieldwork, the peasant union authorities and the local MAS 
councillors, several of whom had served as union dirigentes, were more concerned with 
the aims of inclusion and representation within the Bolivian state alongside access to 
positive social rights and material improvements to people’s lives. The traditional 
authorities, on the other hand, tended to emphasise the defence of their territory and the 
ways of life linked to it. These are all things for which people from communities like 
Bolívar province have fought for during many years but which at times may conflict 
with each other. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) talks about different ideological 
tendencies within the movement for highland indigenous revindication that came to be 
known as Katarismo, distinguishing between the project for inclusion and rights of the 
1952 revolution and the longer struggle for autonomy and territorial control of the ayllu 
against the landlord class and colonial state. While the 1952 revolution is certainly a 
point of reference in the discourse between the different authorities of Bolívar province, 
it was the reforms of the 1990s which allowed them to acquire different roles and 
pursue projects that truly embody these dual aspirations: on the one hand of becoming 
part of the Bolivian nation and gaining representation through the state and on the other 
of defending one’s territory, autonomy and identity. 
With the 2004 election of MAS and POKUY candidates to the local municipal 
government, all the forms of authority were effectively united into a single 
governmental structure. This hybrid system, in which the ayllu authorities, union and 
municipal government function together is understood to be complementary and 
referred to in terms of la parte orgánica. Furthermore, much of the organisational form 
and protocols of the different local organisations are shared, owing to the fact that 
people and ideas move between them, meaning also that notions of leadership, public 
service and democracy are shared between individuals occupying cargos in the peasant 
union and as MAS politicians or traditional authorities. Seen in the way, each form of 
authority gives institutional expression to the different dimensions of the common 
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aspirations of their community. Yet while the peasant union and ayllu, may be viewed as 
hybrid, they exist in a state of complementary tension. The notion of complementary 
tension I am employing follows the logic of the Aymara concept of ch’ixi, described by 
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui: the quality of juxtaposing traits which may seem to be in 
opposition but can be held together as one without ever resolving into each other 
(Cusicanqui, 2010b). This notion accounts for the nature of much of the cultural 
syncretism of Bolivia that has resulted from centuries of colonisation and the common 
experience of highland peoples, who are used to living with different and seemingly 
contradictory meanings, customs and forms of life; negotiating the collectivism of rural 
communities and mines and markets or the teachings of the church and the rituals of the 
ayllu. The case of the different forms of local authority in Bolívar province is but one 
example of how individuals are able to combine seemingly opposing ideas and 
aspirations, without assimilating one into the other. 
Nevertheless, there are moments when opposing traits can no longer be held together. 
The aspiration to defend one’s land as territory and the aspiration to improve material 
conditions and gain inclusion and power within the wider state and society can and do 
conflict with each other and so do their institutionalised expressions. It is this which 
explains the fact that, although the province is small and that individuals occupying the 
roles of dirigente and autoridad originaria are all originarios from the same places and 
families, they express ideological differences and clash with each other. It has been the 
reforms of the national MAS government and interaction with the new Bolivian state 
that has destabilised this hybrid system of government and the complementary tension 
in which it was held together. As was described in chapter 3, the notion of refounding 
the Bolivian state to include those marginalised by centuries of colonisation has created 
a new ‘citizenship regime’ based around the notion of a popular indigenous subject, 
whose definition is left ambiguous. Meanwhile, the implementation of new laws and 
institutions designed to give autonomy to rural communities, privilege indigenous 
custom and effect the decentralisation of judicial power have generated instances of 
interaction with the state that have had the effect in Bolívar of obliging the different 
authorities to define their customs, values and identity. As a consequence, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to hold together the perspectives of those involved in the peasant 
union and the traditional authorities. At the same time, the national government has 
increasingly begun to promote a particular notion of a popular indigenous subject that 
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justifies its expansion of the power of the central state and extractive industry to fund 
social programs and infrastructure development. While the peasant union and local 
MAS municipal government figures broadly support the ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ 
promoted by the national government and do not publicly express opposition to its 
centralisation of authority, the traditional authorities of the province strongly object to 
this direction of national policy. This has been the case especially since the 2011 
protests against the construction of the TIPNIS highway, in which figures like Tata 
Sabino and Juan Apaza were involved. 
In many ways, the project of reform of the national MAS government has forced the 
local authorities of Bolívar province to choose one understanding of what it means to 
belong to their community. This has compelled them to articulate this identity and much 
of the common symbolic elements of their shared social reality. I describe this process 
as an ethical discourse: as a particular type of reflexive communication in which the 
meanings of utterances are made salient and contested (Habermas, 1991). Moreover, 
what Habermas terms ‘ethical-political discourse’ is fundamentally about making a 
claim to authenticity: about determining what values are germane to the particular 
tradition of a sociocultural group, its collective identity and common ends (Ibid.). For 
this reason, much of what is contested concerns what constitutes the collective ‘we’ that 
defines group identity, which as an object of discourse I refer to as the ‘ethical-political 
subject’. 
It is the fact that this contestation takes place in the context of a community seeking to 
establish how it should govern itself by determining its collective identity, shared goals 
and values which distinguishes it as a political phenomenon. This approach represents 
an original contribution to theory in political anthropology. In much of political 
anthropology from the mid-twentieth century onwards, politics and political conflict 
have been understood in terms of a struggle for power between groups (Gledhill, 2000) 
or the analysis of domination and resistance and the discrete operation of power through 
ideology, discourse and other processes (Scott, 1990; Ong, 1987). Yet the term politics 
in the writings of classical political philosophy refers to the institutions and practices 
through which a community governs itself (Aristotle, 2000; Cicero, 2009). If politics 
can refer to self-government, political conflict may also be understood as an attempt on 
the part of groups and persons to shape their community and offer different perspectives 
of the common good and their shared identity. This thesis has examined how the 
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political conflict which took place in Bolívar province during my fieldwork was centred 
around making salient and contesting the norms, values and elements of the collective 
identity of a community which determine its goals and actions. These include the 
institutions and forms of leadership through which they govern themselves (Chapter 4), 
what it means to be an authentic member of their community and how this is related to a 
complex of social practices centred around the land they inhabit and their relationship to 
it (Chapter 5), the administration of justice (Chapter 6) and their common narrative and 
shared goals (Chapter 7).  
Nevertheless, understanding how groups and actors contest elements of their social 
morality and analysing conflict in terms of distinct moral understandings can illuminate 
political processes more widely and relates to various bodies of scholarship within and 
beyond anthropology. For example, anthropologists working in Britain have explored 
the changes in the forms of identity available to people to organise and seek 
representation and the breakdown of the complex of social practices which formerly 
constituted ideas of personhood and community membership among the industrial 
working class (Evans, 2012; 2017; Koch, 2016). This has led to a shift towards 
expressing collective identity in terms of ethnicity and cultural nationalism rather than 
class, and local and national politics has in turn become increasingly defined by the 
multiple contestation of British identity and values (Evans, 2012; Balthazar, 2017; 
Standing, 2012). Meanwhile, a growing body of research in social psychology and the 
cognitive sciences has sought to understand contemporary political conflict in terms of 
disagreement over morality and collective identity (Greene, 2012; Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 
2010). This scholarship has primarily addressed the divided nature of national politics in 
the United States, through exploring how political disagreements are reflective of 
different moral outlooks which emphasise distinct foundational values (Haidt, 2012; 
Greene, 2013) or collective symbolic referents that express contrasting notions of moral 
personhood, justice and authority (Lakoff, 2010). 
While this psychological research offers valuable analysis, it lacks the insights of thick 
description, of a detailed account of the cultural meanings which guide action and 
imbue it with significance, observed in situ by an embedded researcher. It also fails to 
detail the social factors which explain why differences in ethical outlook have emerged 
and become heightened at the present. This thesis has provided just such an account of 
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ethical-political contestation, through the ethnographic study of the political spaces of 
one community at a moment in time. Yet ethical-political discourse, the process of a 
community determining which values are germane to its traditions, its collective 
identity and common ends, is likely a universal feature of politics. Human communities, 
regardless of the nature of their political institutions, cooperate on the basis of a social 
morality which comprises much of the symbolic meanings of a culture (Tomasello, 
2016). What I describe as ethical-political discourse may often take place in moments of 
rupture, when social change leads to a collective re-evaluation of these symbolic 
meanings and when persons struggle to articulate their own interpretations of them. 
This thesis has analysed how disputes which took place during my fieldwork between 
2015 and 2016 reflect these different understandings of what it means to belong to the 
community of Bolívar or Ayllu Kirkiawi and how they are connected to changes which 
have taken place since the election of Evo Morales in 2005. Chapter 4 detailed the 
consequences of the possibility of converting to an autonomous indigenous community 
or AIOC under the 2009 constitution. The issue of indigenous autonomy has divided 
social movements at the national level and the ambivalence of the MAS government 
over its meaning and implementation reveal something of the internal contradictions of 
‘the process of change’. Meanwhile, in Bolívar province it has led to intra-community 
conflict, revealing the problematic ambiguity of how the law defines the competencies 
of local authorities within a majority indigenous community, alongside what constitutes 
their traditional customs, norms and procedures. The history of the province, the nature 
of its local government and collective titling as a TCO mean that the form in which 
conversion to an AIOC may take place became an object of contention between the 
different authorities. However, this dispute quickly transposed into a discussion over 
what constitutes authentic leadership, governance and public service. Nonetheless, these 
debates reveal the extent to which the different authorities are hybridised and share 
certain concepts, protocols and values. What divides them is not so much the nature of 
leadership assumed by jilankus and Kuraj Tatas or dirigentes, but their expression of the 
common and at times conflicting aspirations of their community. 
This difference has been consistently expressed in the long-standing debate over 
whether the land in Bolívar should be collectively or individually titled, dealt with in 
chapter 5. This chapter explained the nature of the land tenancy system in the 
comunidades of the province and how this is linked to traditional forms of agrarian 
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economic activity, understood to be part of the usos y costumbres that are maintained 
and defended by the traditional authorities. The presence of a minor legal functionary 
within a meeting of the ampliado general as part of an effort by the Bolivian state to 
decentralise judicial power led to the airing of this long-standing quarrel. The reasons 
given for defending or revoking the collective titling of their lands ultimately reflect 
different views of what it means to belong to their community: understood as being 
imbricated within a complex of social practices that are organised around the land and 
connect individuals with it, or as a collection of individuals and their families, united by 
a common condition of poverty and marginalisation, who seek ways of improving their 
material circumstances and inclusion within wider society. The comments of some 
informants suggest that the growth in double residence is a factor in the desire of certain 
individuals to seek individual title for their lands. Various aspects of the experiences of 
rural-urban migrants in peri-urban Bolivia tend to motivate them to not only change the 
way they view their lands and aspirations but how they understand and practice 
citizenship. This phenomenon is not only reflected in some of the discourse of the 
peasant union but directly influences the perspectives of its leaders. 
Chapter 6 examined how a conflict over the inheritance of lands in a comunidad 
converted into an altercation between the authorities of the province over its resolution. 
This revealed differences in understandings of justice and its administration (for 
example, whether this is linked to the complex of social practices of the land as 
territory, such as cyclical rotation of ayonoqa plots) as well as interpretation of the 
constitution. The vacillation in the constitution between an inclusive and exclusive 
definition of indigeneity and over who counts as the authorities of an indigenous 
community provided the discursive space in which the dispute took place. Viewing 
indigeneity as exclusive, linked to a specific territory, customs and notions of 
ancestrality or as inclusive, reflective of the ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ of national MAS 
discourse, indicates to a certain extent the differences in how union and traditional 
authorities in Bolívar understand what it means to be originario.  
Finally, chapter 7 considered how development has provided space for contention as it 
materialised as a concept within Bolívar. This took place because of the way the LPP 
made it possible for people in the comunidades to imagine the material transformation 
of their community through their involvement in administering municipal funds. In the 
current period, the direction of national development has divided the MAS and social 
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movements, an issue which has entered public debates in Bolívar. Meanwhile, the fact 
that the government speaks of development in terms of concepts such as el vivir bien, 
presumed to offer an alternative to Western development based on the worldview of 
indigenous peoples, has meant that such terms and the interpretation of their meanings 
have also entered local political discourse. Yet much of the substance of the allegations 
made by local ayllu leaders concerning the actions of the national MAS government and 
the local municipal authorities and peasant union are in reality to do with the perceived 
re-emergence of forms of clientelism and prebendalism against which they had 
previously fought. It is the mutually supportive relationship between the peasant union, 
local MAS figures and the central government that has motivated these accusations and 
brought the issue of development and its meanings to the fore. The differences 
expressed by local authorities over the direction and meaning of development ultimately 
rest on different evocations of history and representations of the collective narrative of 
struggle in which they locate their community and identity as social leaders. As Alasdair 
Macintyre has observed, the nature of human beings as animals who structure their lives 
and selves around stories means that action directed towards possible futures is only 
meaningful in terms of a narrative understanding which links the present to the past and 
the future (Macintyre, 1981, 1988). It is for this reason that the concept and practice of 
development, by presenting the different local authorities with a choice over what ends 
to pursue, became an ineluctable site of struggle, not only over power, but more 
fundamentally over who they really are. While the traditional authorities make reference 
to the idealised social and ethical order of their ancestors and the fight to defend their 
land as territory, the union look to the completion of the struggle to free the originarios 
from poverty, exclusion and political serfdom. 
In all these disputes the term originario has been used by various figures to denote the 
ethical-political subject, the collective ‘we’ that defines group identity and underlies 
their disagreements. The fact that the word originario is a multivocal term is precisely 
what allows for its use in this way. While in national discourse it is often used to mean 
something akin to indigenous, it can also refer to a category of ayllu membership or 
simply connote one who is the original inhabitant of a place, as well as the ordinary 
people of the comunidades who have been denied power and dignity, in this sense used 
almost interchangeably with the term gente humilde or ‘humble folk’. Depending on the 
emphasis placed on these different meanings, it can stand for a class of individuals from 
230 
 
 
the countryside united by their exclusion and poverty or for the authentic heirs to a 
historic pre-colonial polity.  
What it means to be originario for a number of the traditional authorities I spoke with is 
in reference to a past that is immanent in the present. This past is evoked and made real 
in moments of ritual, such as the placing of the tata santísimo together to be offered 
ritual libation and coca or in the veneration of the soqta achichilas and ancestral 
documents in the ceremony of misa mast’ay. For them, their identity as originarios is 
inseparable from the complex of social practices that mediate relationships between 
individuals and the land they inhabit and the living past which imbues this with 
significance. ‘To understand who they really are’ and ‘to be originarios’ is in reference 
to the historic ayllu and the struggles of their ancestors. Meanwhile, the rhetorical claim 
on the part of local peasant union and MAS figures that ‘we are all originarios’ is more 
than simply an affirmation of their common origins. Rather, it is the endorsement of a 
view of their identity which echoes the substance and rhetoric of the ecumenical 
indigeneity of the national MAS party. This is a broader and more inclusive 
understanding in which individuals are united by their humble rural origins as a 
marginalised group. What makes someone an originario is not their connection with the 
land and its past but simply the fact that they were born in one of the comunidades, 
including if they have left for the city at an early age and do not practice agricultural 
work. Displaying pride in one’s origins through the diacritical markers of indigenous 
ethnic identity shows the progress made by originarios and their solidarity with their 
fellows. Those from humble origins who have been denied dignity and full inclusion 
within the state, educational system and wider culture are now in power and thanks to 
the process of change will see the benefits of development and opportunity for 
themselves and their children. 
These different perspectives do not result from the objective characteristics of their 
community but from how the community chooses to view itself depending on what it 
aspires to be. These aspirations have emerged from separate attempts to organise 
themselves to address their condition of poverty and marginalisation and position of 
cultural and political subordination by a wider state and society which has successively 
threatened their autonomy and existence. This was given full expression through the 
manner in which the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s provided distinct but 
complementary political projects and roles to the peasant union and traditional 
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authorities. Yet while the peasant union has sought the possibility of better lives and 
inclusion within the state and nation and the traditional authorities the preservation of 
their territory and with it the integrity of custom, these two dimensions of the common 
aspirations of their community were held together in balance. It has been the emergence 
of the MAS government and the effects of its state-building project that have 
contributed to the conflict witnessed at the time of my fieldwork. Despite aiming to 
create a ‘plurinational state’ that respects the diversity and autonomy of Bolivian ethnic 
groups and seeks the decolonisation of government and society, this remains essentially 
a project of liberal state-building which attempts to construct a nation around a unifying 
concept of citizenship, while increasing the bureaucratic power and presence of the state 
(Postero, 2016). In seeking the inclusion of previously marginalised peoples, the 
Bolivian government not only excludes certain constituencies (Canessa, 2012, 2014; 
Postero, 2016) but also obliges groups to make their identities legible to it, a 
development which this thesis has demonstrated can have the consequence of 
unbalancing one of the characteristic features of highland indigenous societies: that of 
holding together seemingly contradictory ideas and aspirations. 
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List of key informants 
 
 
Mallku Gregorio: Gregorio was the Kuraj Mallku of Ayllu Kirkiawi during the time of 
my fieldwork and lived in a house built on the edge of the village of Bolívar where I 
stayed for extended periods with his wife Dominga and their three children. I 
accompanied him and others, including his friend Javier, to meetings in Sucre, 
Cochabamba and La Paz. He taught me how to play the charango guitar. 
 
Tata Sabino Veizaga: A former ayllu leader and full-time functionary of the COAMAC 
regional ayllu federation. Sabino was also one of the founders of Ayllu Kirkiawi’s 
political instrument, POKUY. Although resident in the city of Oruro he was often 
present in meetings of the traditional authorities, NGOs and the ampliado general.  
 
Tata Juan Apaza: A native of Vilaycayma and former ayllu leader resident in Oruro 
who also attended all meetings of the traditional authorities. Like Tata Sabino he had 
also helped found POKUY and had been very involved in the process of titling the 
TCO. 
 
Tata Apolonio Guitierrez: The Kuraj Tata of Eximo jap’iy during my fieldwork, who 
lived in the town of Bolívar. 
 
Alcalde Francisco: The Mayor of Bolívar was from Tanqaleque comunidad but had 
moved to Oruro while relatively young to study. An agronomic engineer, he had worked 
prior to his election as Mayor as a técnico in the municipal government. 
 
Olker Nina: The provincial peasant union leader or Tata Provincial.  
 
Don Justiniano Cunurana: A former provincial union leader and elected councillor 
who lived in Cochabamba at the time of my fieldwork. He had been a key figure in 
organising the peasant union during the LPP process. He was also a member of the 
Baptist Union church. 
 
Vincente Condori: A local MAS council leader and former provincial union leader. 
 
Severina Wayatola: A departmental union leader who was often present in meetings of 
the ampliado general. 
 
Don Preksy: The owner of the shop in the central square of the town of Bolívar. 
 
Don Severino: Former MAS congressman who lived in Cochabamba but served as the 
local union dirigente in his native comunidad of Vilaycayma. I would stay with him in 
his house in Vilaycayma and we met many times in Bolívar and Cochabamba. 
 
Tata Maximo: The jilanku in Vilaycayma during my fieldwork. 
 
Don Enrique Tola: A septuagenarian candidate for POKUY who lived with his wife in 
Vilaycayma, while his sons lived in the neighbourhood of Copacabana where they ran a 
printing business. 
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Don Pancho: A hospital orderly who worked in Cochabamba and lived near Yuraq 
Rumi. He was a native of Vilaycayma and organised communal work and attended 
many political meetings. A larger-than-life character full of stories and dreams, he had 
worked for many years as an artisanal gold miner in various parts of Bolivia. While an 
outspoken critic of the peasant union and the MAS party, he and Don Severino were 
childhood friends. 
 
Don Victor Ari: The local pastor of the Baptist Union congregation in Yuraq Rumi who 
also occasionally served as pastor in his home comunidad of Vilaycayma when he 
would visit. 
 
Don Fermin: A member of the Baptist union congregation. Originally from Palca 
comunidad in Bolívar while his wife was from Vilaycayma. 
 
Don Francisco: The president of the OTB of Copacabana who spoke with me and 
allowed me to attend meetings. 
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